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Purpose - This paper shows an unexplored area related to involuntary delisting. Specifically, this research investigates the effect of target firm...
Ephraim Kwashie Thompson; Chang-Ki Kim. The Effect of Information Asymmetry on the Method of Payment and Post-M&A Involuntary Delisting. The Institute of Management and Economy Research 2020, 11, 1 -20.
AMA StyleEphraim Kwashie Thompson, Chang-Ki Kim. The Effect of Information Asymmetry on the Method of Payment and Post-M&A Involuntary Delisting. The Institute of Management and Economy Research. 2020; 11 (3):1-20.
Chicago/Turabian StyleEphraim Kwashie Thompson; Chang-Ki Kim. 2020. "The Effect of Information Asymmetry on the Method of Payment and Post-M&A Involuntary Delisting." The Institute of Management and Economy Research 11, no. 3: 1-20.
Firm values change substantially between deal announcement and closing, risking renegotiation or termination. For deals that eventually close, does waiting longer to close benefit the acquirer post-M&A? We investigate whether the time that elapses until deal completion is an indicator of post-M&A performance and failure. We find that deals taking an optimum time to implement perform better, supporting the due diligence hypothesis, while taking too long to close is an indication of poor post-M&A performance and subsequent failure, supporting the overdue hypothesis.
Ephraim Kwashie Thompson; Changki Kim. Post-M&A Performance and Failure: Implications of Time until Deal Completion. Sustainability 2020, 12, 2999 .
AMA StyleEphraim Kwashie Thompson, Changki Kim. Post-M&A Performance and Failure: Implications of Time until Deal Completion. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (7):2999.
Chicago/Turabian StyleEphraim Kwashie Thompson; Changki Kim. 2020. "Post-M&A Performance and Failure: Implications of Time until Deal Completion." Sustainability 12, no. 7: 2999.