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A global goal to limit dangerous climate change has been agreed through the 2015 Paris Accords. The scientific case for action has been accepted by nearly all governments, at national and local or state level. Yet in all legislatures, there is a gap between the stated climate ambitions and the implementation of the measures necessary to achieve them. This paper examines this gap by analysing the experience of the following three UK cities: Belfast, Edinburgh, and Leeds. Researchers worked with city officials and elected representatives, using interviews and deliberative workshops to develop their shared understandings. The study finds that local actors employ different strategies to respond to the stated climate emergency, based on their innate understanding, or ‘phronetic knowledge’, of what works. It concludes that rapid climate action depends not just on the structures and mechanisms of governance, but at a deeper level, the assumptions, motivations and applied knowledge of decision-makers.
Andy Yuille; David Tyfield; Rebecca Willis. Implementing Rapid Climate Action: Learning from the ‘Practical Wisdom’ of Local Decision-Makers. Sustainability 2021, 13, 5687 .
AMA StyleAndy Yuille, David Tyfield, Rebecca Willis. Implementing Rapid Climate Action: Learning from the ‘Practical Wisdom’ of Local Decision-Makers. Sustainability. 2021; 13 (10):5687.
Chicago/Turabian StyleAndy Yuille; David Tyfield; Rebecca Willis. 2021. "Implementing Rapid Climate Action: Learning from the ‘Practical Wisdom’ of Local Decision-Makers." Sustainability 13, no. 10: 5687.
Following the release of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 1.5 °C Special Report in October 2018, there has been a surge in public concern about climate change and demands for greater government action. We analyse the discourse of Members of Parliament (MPs) on climate change on Twitter to examine the extent to which these recent public climate-related events have influenced political agenda-setting. We argue that these events have had two, linked, effects: increased political discourse on climate change, and an increasing use of ‘urgent’ climate language. However, the language style used between political parties differs. Additionally, while the youth strikes and Greta Thunberg, who initiated these strikes, appear to have the greatest influence on MPs’ discourse, the overall relative impact is low, with responses predominately from left- and centrist-political parties. This indicates a clear difference between parties. However, Twitter may not be a suitable platform for investigating Conservative discourse. Further work to explore agenda-setting on Conservative policymaking is required.
Rhian Ebrey; Stephen Hall; Rebecca Willis. Is Twitter Indicating a Change in MP’s Views on Climate Change? Sustainability 2020, 12, 10334 .
AMA StyleRhian Ebrey, Stephen Hall, Rebecca Willis. Is Twitter Indicating a Change in MP’s Views on Climate Change? Sustainability. 2020; 12 (24):10334.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRhian Ebrey; Stephen Hall; Rebecca Willis. 2020. "Is Twitter Indicating a Change in MP’s Views on Climate Change?" Sustainability 12, no. 24: 10334.
The COVID-19 imposed lockdown has led to a number of temporary environmental side effects (reduced global emissions, cleaner air, less noise), that the climate community has aspired to achieve over a number of decades. However, these benefits have been achieved at a massive cost to welfare and the economy. This commentary draws lessons from the COVID-19 crisis for climate change. It discusses whether there are more sustainable ways of achieving these benefits, as part of a more desirable, low carbon resilient future, in a more planned, inclusive and less disruptive way. In order to achieve this, we argue for a clearer social contract between citizens and the state. We discuss how COVID-19 has demonstrated that behaviours can change abruptly, that these changes come at a cost, that we need a ‘social mandate’ to ensure these changes remain in the long-term, and that science plays an important role in informing this process. We suggest that deliberative engagement mechanisms, such as citizens’ assemblies and juries, could be a powerful way to build a social mandate for climate action post-COVID-19. This would enable behaviour changes to become more accepted, embedded and bearable in the long-term and provide the basis for future climate action.
Candice Howarth; Peter Bryant; Adam Corner; Sam Fankhauser; Andy Gouldson; Lorraine Whitmarsh; Rebecca Willis. Building a Social Mandate for Climate Action: Lessons from COVID-19. Environmental and Resource Economics 2020, 76, 1107 -1115.
AMA StyleCandice Howarth, Peter Bryant, Adam Corner, Sam Fankhauser, Andy Gouldson, Lorraine Whitmarsh, Rebecca Willis. Building a Social Mandate for Climate Action: Lessons from COVID-19. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2020; 76 (4):1107-1115.
Chicago/Turabian StyleCandice Howarth; Peter Bryant; Adam Corner; Sam Fankhauser; Andy Gouldson; Lorraine Whitmarsh; Rebecca Willis. 2020. "Building a Social Mandate for Climate Action: Lessons from COVID-19." Environmental and Resource Economics 76, no. 4: 1107-1115.
Steven R. Smith; Ian Christie; Rebecca Willis. Social tipping intervention strategies for rapid decarbonization need to consider how change happens. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 2020, 117, 10629 -10630.
AMA StyleSteven R. Smith, Ian Christie, Rebecca Willis. Social tipping intervention strategies for rapid decarbonization need to consider how change happens. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2020; 117 (20):10629-10630.
Chicago/Turabian StyleSteven R. Smith; Ian Christie; Rebecca Willis. 2020. "Social tipping intervention strategies for rapid decarbonization need to consider how change happens." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 20: 10629-10630.
The scientific case for co-ordinated global governance of the climate system is firmly established, but how does this fit with a politician’s mandate as a democratically elected representative? What role do national politicians think they can and should play in climate governance? This paper tests these questions empirically, using data from interviews with 23 Members of the UK Parliament, and a focus group of civil society advocates, conducted between 2016 and 2018. A global goal to limit climate change has been agreed through the 2015 Paris Agreement. Yet while the Agreement sets a clear goal, the means to achieve it remain firmly at the level of the nation-state, with each country assuming responsibility for its own national plan. Thus national administrations, run by elected politicians, have a crucial role to play. This study shows that, while Members of the UK Parliament have an understanding of the challenges posed by climate change and wider changes to earth systems, few have yet been able to operationalise this understanding into meaningful responses at the national level. The study highlights two, linked, reasons for this. First, politicians’ ability to act – their agency – is limited by the practicalities and procedures of everyday politics, and by the norms and cultures of their working life. Second, UK politicians feel little pressure from their electors to act on climate change, and have to work to justify why action on climate change carries democratic legitimacy. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of this research, in the light of the recent high-profile climate protests and declarations of a ‘climate emergency’. It argues that politicians, working with other stakeholders, need support in order to articulate the scale and significance of global climate governance, and craft responses which build democratic support for further action.
Rebecca Willis. The role of national politicians in global climate governance. Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space 2019, 3, 885 -903.
AMA StyleRebecca Willis. The role of national politicians in global climate governance. Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space. 2019; 3 (3):885-903.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRebecca Willis. 2019. "The role of national politicians in global climate governance." Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space 3, no. 3: 885-903.
Targets and accounting for negative emissions should be explicitly set and managed separately from existing and future targets for emissions reduction. Failure to make such a separation has already hampered climate policy, exaggerating the expected future contribution of negative emissions in climate models, while also obscuring the extent and pace of the investment needed to deliver negative emissions. Separation would help minimize the negative impacts that promises and deployments of negative emissions could have on emissions reduction, arising from effects such as temporal trade-offs, excessive offsetting, and technological lock-in. Benefits for international, national, local, organizational, and sectoral planning would arise from greater clarity over the role and timing of negative emissions alongside accelerated emissions reduction.
Duncan P. McLaren; David P. Tyfield; Rebecca Willis; Bronislaw Szerszynski; Nils Markusson. Beyond “Net-Zero”: A Case for Separate Targets for Emissions Reduction and Negative Emissions. Frontiers in Climate 2019, 1, 1 .
AMA StyleDuncan P. McLaren, David P. Tyfield, Rebecca Willis, Bronislaw Szerszynski, Nils Markusson. Beyond “Net-Zero”: A Case for Separate Targets for Emissions Reduction and Negative Emissions. Frontiers in Climate. 2019; 1 ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDuncan P. McLaren; David P. Tyfield; Rebecca Willis; Bronislaw Szerszynski; Nils Markusson. 2019. "Beyond “Net-Zero”: A Case for Separate Targets for Emissions Reduction and Negative Emissions." Frontiers in Climate 1, no. : 1.
In 2014, a Community Energy Strategy was introduced, to find ways of overcoming the barriers faced by community energy. In spite of some improvements with a change of government in 2015, this strand of work did not continue. The year 2015 also saw sharp reductions in FiT rates, alongside reductions in tax incentives and the closure of early-stage funding and support instruments. In this environment, community groups are attempting to adapt and innovate—ideas are being floated for new business models, new sources of funding, and new technologies. Furthermore, consumer (co-)ownership received explicit recognition of its crucial role in the 2018 recast of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II) as part of the Clean Energy Package. However, in the light of ‘Brexit’ the transposition of the RED II into UK Law until 2021 is unsure, although it would be an important legislative impulse as it introduces a legal framework for consumer (co-)ownership. Individual households can own RE installations, and use the power or heat directly, or sell to the grid, with investments in so-called Individual Saving Accounts being tax-exempt. Community ownership takes a number of legal forms, with the Industrial and Provident Society, a form of co-operative, being the most common type. Another option is the Community Interest Company, which is essentially a company working for the benefit of the community or a registered charity. Following the decline in support from the Feed-in Tariff in 2015–16, community groups have been looking at new business models for consumer (co-)ownership of energy, focusing on options for self-supply, where energy is used locally, not sold through the grid. Partnership with local authorities and housing associations to further local ownership of RE is also present.
Rebecca Willis; Neil Simcock. Consumer (Co-)Ownership of Renewables in England and Wales (UK). Energy Transition 2019, 369 -394.
AMA StyleRebecca Willis, Neil Simcock. Consumer (Co-)Ownership of Renewables in England and Wales (UK). Energy Transition. 2019; ():369-394.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRebecca Willis; Neil Simcock. 2019. "Consumer (Co-)Ownership of Renewables in England and Wales (UK)." Energy Transition , no. : 369-394.
This research note describes the use of composite narratives to present interview data. A composite narrative uses data from several individual interviews to tell a single story. In the research discussed here, investigating how politicians consider climate change, four composites were created from fourteen interviews with Members of the UK Parliament. A method for creating composite narratives is described. Three, linked, benefits of the technique are discussed. First, they allow researchers to present complex, situated accounts from individuals, rather than breaking data down into categories. Second, they confer anonymity, vital when reporting on private deliberations, particularly if interviewees are public figures. Third, they can contribute to ‘future-forming’ research, by presenting findings in ways that are useful and accessible to those outside academia. The main limitation of composite narratives is the burden of responsibility upon the researcher, to convey accurate, yet anonymized, portrayals of the accounts of a group of individuals.
Rebecca Willis. The use of composite narratives to present interview findings. Qualitative Research 2018, 19, 471 -480.
AMA StyleRebecca Willis. The use of composite narratives to present interview findings. Qualitative Research. 2018; 19 (4):471-480.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRebecca Willis. 2018. "The use of composite narratives to present interview findings." Qualitative Research 19, no. 4: 471-480.
At the 2015 Paris Summit, global leaders agreed a strategy to tackle climate change. Under the agreement, each country must prepare a national plan. What challenges does this pose for politicians? How do they reconcile their representative role with understandings of climate change and measures required to address it? This article analyses interviews with UK politicians, through the framework of the ‘representative claim’ developed by Michael Saward, seeing representation as a dynamic interaction between politicians and those they claim to represent. Thus, politicians need to construct a ‘representative claim’ to justify action on climate. Four different types of claims are identified: a ‘cosmopolitan’ claim, a ‘local prevention’ claim, a ‘co-benefits’ claim and a ‘surrogate’ claim. The analysis shows that it is not straightforward for a politician to argue that action is in the interests of their electorate and that climate advocates need to support efforts to construct and defend claims.
Rebecca Willis. Constructing a ‘Representative Claim’ for Action on Climate Change: Evidence from Interviews with Politicians. Political Studies 2018, 66, 940 -958.
AMA StyleRebecca Willis. Constructing a ‘Representative Claim’ for Action on Climate Change: Evidence from Interviews with Politicians. Political Studies. 2018; 66 (4):940-958.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRebecca Willis. 2018. "Constructing a ‘Representative Claim’ for Action on Climate Change: Evidence from Interviews with Politicians." Political Studies 66, no. 4: 940-958.
Action on climate change, to meet the targets set in the 2015 Paris Agreement, requires strong political support at the national level. Whilst the political and governance challenges of climate change have been discussed at length, there is little understanding of how politicians, as influential individuals within the political system, understand or respond to climate change. This article presents findings from 14 qualitative interviews with Members of the UK Parliament, to discuss how politicians conceptualise climate change, and their deliberations on whether or how to act on the issue. First, it reviews an interdisciplinary literature from sociology, political theory and science and technology studies, to investigate how politicians navigate their work and life. Second, it presents ‘composite narratives’ to provide four different MPs’ stories. Last, it draws conclusions and implications for practice. It highlights three crucial factors: identity, or how politicians consider the climate issue in the context of their professional identity and the cultural norms of their workplace; representation, how politicians assess their role as a representative, and whether proposed political action on climate is seen as compatible with this representative function; and working practices, how day-to-day work rituals and pressures influence the aims, ambitions and engagement of politicians with climate change.
Rebecca Willis. How Members of Parliament understand and respond to climate change. The Sociological Review 2017, 66, 475 -491.
AMA StyleRebecca Willis. How Members of Parliament understand and respond to climate change. The Sociological Review. 2017; 66 (3):475-491.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRebecca Willis. 2017. "How Members of Parliament understand and respond to climate change." The Sociological Review 66, no. 3: 475-491.
The politics of climate change is much discussed, but there has been little investigation into how politicians themselves understand or articulate the issue. Corpus analysis, a method developed within linguistics, is used to investigate how UK politicians talk about climate change, using the example of the 2008 Climate Change Bill. Corpus techniques, including keyword analysis, collocation and semantic tagging, are used, alongside critical reading of the text. The analysis shows that politicians frame climate change as an economic and technical issue, and neglect discussion of the human and social dimensions. They are selective in their use of scientific evidence, with little mention of abrupt or irreversible change. In doing so, they attempt to ‘tame’ climate change, rather than confronting difficult realities. While this strategy has the benefit of political acceptability, it does not allow for discussion of the full political and social implications of climate change, and precludes more radical responses.
Rebecca Willis. Taming the Climate? Corpus analysis of politicians’ speech on climate change. Environmental Politics 2016, 26, 212 -231.
AMA StyleRebecca Willis. Taming the Climate? Corpus analysis of politicians’ speech on climate change. Environmental Politics. 2016; 26 (2):212-231.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRebecca Willis. 2016. "Taming the Climate? Corpus analysis of politicians’ speech on climate change." Environmental Politics 26, no. 2: 212-231.