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Dr. Antonella Battaglini
Chief Executive Officer,Renewables-Grid Initiative (RGI), Krausenstrasse 8, 10117 Berlin, Germany

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0 energy transition
0 Renewable energies
0 power grids
0 Decentralised generation
0 Smart grids environmental protection

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Journal article
Published: 01 November 2017 in Energy Policy
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ACS Style

Andrzej Ceglarz; Andreas Beneking; Saskia Ellenbeck; Antonella Battaglini. Understanding the role of trust in power line development projects: Evidence from two case studies in Norway. Energy Policy 2017, 110, 570 -580.

AMA Style

Andrzej Ceglarz, Andreas Beneking, Saskia Ellenbeck, Antonella Battaglini. Understanding the role of trust in power line development projects: Evidence from two case studies in Norway. Energy Policy. 2017; 110 ():570-580.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Andrzej Ceglarz; Andreas Beneking; Saskia Ellenbeck; Antonella Battaglini. 2017. "Understanding the role of trust in power line development projects: Evidence from two case studies in Norway." Energy Policy 110, no. : 570-580.

Journal article
Published: 31 August 2015 in Energies
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The European Union has set ambitious targets for deployment of renewable energy sources to reach goals of climate change mitigation and energy security policies. However, the current state of electricity transmission infrastructure is a major bottleneck for further scaling up of renewable energy in the EU. Several thousands of kilometers of new lines have to be constructed and upgraded to accommodate growing volumes of intermittent renewable electricity. In many countries, construction of electricity transmission projects has been delayed for several years due to concerns of local stakeholders. The innovative BESTGRID approach, reported here, brings together transmission system operators (TSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to discuss and understand the nature of stakeholder concerns. This paper has three objectives: (1) to understand stakeholder concerns about the deployment of electricity transmission grids in four pilot projects according to five guiding principles: need, transparency, engagement, environment, and impacts on human health as well as benefits; (2) to understand how these principles can be addressed to provide a basis for better decision-making outcomes; and (3) to evaluate the BESTGRID process based on feedback received from stakeholders and the level of participation achieved according to the ladder of Arnstein. This paper goes beyond a discussion of “measures to mitigate opposition” to understand how dialogue between TSOs and the public—represented mainly by NGOs and policy-makers—might lead to a better decision-making process and more sustainable electricity transmission infrastructure deployment.

ACS Style

Nadejda Komendantova; Marco Vocciante; Antonella Battaglini. Can the BestGrid Process Improve Stakeholder Involvement in Electricity Transmission Projects? Energies 2015, 8, 9407 -9433.

AMA Style

Nadejda Komendantova, Marco Vocciante, Antonella Battaglini. Can the BestGrid Process Improve Stakeholder Involvement in Electricity Transmission Projects? Energies. 2015; 8 (9):9407-9433.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Nadejda Komendantova; Marco Vocciante; Antonella Battaglini. 2015. "Can the BestGrid Process Improve Stakeholder Involvement in Electricity Transmission Projects?" Energies 8, no. 9: 9407-9433.

Journal article
Published: 03 June 2015 in Energies
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The European Union and its Member States are seeking to decarbonize their energy systems, including the electricity sector and, at the same time, pursue market integration. However, renewable energy (RE) deployment and the liberalization of the energy-only market have raised concerns at the national level about the security of electricity supplies in the future. Some actors consider the lack of sufficient investments in generation capacities a threat to supply security. As a consequence, it was proposed that capacity markets solve these problems. The underlying assumption is that the market design is the only determining factor for investments in security of supply options. In this article, we question this narrow view and identify further determinants of the investment decisions of electricity market participants. Based on the insights of institutional sociology and economics, we understand the market to be a social institution that structures the behavioural expectations of market participants. Derived from the theoretical conceptualization and based on qualitative literature review and own work, we find four determinants for investment behaviour beyond the formal market design: Material opportunities, strategic actor behavior and identity, focusing events and discursive expectations about the future. With this perspective, we discuss the introduction of a European Energy Union as a possible tool that might have a great impact on the more informal determinants such as expectations about the future and the construction of a European energy narrative.

ACS Style

Saskia Ellenbeck; Andreas Beneking; Andrzej Ceglarz; Peter Schmidt; Antonella Battaglini. Security of Supply in European Electricity Markets—Determinants of Investment Decisions and the European Energy Union. Energies 2015, 8, 5198 -5216.

AMA Style

Saskia Ellenbeck, Andreas Beneking, Andrzej Ceglarz, Peter Schmidt, Antonella Battaglini. Security of Supply in European Electricity Markets—Determinants of Investment Decisions and the European Energy Union. Energies. 2015; 8 (6):5198-5216.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Saskia Ellenbeck; Andreas Beneking; Andrzej Ceglarz; Peter Schmidt; Antonella Battaglini. 2015. "Security of Supply in European Electricity Markets—Determinants of Investment Decisions and the European Energy Union." Energies 8, no. 6: 5198-5216.

Viewpoint
Published: 20 October 2011 in Climate and Development
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The core objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations to non-dangerous levels quickly enough to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally, while not threatening food production or sustainable economic development. The approach embedded in the Kyoto Protocol, reflecting the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities, has been to start by setting binding emissions targets for industrialized countries, while using carbon markets to mobilize international finance for mitigation efforts in developing countries. The critical challenges for negotiators since then, however, have been in agreeing when the time is right to move towards binding emissions targets for developing countries and what level of financial assistance from developed countries is appropriate and politically feasible, given the well-founded perception that such targets, if sufficiently stringent to limit climate change and unaccompanied by strong financial assistance, could in fact hinder many countries. immediate economic development

ACS Style

Johan Lilliestam; Antonella Battaglini; Charlotte Finlay; Daniel Fürstenwerth; Anthony Patt; Gus Schellekens; Peter Schmidt. An alternative to a global climate deal may be unfolding before our eyes. Climate and Development 2011, 4, 1 -4.

AMA Style

Johan Lilliestam, Antonella Battaglini, Charlotte Finlay, Daniel Fürstenwerth, Anthony Patt, Gus Schellekens, Peter Schmidt. An alternative to a global climate deal may be unfolding before our eyes. Climate and Development. 2011; 4 (1):1-4.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Johan Lilliestam; Antonella Battaglini; Charlotte Finlay; Daniel Fürstenwerth; Anthony Patt; Gus Schellekens; Peter Schmidt. 2011. "An alternative to a global climate deal may be unfolding before our eyes." Climate and Development 4, no. 1: 1-4.