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Prof. Sung-Hoon Park
Chosun University

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Research Keywords & Expertise

0 Game Theory
0 natural selection
0 environmental conflict
0 Contest Theory
0 Citizen suit

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Short Biography

Sung-Hoon Park is a professor in the Department of Economics at Chosun University. His research covers a range of topics such as citizen suits, rent-seeking behavior, and natural selection.

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Journal article
Published: 12 July 2021 in Sustainability
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Governments create contests to allocate resources to stakeholders, e.g., grants, contracts. The actions of these stakeholders can generate a positive externality for themselves—the contest winner can attract additional outside funding and donations from third-parties who want to jump on the winner’s bandwagon. Herein we examine the externalities arising from these contests created by governance and their impact on a virtuous circle of governance contests. Among various conditions that make governance virtuous, we focus on the equilibrium expected payoffs of stakeholders, the difference in them, and the rent-dissipation rates. Our study shows that the impact of externalities on the efficiency of governance depends on two key factors: (i) the choice of governance contests, the player-externality and the winner-externality, and (ii) the relative efficiency of stakeholders’ efforts.

ACS Style

Sung-Hoon Park; Jason Shogren. A Virtuous Circle of Governance Contests with Externalities. Sustainability 2021, 13, 7766 .

AMA Style

Sung-Hoon Park, Jason Shogren. A Virtuous Circle of Governance Contests with Externalities. Sustainability. 2021; 13 (14):7766.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sung-Hoon Park; Jason Shogren. 2021. "A Virtuous Circle of Governance Contests with Externalities." Sustainability 13, no. 14: 7766.

Articles
Published: 22 October 2019 in International Economic Journal
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We study a two-player contest in which each egoistic player can choose to release his emotion information to the rival. Each player selects his emotion-parameter value to maximize his material payoffs and his effort level to maximize his subjective utility. There are different equilibria depending on the difference between the abilities of the players. The favorite reveals his envious emotion and the underdog his altruistic emotion in the equilibrium if the favorite’s ability is moderately higher than that of the underdog. Our results suggest that the classic result of the favorite-as-follower does not occur in the equilibrium of the full game.

ACS Style

Sung-Hoon Park; Jason Shogren. How Selfish Contestants Use Endogenous Emotions to Increase Subjective Utilities. International Economic Journal 2019, 34, 16 -32.

AMA Style

Sung-Hoon Park, Jason Shogren. How Selfish Contestants Use Endogenous Emotions to Increase Subjective Utilities. International Economic Journal. 2019; 34 (1):16-32.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sung-Hoon Park; Jason Shogren. 2019. "How Selfish Contestants Use Endogenous Emotions to Increase Subjective Utilities." International Economic Journal 34, no. 1: 16-32.

Journal article
Published: 06 March 2019 in Review of Law & Economics
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We examine a two-stage litigation in which risk-averse litigants set contingent fees strategically for risk-neutral lawyers. In the first stage of the litigation, each litigant sets a fixed fee and a contingent fee for his lawyer. In the second stage, each lawyer exerts effort to win a lawsuit on behalf of the litigant. Employing the subgame-perfect equilibrium as a solution concept, we obtain the following results. First, if a litigant sets a higher rate of contingent fee, then the opponent follows suit and the contingent fee fraction increases in the difference in litigant’s utility between winning and losing the case. Second, changes in a litigant’s initial endowment have different effects on the contingent fee fraction depending upon litigant preferences, while an increase in the prize of the case always increases the contingent fee fraction regardless of litigant preferences.

ACS Style

Sung-Hoon Park; Sanghack Lee. How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers? Review of Law & Economics 2019, 15, 1 .

AMA Style

Sung-Hoon Park, Sanghack Lee. How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers? Review of Law & Economics. 2019; 15 (2):1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sung-Hoon Park; Sanghack Lee. 2019. "How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers?" Review of Law & Economics 15, no. 2: 1.

Journal article
Published: 01 May 2013 in 중소연구
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ACS Style

Sung-Hoon Park; 수행 이. Comparative Studies on the Industrial Structures of Korea and China by Input-output Tables. 중소연구 2013, 37, 105 -127.

AMA Style

Sung-Hoon Park, 수행 이. Comparative Studies on the Industrial Structures of Korea and China by Input-output Tables. 중소연구. 2013; 37 (1):105-127.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sung-Hoon Park; 수행 이. 2013. "Comparative Studies on the Industrial Structures of Korea and China by Input-output Tables." 중소연구 37, no. 1: 105-127.