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Nicholas Kyriazis
Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, 38333 Volos, Greece

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Journal article
Published: 10 March 2021 in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
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In the beginning of the second book of his Politeia (Republic) Plato in passage 2.358e–359a–c raises the issue of the administration of justice as a means of motivating people to behave fairly regarding their relationships and when cooperating with each other because, at the end, this is mutually beneficial for all of them. We argue that this particular passage could be seen as a part of a wider process of evolution and development of the institutions of the ancient Athenian economy during the Classical period (508–322 BCE) and could be interpreted through modern theoretical concepts, and more particularly, game theory. Plato argued that there are two players, each with two identical strategies, to treat the other justly or unjustly. In the beginning, each player chooses the “unjust” strategy, trying to cheat the other. In this context, which could be seen as a prisoner’s dilemma situation, both end with the worst possible outcome, that is, deceiving each other and this has severe financial consequences for both of them. Realizing this, in a repeated game situation, with increasing information on the outcome and on each other, they choose the “just” strategy so achieving the best outcome and transforming the game in a cooperative one. We analyze this, formulating a dynamic game which is related to international commercial transactions, after explaining how such a situation could really arise in Classical Athens. We argue that this is the optimal scenario for both parties because it minimizes the risk of deceiving each other and creates harmony while performing financial transactions.

ACS Style

George Halkos; Nicholas Kyriazis; Emmanouil Economou. Plato as a Game Theorist towards an International Trade Policy. Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2021, 14, 115 .

AMA Style

George Halkos, Nicholas Kyriazis, Emmanouil Economou. Plato as a Game Theorist towards an International Trade Policy. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2021; 14 (3):115.

Chicago/Turabian Style

George Halkos; Nicholas Kyriazis; Emmanouil Economou. 2021. "Plato as a Game Theorist towards an International Trade Policy." Journal of Risk and Financial Management 14, no. 3: 115.

Journal article
Published: 11 January 2021 in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
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By analyzing the case of Athens during the Classical period (508-323 BCE) the main thesis of this paper is that under direct democracy procedures and the related institutional setup, a monetary system without a Central Bank may function relatively well. We focus on the following issues: (i) Τhe procedures of currency issuing in the Athenian city-state, (ii) why the Athenian drachma become the leading international currency in the Mediterranean world (iii) how and towards which targets monetary policy without a Central Bank was possible (iv) defining the targets of monetary policy and the mechanisms for its implementation (v) the role of money in the economy (vi) the issue of deficit spending (vii) the reasons of the replacement of the Athenian drachma as a leading currency by others from the Hellenistic period onwards (viii) the correlation of our findings regarding the decentralized character of monetary policy in Classical Athens to today’s realities, such as the issue of cryptocurrencies. Our analysis shows that monetary policy without a Central Bank was possible, with its foremost aim being the stability of the currency (mainly, silver coins) in order to enhance trust in it and so, make it an international currency which could outcompete other currencies. Since there was no Central Bank like today, monetary policy decisions were taken by the popular assembly of citizens in combination with the market forces themselves.

ACS Style

Emmanouil-Marios L. Economou; Nicholas C. Kyriazis; Nikolaos A. Kyriazis. Money Decentralization under Direct Democracy Procedures. The Case of Classical Athens. Journal of Risk and Financial Management 2021, 14, 30 .

AMA Style

Emmanouil-Marios L. Economou, Nicholas C. Kyriazis, Nikolaos A. Kyriazis. Money Decentralization under Direct Democracy Procedures. The Case of Classical Athens. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2021; 14 (1):30.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Emmanouil-Marios L. Economou; Nicholas C. Kyriazis; Nikolaos A. Kyriazis. 2021. "Money Decentralization under Direct Democracy Procedures. The Case of Classical Athens." Journal of Risk and Financial Management 14, no. 1: 30.

Journal article
Published: 18 January 2016 in Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
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In the present essay, we analyse the development of the proto-federations of the democratic city-states. We examine the political institutions and policies developed in the Achaean federation such as common defense and external policy, military organization, representative federal bodies like popular assemblies, parliament, generals as military and political commanders, federal finance ministers, etc., as well as its economic institutions and policies: common currency, federal budget and federal revenues. We offer arguments as to why the Achaean federation emerged and proved successful and finally, we offer some ideas as to how the Achaean federation would have faced a series of current global issues such as the European Union integration, global terrorism, etc.

ACS Style

Emmanouil Marios L. Economou; Nicholas Kyriazis. The emergence and the development of the Achaean federation: lessons and institutional proposals for modern societies. Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 2016, 13, 93 -112.

AMA Style

Emmanouil Marios L. Economou, Nicholas Kyriazis. The emergence and the development of the Achaean federation: lessons and institutional proposals for modern societies. Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review. 2016; 13 (1):93-112.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Emmanouil Marios L. Economou; Nicholas Kyriazis. 2016. "The emergence and the development of the Achaean federation: lessons and institutional proposals for modern societies." Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 13, no. 1: 93-112.

Book chapter
Published: 03 June 2015 in SpringerBriefs in Economics
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In the present essay we present first a theoretical model, introducing the term “macroculture” as a long-term set of norms, values, institutions, and organizations that characterize societies. We analyze how a/new democratic macroculture emerged for the first time in the Greek city-states by the end of the sixth century BCE. We then, inspired by Humboldt’s work on education as a condition for the good functioning of democracy, taking a case study, Classical Athens. Athenians were well aware that for a smooth functioning of democracy the citizens, who voted in the Assembly under direct democracy procedures, had to be educated. Thus, they could find good solutions in the decision process of the Assembly. To achieve this, they introduced some ingenious policy measures.

ACS Style

Nicholas C. Kyriazis; Emmanouil Marios L. Economou. Democracy and Education: A History from Ancient Athens. SpringerBriefs in Economics 2015, 75 -84.

AMA Style

Nicholas C. Kyriazis, Emmanouil Marios L. Economou. Democracy and Education: A History from Ancient Athens. SpringerBriefs in Economics. 2015; ():75-84.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Nicholas C. Kyriazis; Emmanouil Marios L. Economou. 2015. "Democracy and Education: A History from Ancient Athens." SpringerBriefs in Economics , no. : 75-84.

Journal article
Published: 25 December 2014 in Economics of Governance
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In the present paper we analyse the ancient Greek regional proto-federations of free-democratic city-states. We examine their political institutions and policies like common defence, representative federal bodies such as popular assemblies, parliament, state and regional organization, federal finance ministers as well as their economic institutions: common currency, federal budget and federal revenues. We address in more detail the case of the Aetolian League, or Federation, comparing it with some of today’s federal states and the European Union and conclude that in some respects, the proto-federation was more advanced than the EU, and thus can serve as a benchmark in addressing current European integration issues.

ACS Style

Emmanouil Marios L. Economou; Nicholas C. Kyriazis; Theodore Metaxas. The institutional and economic foundations of regional proto-federations. Economics of Governance 2014, 16, 251 -271.

AMA Style

Emmanouil Marios L. Economou, Nicholas C. Kyriazis, Theodore Metaxas. The institutional and economic foundations of regional proto-federations. Economics of Governance. 2014; 16 (3):251-271.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Emmanouil Marios L. Economou; Nicholas C. Kyriazis; Theodore Metaxas. 2014. "The institutional and economic foundations of regional proto-federations." Economics of Governance 16, no. 3: 251-271.