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G. Keong Leong
College of Business Administration and Public Policy, California State University Dominguez Hills, Carson, CA 90747, USA

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Journal article
Published: 21 August 2018 in Sustainability
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At present, most of China’s waste electrical and electronic equipment (hereafter referred to as WEEE) flow into the informal recycling sector, which has no official disassembly certification. To regulate the WEEE recycling industry, the policy of the WEEE disposal fund has been implemented to levy recycling fees from producers and subsidize the formal recycling sector. This paper aims to solve the challenging problem of how to optimize recycling fees and subsidies. We first study the competition between the formal and informal sectors, and construct the game models of the dismantling and refurbishing processes. Based on the equilibrium outcomes, we then examine the impact of the disposal fund on producers, as well as the formal and informal recycling sectors. With the goal of maximizing social welfare and maintaining a balanced budget for the disposal fund, we study the optimal recycling fee levied on producers and the corresponding subsidy provided to the formal sector. Social welfare is a function of producer and formal-recycler profits, consumer surplus, and the negative externality caused by informal dismantling and refurbishing, such as environmental pollution and safety problems. Results show that the use of subsidy can increase the acquisition quantity of used products in the formal sector, but the increase will slow down with higher subsidy. If the recycling fee that producers are charged is small, social welfare will be improved. In addition, as the fee is increased, social welfare will rise first and then fall. As such, any excessive increase in recycling fees should be avoided.

ACS Style

Huihui Liu; Xiaolin Wu; Desheng Dou; Xu Tang; G. Keong Leong. Determining Recycling Fees and Subsidies in China’s WEEE Disposal Fund with Formal and Informal Sectors. Sustainability 2018, 10, 2979 .

AMA Style

Huihui Liu, Xiaolin Wu, Desheng Dou, Xu Tang, G. Keong Leong. Determining Recycling Fees and Subsidies in China’s WEEE Disposal Fund with Formal and Informal Sectors. Sustainability. 2018; 10 (9):2979.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Huihui Liu; Xiaolin Wu; Desheng Dou; Xu Tang; G. Keong Leong. 2018. "Determining Recycling Fees and Subsidies in China’s WEEE Disposal Fund with Formal and Informal Sectors." Sustainability 10, no. 9: 2979.

Journal article
Published: 01 January 2018 in International Journal of Production Economics
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ACS Style

Huihui Liu; Ming Lei; Tao Huang; G. Keong Leong. Refurbishing authorization strategy in the secondary market for electrical and electronic products. International Journal of Production Economics 2018, 195, 198 -209.

AMA Style

Huihui Liu, Ming Lei, Tao Huang, G. Keong Leong. Refurbishing authorization strategy in the secondary market for electrical and electronic products. International Journal of Production Economics. 2018; 195 ():198-209.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Huihui Liu; Ming Lei; Tao Huang; G. Keong Leong. 2018. "Refurbishing authorization strategy in the secondary market for electrical and electronic products." International Journal of Production Economics 195, no. : 198-209.

Original articles
Published: 26 May 2017 in International Journal of Production Research
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When a manufacturer adds a direct sales channel to its existing retail channel, retailers may cooperate with one another to respond to this new competition. Our study develops a Cournot competition model in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers. In a Stackelberg decision model, the manufacturer first sets the direct sales quantity and wholesale price, and then the retailers decide the order quantities. The results indicate that forming an alliance is not always beneficial for retailers. When direct sales cost is high, there is less likelihood for retailers to collaborate. On the other hand, retailers will form an alliance when direct sales cost is sufficiently low. This will likely reduce the manufacturer’s profit. As such decreasing direct sales cost is not necessarily beneficial for the manufacturer because of the retailers’ possible collaborative efforts. In addition, the study finds that when demand fluctuation increases or the manufacturer’s information accuracy decreases, it is more likely that retailers will form an alliance. After relaxing the assumption of homogeneous retailers, our numerical study validates the possibility of partial alliance. If some retailers’ marginal costs are sufficiently high, we could see the formation of a partial alliance.

ACS Style

Huihui Liu; Shuguang Sun; Ming Lei; Honghui Deng; G. Keong Leong. The impact of retailers’ alliance on manufacturer’s profit in a dual-channel structure. International Journal of Production Research 2017, 55, 6592 -6607.

AMA Style

Huihui Liu, Shuguang Sun, Ming Lei, Honghui Deng, G. Keong Leong. The impact of retailers’ alliance on manufacturer’s profit in a dual-channel structure. International Journal of Production Research. 2017; 55 (22):6592-6607.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Huihui Liu; Shuguang Sun; Ming Lei; Honghui Deng; G. Keong Leong. 2017. "The impact of retailers’ alliance on manufacturer’s profit in a dual-channel structure." International Journal of Production Research 55, no. 22: 6592-6607.

Journal article
Published: 30 March 2017 in Sustainability
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While remanufacturing is highly encouraged worldwide, some original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the electrical and electronics industry are still not willing to embrace remanufacturing, for fear of expensive investment or the cannibalization of existing products. Meanwhile, third-party remanufacturers’ (TPRs) remanufactured products are developing quickly. Due to quality reasons, consumers usually have a higher preference for OEM-certified remanufactured products than uncertified ones. As such, remanufacturing certification has become a strategy that OEMs can use to benefit from product remanufacturing. Our paper focuses on the remanufacturing certification contract between an OEM and a TPR. Once certified, the TPR makes payments to the OEM. These payment terms will affect their enthusiasm for participating in remanufacturing certification. By establishing game models among an OEM, a certified TPR, and an uncertified TPR, our paper explores three certification contracts, namely, the lump-sum payment, profit-sharing payment, and piece-rate payment. We identify the conditions for the OEM and certified TPR to reach a win-win outcome. Our results show that when TPRs have a high profit margin and there is no significant difference in consumers’ preferences between certified and non-certified remanufacturing channels, the profit-sharing payment contract yields the highest profit; otherwise, the piece-rate payment contract is best for the OEM.

ACS Style

Huihui Liu; Xiaohang Yue; Hui Ding; G. Keong Leong. Optimal Remanufacturing Certification Contracts in the Electrical and Electronic Industry. Sustainability 2017, 9, 516 .

AMA Style

Huihui Liu, Xiaohang Yue, Hui Ding, G. Keong Leong. Optimal Remanufacturing Certification Contracts in the Electrical and Electronic Industry. Sustainability. 2017; 9 (4):516.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Huihui Liu; Xiaohang Yue; Hui Ding; G. Keong Leong. 2017. "Optimal Remanufacturing Certification Contracts in the Electrical and Electronic Industry." Sustainability 9, no. 4: 516.

Research article
Published: 29 May 2016 in Mathematical Problems in Engineering
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Many studies examine information sharing in an uncertain demand environment in a supply chain. However there is little literature on cost information sharing in a dual-channel structure consisting of a retail channel and a direct sales channel. Assuming that the retail sale cost and direct sale cost are random variables with a general distribution, the paper investigates the retailer’s choice on cost information sharing in a Bertrand competition model. Based on the equilibrium outcome of information sharing, the manufacturer’s channel choice is discussed in detail. Our paper provides several interesting conclusions. In both single- and dual-channel structures, the retailer has little motivation to share its private cost information which is verified to be valuable for the manufacturer. When the cost correlation between the two channels increases, our analyses show that the manufacturer’s profit improves. However, when channel choice is involved, the value of information could play a different role. The paper finds that a dual-channel structure can benefit the manufacturer only when the cost correlation is sufficiently low. In addition, if the cost correlation is weak, the cost fluctuation will bring out the advantage of a dual-channel structure and adding a new direct channel will help in risk pooling.1. IntroductionWith the rapid development of e-commerce and third-party logistics, many manufacturers set up a direct sales channel besides an existing retail channel. As such the dual-channel structure is becoming more common in the business world. For a supply chain with one retail channel, introducing a direct channel will have a big impact on both manufacturers and retailers, since the retail and direct channels compete in the same market. How to choose the optimal sales channel structure becomes a key question facing manufacturers looking to maximize profits.In business reality, because of various uncontrollable factors, sale costs are usually uncertain and private for firms in a supply chain. Take the retailer Best Buy as an example; the income from maintenance service is an important part of operating profit, and the cost generated is always uncertain and held privately by Best Buy [1]. In addition, we find that many franchisees often conceal cost information such as sales cost from franchisors in the contract [2]. Since cost is a crucial factor in a firm’s profit performance, the fluctuation in cost should not be ignored. In a supply chain, cost uncertainty influences directly pricing decision, products sales amount in specific sale channel, and even cooperation between upstream and downstream firms. As such cost information sharing becomes an important issue for firms in a supply chain.The two issues of channel choice and cost information sharing are closely related. On one hand, once the retailer chooses to share cost information, which will affect the distribution of cost information among the supply chain firms, the manufacturer has to examine the channel choice again. On the other hand, channel structure has a direct influence on the retailer. The manufacturer direct sales cost is also uncertain, and usually correlated with the sales cost in a retail channel since the same products are sold in the market. Therefore, once a direct channel is added, the retailer has to rethink the sharing choice. Another important concern is the process of comparing the value of cost information. The value is one thing in a certain channel structure, but may be another thing when comparing different channel structures in making a channel choice.Due to the popularity of the dual-channel structure, many studies investigate whether a manufacturer should open up a direct channel (Park and Keh [3], Chiang et al. [4], Liu and Zhang [5], Dumrongsiri et al. [6], Cai [7], and Yoo and Lee [8]). However, in the situation with cost uncertainty, the analysis of channel choice is still lacking. In addition, in a dual-channel structure, there is little literature on cost information sharing involving cost uncertainty. With the above motivation, our paper focuses on a retailer’s choice on cost information sharing and a manufacturer’s channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with cost uncertainty.The objective of our paper is to provide answers to the following questions. Is a retailer willing to share cost information with the upstream manufacturer in a dual-channel structure? Based on the analysis in information sharing, how do cost uncertainties in the two channels affect the manufacturer’s channel choice? In a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, the paper establishes a Stackelberg game and studies the retailer’s information sharing choice. By comparing the manufacturer’s profits in the dual-channel and single-channel structures, the conditions under which a direct channel should be added are provided.2. Literature ReviewRecently, the issue of sharing uncertain information in supply chain is a hot topic because of its impact on profitability and how companies organize their distribution channels. According to Li’s [9] classification on information value, uncertainty could be divided into two groups: common value and private value. Among all the uncertainty sources, demand and cost are the most familiar ones, which belong to common value and private value, respectively.In a review of the information sharing literature, most related studies focus on whether a retailer shares its private market demand information [10–15]. With fluctuating demand, Yue and Liu [16] examine vertical information sharing and channel choice in supply chain with one retailer. Lei et al. [17] extend their study to a situation with multiple retailers and also examine horizontal information sharing between retailers. To reduce the influence of uncertainties, Ryu et al. [18] investigate two types of information sharing methods to clarify their control characteristics; one is based on planned demand and the other on forecasted demand. In the above studies, cost uncertainty is not involved.In the literature related with cost uncertainty, several studies examine sharing behavior in an oligopoly situation when there is firm-specific cost uncertainty. In a Cournot competition, Li’s [9] research examines information sharing in both demand and cost. Wu et al. [19] introduce capacity upper limit and discusses partial sharing behavior in a duopoly. Also, some researchers focus on cost information sharing in a supply chain. For example, in Yao et al. [20], two retailers add value to goods by improving their service after wholesaling from a manufacturer, and the coefficient in the cost of adding value is uncertain. All the above papers only consider a single-channel structure in a supply chain.Research in a dual-channel supply chain structure is still lacking. Mukhopadhyay et al. [21] and Cao et al. [22] examine cost information sharing in a dual-channel supply chain. Mukhopadhyay et al. [21] extend Yao et al.’s [20] study to a dual-channel setting. The cost coefficient of value-added service is assumed to be unknown by others. The assumption is that a retailer’s cost is either high or low, and a signaling game is carried out with respect to the retailer’s cost. From the perspective of supply chain coordination, this paper only maximizes the manufacturer’s profit and derives the optimal pricing decision.Our paper differs from previous research in the following ways. First, we assume that uncertainty comes from sale cost itself and is a random variable with a general distribution. Second, since the manufacturer bears the cost when selling in a direct channel, the direct sales cost is assumed uncertain too, and we focus on the correlation between costs in the two channels. Finally, based on the results of information sharing, the manufacturer’s channel choice is discussed and the effect of cost fluctuation is explored in detail.The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 provides a model framework with basic model settings provided. In Section 4, the retailer’s decision on whether to share information is examined both in a dual-channel structure and single-channel structure. We discuss the manufacturer’s decision on channel structure in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we provide concluding remarks.3. Model FrameworkIn a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, the manufacturer wholesales products to the retailer, which sells them to consumers at the retail price. If a direct channel is added, the manufacturer also markets directly to consumers at the direct sales price. In a dual-channel structure, the two channels compete on price.Several key assumptions are made which are consistent with previous studies [3, 17, 23, 24].(1)The manufacturer only provides base products to the retailer and the direct channel. Due to geographic factors and services, the products sold by the two channels are imperfect substitutes.(2)The direct sale price is higher than the wholesale price, to avoid the retailer purchasing from the direct channel.(3)Fixed costs are not considered.To clearly differentiate the different channels and scenarios, we use subscripts d and r to denote direct channel and retail channel, and superscripts S and NS to represent sharing information and nonsharing information. To facilitate understanding of the model, the symbols used and their corresponding definitions are shown in Abbreviations section.Similar to Yue and Liu’s [16] study, demand functions in the direct channel and retail channel are set as and . We define as the basic demand (i.e., potential demand if products are free of charge). Here represents the proportion of basic market demand for the direct channel, exclusive of the price factor. indicates the consumer’s preference and captures the absolute difference in demands between retail and direct channels. A higher value of means a larger preference for the direct channel, and conseq

ACS Style

Huihui Liu; Shuguang Sun; Ming Lei; G. Keong Leong; Honghui Deng. Research on Cost Information Sharing and Channel Choice in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain. Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2016, 2016, 1 -12.

AMA Style

Huihui Liu, Shuguang Sun, Ming Lei, G. Keong Leong, Honghui Deng. Research on Cost Information Sharing and Channel Choice in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2016; 2016 ():1-12.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Huihui Liu; Shuguang Sun; Ming Lei; G. Keong Leong; Honghui Deng. 2016. "Research on Cost Information Sharing and Channel Choice in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2016, no. : 1-12.

Journal article
Published: 01 March 2016 in Omega
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ACS Style

Huihui Liu; Ming Lei; Honghui Deng; G. Keong Leong; Tao Huang. A dual channel, quality-based price competition model for the WEEE recycling market with government subsidy. Omega 2016, 59, 290 -302.

AMA Style

Huihui Liu, Ming Lei, Honghui Deng, G. Keong Leong, Tao Huang. A dual channel, quality-based price competition model for the WEEE recycling market with government subsidy. Omega. 2016; 59 ():290-302.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Huihui Liu; Ming Lei; Honghui Deng; G. Keong Leong; Tao Huang. 2016. "A dual channel, quality-based price competition model for the WEEE recycling market with government subsidy." Omega 59, no. : 290-302.

Journal article
Published: 07 April 2014 in International Journal of Production Research
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ACS Style

Ming Lei; Huihui Liu; Honghui Deng; Tao Huang; G. Keong Leong. Demand information sharing and channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with multiple retailers. International Journal of Production Research 2014, 52, 6792 -6818.

AMA Style

Ming Lei, Huihui Liu, Honghui Deng, Tao Huang, G. Keong Leong. Demand information sharing and channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with multiple retailers. International Journal of Production Research. 2014; 52 (22):6792-6818.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Ming Lei; Huihui Liu; Honghui Deng; Tao Huang; G. Keong Leong. 2014. "Demand information sharing and channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with multiple retailers." International Journal of Production Research 52, no. 22: 6792-6818.