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Lipan Feng
Institute of Supply Chain Analytics, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, Liaoning 116025, China

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Journal article
Published: 24 July 2020 in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
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Motivated by the practice, we investigate logistics service outsourcing choices in a retailer-led supply chain where the retailer offers logistics service by itself or outsources it to a third party logistics service provider. Results show that offering logistics service by the retailer is not always the optimal choice although it alleviates the double marginalization effect. Regarding the value of cost-sharing contracts in such a supply chain, we find that a variable cost sharing contract benefits the retailer but hurts the logistics service provider. When a part of fixed cost is shared by the retailer, a win–win outcome will be achieved.

ACS Style

Yaqi Lou; Lipan Feng; Shuguang He; Zhen He; Xiukun Zhao. Logistics service outsourcing choices in a retailer-led supply chain. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 2020, 141, 101944 .

AMA Style

Yaqi Lou, Lipan Feng, Shuguang He, Zhen He, Xiukun Zhao. Logistics service outsourcing choices in a retailer-led supply chain. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review. 2020; 141 ():101944.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Yaqi Lou; Lipan Feng; Shuguang He; Zhen He; Xiukun Zhao. 2020. "Logistics service outsourcing choices in a retailer-led supply chain." Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 141, no. : 101944.

Journal article
Published: 29 August 2019 in International Journal of Production Economics
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In platform operations for rental services, product information disclosure (supported by the blockchain technology) is critical to attract customers. By building a stylized duopoly basic analytical model, we conduct a game-theoretic analysis to explore the product information disclosure game between two rental service platforms. We derive the optimal level of product information disclosure and identify the theoretical conditions in which it is optimal to disclose or not to disclose information, which actually means two different types of supply chains. Under the basic model with the two competing platforms scenario, we uncover that from each platform's perspective, there exists a critical threshold on the proportion of information sensitive consumers in the market with which the platform can decide whether it is optimal to disclose product information or not. If the information auditing cost is sufficiently small, it is optimal for the platform to disclose the product information as much as possible. We find that when the product's rental service profit margin increases, the likelihood that both competing platforms will disclose information (including full information) for their products is higher. We also explore the impacts brought by product information disclosure on consumer surplus and seller benefits, and discuss the roles played by the blockchain technology. To check robustness of the results as well as to examine different supply chain configurations, we extend the analysis to the cases when (i) the platforms are risk averse in decision making, (ii) rather than selling the product, the seller (owner of the product to be shared) consigns the product to the platform and shares a revenue, (iii) there is a common rental service platform which receives and provides rental services for two substitutable products. We find that the core qualitative managerial insights remain valid in the basic and all the extended models. Managerial implications are discussed.

ACS Style

Tsan-Ming Choi; Lipan Feng; Rong Li. Information disclosure structure in supply chains with rental service platforms in the blockchain technology era. International Journal of Production Economics 2019, 221, 107473 .

AMA Style

Tsan-Ming Choi, Lipan Feng, Rong Li. Information disclosure structure in supply chains with rental service platforms in the blockchain technology era. International Journal of Production Economics. 2019; 221 ():107473.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Tsan-Ming Choi; Lipan Feng; Rong Li. 2019. "Information disclosure structure in supply chains with rental service platforms in the blockchain technology era." International Journal of Production Economics 221, no. : 107473.

Journal article
Published: 14 September 2018 in Sustainability
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Supply disruption is a common phenomenon in industry, which brings destructive effects to downstream firms and damages the sustainability of the supply chain. To mitigate the supply disruption risk, the authors investigate two types of procurement strategies for a firm with two ordering opportunities. Through establishing Stackelberg game models, the authors drive the supplier’s optimal production, and the firm’s optimal procurement and replenishment strategies under the option purchase (OP) strategy and the procurement commitment (PC) strategy, respectively. The findings show that, under both types of strategies, the firm’s procurement follows a “threshold” principle. Moreover, the firm’s procurement quantity can be represented by two newsvendor solutions. A lower option price or option exercise price benefits the firm, while it damages the supplier. The supplier benefits from a higher mean value (MV) of emergency procurement price and the firm benefits from a lower market demand variability. Counter-intuitively, a lower MV of the emergency procurement price is not always beneficial to the firm. A higher market demand variability could be beneficial to the supplier under the PC strategy. The firm should first choose the PC strategy and then change to the OP strategy as the disruption risk increases.

ACS Style

Kelei Xue; Ya Xu; Lipan Feng. Managing Procurement for a Firm with Two Ordering Opportunities under Supply Disruption Risk. Sustainability 2018, 10, 3293 .

AMA Style

Kelei Xue, Ya Xu, Lipan Feng. Managing Procurement for a Firm with Two Ordering Opportunities under Supply Disruption Risk. Sustainability. 2018; 10 (9):3293.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Kelei Xue; Ya Xu; Lipan Feng. 2018. "Managing Procurement for a Firm with Two Ordering Opportunities under Supply Disruption Risk." Sustainability 10, no. 9: 3293.