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Prof. Dr. Hans Pasman
Texas A&M University, College Station

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0 Process Safety
0 Risk Analysis
0 Resilience assessment
0 Risk Assessment and Management
0 Chemical Accident

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Process Safety
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Journal article
Published: 10 January 2021 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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Understanding the commonalities among previous chemical process incidents can help mitigate recurring incidents in the chemical process industry and will be useful background knowledge for designers intending to foster inherent safety. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) reports provide detailed and vital incident information that can be used to identify possible commonalities. This study aims to develop a systematic approach for extracting data from the CSB reports with the objective of establishing these commonalities. Data were extracted based on three categories: attributed incident causes, scenarios, and consequences. Seventeen causal factors were classified as chemical indicators or process indicators. Twelve chemical indicators are associated with the hazards of the chemicals involved in the incidents, whereas five process indicators account for the hazards presented by process conditions at the time of the incident. Seven scenario factors represent incident sequences, equipment types, operating modes, process units, domino effects, detonation likelihood for explosion incidents, and population densities. Finally, three consequence factors were selected based on types of chemical incidents, casualties, population densities, and economic losses. Data from 87 CSB reports covering 94 incidents were extracted and analyzed according to the proposed approach. Based on these findings, the study proposes guidelines for future collection of information to provide valuable resources for prediction and risk reduction of future incidents.

ACS Style

SunHwa Park; Edna Mendez; James P. Bailey; William Rogers; Hans J. Pasman; Mahmoud M. El-Halwagi. What can the trove of CSB incident investigations teach us? A detailed analysis of information characteristics among chemical process incidents investigated by the CSB. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2021, 69, 104389 .

AMA Style

SunHwa Park, Edna Mendez, James P. Bailey, William Rogers, Hans J. Pasman, Mahmoud M. El-Halwagi. What can the trove of CSB incident investigations teach us? A detailed analysis of information characteristics among chemical process incidents investigated by the CSB. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2021; 69 ():104389.

Chicago/Turabian Style

SunHwa Park; Edna Mendez; James P. Bailey; William Rogers; Hans J. Pasman; Mahmoud M. El-Halwagi. 2021. "What can the trove of CSB incident investigations teach us? A detailed analysis of information characteristics among chemical process incidents investigated by the CSB." Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 69, no. : 104389.

Journal article
Published: 22 October 2020 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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Emerging sensors, computers, network technologies, and connected platforms result potentially in an immeasurable collection of data within plant operations. This creates the possibility of solving problems innovatively. Because most of the data appear to be unstructured or semi-structured, organizations shall design and adopt new strategies. Further, workflow architectures with data analytics are needed including machine learning tools and artificial intelligence techniques before proto-type solutions can be developed. We shall discuss several prospects of using (big) data analytics integrated with cloud services to produce solutions for improving plant operations. The paper outlines the vision and a systematic framework highlighting the data analytics lifecycle in the area of plant operation, process safety, and environmental protection. Four rather diverse example case studies are demonstrated including (1) deep learning-based predictive maintenance monitoring modeling, (2) Natural Language Processing (NLP) for mining text, (3) barrier assessment for dynamic risk mapping (DRA), and (4) correlation development for sustainability indicators. It further discusses the challenges in both research and implementation of proposed solutions in the industry. It is concluded that a well-balanced integrated approach including machine supporting decisions integrated with expert knowledge and available information from various key resources is required to enable more informed policy, strategic, and operational risk decision-making leading to safer, reliable and more efficient operations.

ACS Style

Pankaj Goel; Prerna Jain; Hans J. Pasman; E.N. Pistikopoulos; Aniruddha Datta. Integration of data analytics with cloud services for safer process systems, application examples and implementation challenges. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2020, 68, 104316 .

AMA Style

Pankaj Goel, Prerna Jain, Hans J. Pasman, E.N. Pistikopoulos, Aniruddha Datta. Integration of data analytics with cloud services for safer process systems, application examples and implementation challenges. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2020; 68 ():104316.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Pankaj Goel; Prerna Jain; Hans J. Pasman; E.N. Pistikopoulos; Aniruddha Datta. 2020. "Integration of data analytics with cloud services for safer process systems, application examples and implementation challenges." Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 68, no. : 104316.

Original article
Published: 14 October 2020 in Process Safety Progress
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Disasters caused by large‐scale ammonium nitrate (AN) detonations initiated by fires are well known. The Beirut explosion is again a very sad event with disastrous consequences, but it is not a surprise in the sense of a new phenomenon. It is tragic that calamities with AN occur despite ample guidelines for prevention. Knowledge of the decomposition of AN over the years has greatly progressed, as well how to initiate a detonation with a strong shock wave from a high explosive charge. However, to reproduce the initiation of a detonation by a fire under controlled laboratory conditions never succeeded. The details of the transition of decomposing AN to a detonation remained an open question. Is it a deflagration to detonation mechanism, or is it a shock to detonation one? Knowledge of this may further help process safety measures for the product. The paper will bring research contributions from over a century together, it will develop a scenario how this disaster could happen in Beirut, how much of the AN contributed to the blast, and how further research effort could be beneficial. In addition, the paper estimates the TNT mass equivalent of the AN detonation in Beirut employing three different methods.

ACS Style

Hans J. Pasman; Charline Fouchier; SunHwa Park; Noor Quddus; Delphine Laboureur. Beirut ammonium nitrate explosion: Are not we really learning anything? Process Safety Progress 2020, 39, 1 .

AMA Style

Hans J. Pasman, Charline Fouchier, SunHwa Park, Noor Quddus, Delphine Laboureur. Beirut ammonium nitrate explosion: Are not we really learning anything? Process Safety Progress. 2020; 39 (4):1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hans J. Pasman; Charline Fouchier; SunHwa Park; Noor Quddus; Delphine Laboureur. 2020. "Beirut ammonium nitrate explosion: Are not we really learning anything?" Process Safety Progress 39, no. 4: 1.

Journal article
Published: 28 September 2020 in Process Safety and Environmental Protection
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Incident trend analysis has been important in the past for understanding how a system has been performing over time. The system can refer to a particular equipment, facility or organization and its performance can be monitored in terms of numbers or rates of failures, incidents or events over time. A good trend analysis leads to better projections into the future, enabling a more accurate prediction of future incidents or failures. In most cases however, it is generally assumed that incident or failure rates remain constant over time and the same value of the rate is used in all estimations. This study uses data of past offshore fire incidents in the Gulf of Mexico to predict future incidents and shows that such an assumption can fail to provide accurate predictions. The data is normalized to account for the year-to-year variation in operation and shows how using a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) assumption, where failure rate is a function of time, enables a better understanding of performance, and can be used to predict future incidents more accurately. This will help regulatory bodies to understand whether operation in the Gulf of Mexico has been improving or not and to take proactive measures before the next fire incident occurs.

ACS Style

Syeda Zohra Halim; Noor Quddus; Hans Pasman. Time-trend analysis of offshore fire incidents using nonhomogeneous Poisson process through Bayesian inference. Process Safety and Environmental Protection 2020, 147, 421 -429.

AMA Style

Syeda Zohra Halim, Noor Quddus, Hans Pasman. Time-trend analysis of offshore fire incidents using nonhomogeneous Poisson process through Bayesian inference. Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 2020; 147 ():421-429.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Syeda Zohra Halim; Noor Quddus; Hans Pasman. 2020. "Time-trend analysis of offshore fire incidents using nonhomogeneous Poisson process through Bayesian inference." Process Safety and Environmental Protection 147, no. : 421-429.

Review article
Published: 14 September 2020 in Process Safety and Environmental Protection
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The first European Loss Prevention Symposium under the auspices of the European Federation of Chemical Engineering (EFCE) took place in 1974 in the then new Aula of the Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands. After the triennial symposium over a period of 45 years having been organized in several European cities, it returned in 2019 to the Delft Aula. Authors of this paper are members of EFCE Loss Prevention Working Party organizing the LP Symposia and after nearly half century, it is therefore worthwhile to look back and also to look forward, following the evolution of process safety. This paper presents an impression of the changes in process safety, risk management approaches, and methods over that 45-year period, while at the same time the last symposium contributions are briefly reviewed and a few highlights, called breakthroughs, are identified.

ACS Style

Hans J. Pasman; Bruno Fabiano. The Delft 1974 and 2019 European Loss Prevention Symposia: Highlights and an impression of process safety evolutionary changes from the 1st to the 16th LPS. Process Safety and Environmental Protection 2020, 147, 80 -91.

AMA Style

Hans J. Pasman, Bruno Fabiano. The Delft 1974 and 2019 European Loss Prevention Symposia: Highlights and an impression of process safety evolutionary changes from the 1st to the 16th LPS. Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 2020; 147 ():80-91.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hans J. Pasman; Bruno Fabiano. 2020. "The Delft 1974 and 2019 European Loss Prevention Symposia: Highlights and an impression of process safety evolutionary changes from the 1st to the 16th LPS." Process Safety and Environmental Protection 147, no. : 80-91.

Journal article
Published: 04 September 2020 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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History has taught us that quite disastrous events with much human loss, injuries and asset damage could have been prevented or at least mitigated, if top management had recognized early warning signals in some form as urgent and had decided to take timely preventative measures. It turns out to be a rather common phenomenon in various sectors of life and some process industry examples are presented. The problem is further analyzed from a leadership point of view, from organizational structure and culture aspect, and what modern technology developments can help to improve the situation. Research in the latter directions is encouraged.

ACS Style

Hans J. Pasman. Early warning signals noticed, but management doesn't act adequately or not at all: a brief analysis and direction of possible improvement. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2020, 70, 104272 .

AMA Style

Hans J. Pasman. Early warning signals noticed, but management doesn't act adequately or not at all: a brief analysis and direction of possible improvement. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2020; 70 ():104272.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hans J. Pasman. 2020. "Early warning signals noticed, but management doesn't act adequately or not at all: a brief analysis and direction of possible improvement." Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 70, no. : 104272.

Review
Published: 30 July 2020 in Sustainability
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Resilience is the ability to restore performance after sustaining serious damage by a usually unexpected threat. This paper analyzes resilience of process plants as there are oil and gas refining, chemical manufacturing, power-producing plants, and many more. Over the years, plant safety has shifted from retrospective to proactive measures. Safety is important from many points of view, such as protection of workforce and nearby population, but certainly too from an economical and sustainability aspect. Pro-action requires predictive insight of what in the process can go wrong because of internal or external disruptive disturbance. Over the years, to that end, much effort was spent developing risk assessment methods and management. However, risk assessment has proven to be fallible because of various uncertainties and not the least by overlooked or unknown threats. To protect against those upsetting threats, measures can be taken up to a certain limit. These start in designing error-tolerant equipment able to be receptive to early warning signals during operations, responding to those with ‘plasticity’ of mind (that is, an organization and its leadership especially able to think ‘outside-the box’ for coping with unexpected situations), and finally, to deploy effective emergency response and able to recover from damage quickly. The paper presents a summary/review of nearly a decade of research work at the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at the Texas A&M University to develop the concept and the techniques to realize a resilient plant, so far with a focus on chemical plant. It is, however, still a ‘work-in-progress’; potential is large. Besides the conceptual details, cases are presented that show how human and technical factors, combined in a socio-technical system, can lead to a broader plant safety insight enabling more effective risk control and increased resilience. These cases have up to now only considered warning signals and possible management action, while still limited to internal threats. Hence, aspects of equipment design and recovery should be further considered, also in the light of the dynamics of present-day business environment.

ACS Style

Hans Pasman; Kedar Kottawar; Prerna Jain. Resilience of Process Plant: What, Why, and How Resilience Can Improve Safety and Sustainability. Sustainability 2020, 12, 6152 .

AMA Style

Hans Pasman, Kedar Kottawar, Prerna Jain. Resilience of Process Plant: What, Why, and How Resilience Can Improve Safety and Sustainability. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (15):6152.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hans Pasman; Kedar Kottawar; Prerna Jain. 2020. "Resilience of Process Plant: What, Why, and How Resilience Can Improve Safety and Sustainability." Sustainability 12, no. 15: 6152.

Review article
Published: 18 June 2020 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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To be acceptably safe one must identify the risks one is exposed to and decide what risk reducing measures are required. It is uncertain whether the threat really will materialize, but determining the size and probability of the risk is also full of uncertainty. When performing an analysis and preparing for decision making under uncertainty, quite frequently failure rate data, information on consequence severity or on a probability value, yes, even on the possibility that an event can or cannot occur, is lacking. In those cases, a possible way and sometimes the only way to proceed is to revert to expert judgment. Even in case historical data is available, an expert can be asked whether and to what extent such data still hold in the current situation. Anyhow, expert elicitation comes with an uncertainty depending on the expert’s reliability, which becomes very visible when two or more experts give different answers or even conflicting answers. This is not a new problem, and very bright minds have thought how to tackle this in a rational and objective way. But so far, however, the topic has not been given much attention in daily process safety and risk assessment practice. Therefore, this paper has a review and applied character and will present various approaches with detailed explanation and examples.

ACS Style

Hans J. Pasman; William J. Rogers. How to treat expert judgment? With certainty it contains uncertainty! Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2020, 66, 104200 .

AMA Style

Hans J. Pasman, William J. Rogers. How to treat expert judgment? With certainty it contains uncertainty! Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2020; 66 ():104200.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hans J. Pasman; William J. Rogers. 2020. "How to treat expert judgment? With certainty it contains uncertainty!" Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 66, no. : 104200.

Journal article
Published: 26 March 2020 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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Microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) is a microbial community assisted degradation of materials affecting chemical processing and oil and gas industries. MIC has been implicated in incidents involving loss of containment of hazardous hydrocarbons which have led to fires and explosions, economic and environmental impact. The interplay between abiotic environmental factors and dynamic biotic factors in MIC are poorly understood. There is a lack of mechanistic understanding of MIC and very few models are available to predict or assess MIC threat. Here we report on the development of a model to assess the susceptibility to MIC. The high-resolution model utilizes 60 independent nodes, including operational and historical failure analysis data, and is built by combining empirical relationships between the abiotic and biotic variables impacting MIC. Both static and dynamic Bayesian-network (BN) approaches were used to combine heuristic and quantitative states of variables to ultimately yield a susceptibility measure for MIC. A confidence-in-information metric was generated to reflect the amount of data used in the estimation. A susceptibility to MIC of 45%–60% was estimated by the model for ten different scenarios simulated using case-studies from literature. The susceptibility to MIC estimated by these scenarios was further interpreted in the context of these cases. This systems-based MIC model can be utilized as an independent estimator of susceptibility or can be incorporated as a sub-model within comprehensive safety threat assessment models currently utilized in industry.

ACS Style

Pranav Kannan; Susmitha Purnima Kotu; Hans Pasman; Sreeram Vaddiraju; Arul Jayaraman; M. Sam Mannan. A systems-based approach for modeling of microbiologically influenced corrosion implemented using static and dynamic Bayesian networks. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2020, 65, 104108 .

AMA Style

Pranav Kannan, Susmitha Purnima Kotu, Hans Pasman, Sreeram Vaddiraju, Arul Jayaraman, M. Sam Mannan. A systems-based approach for modeling of microbiologically influenced corrosion implemented using static and dynamic Bayesian networks. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2020; 65 ():104108.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Pranav Kannan; Susmitha Purnima Kotu; Hans Pasman; Sreeram Vaddiraju; Arul Jayaraman; M. Sam Mannan. 2020. "A systems-based approach for modeling of microbiologically influenced corrosion implemented using static and dynamic Bayesian networks." Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 65, no. : 104108.

Book chapter
Published: 18 March 2020 in Methods in Chemical Process Safety
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For the origin of logic based methods to assess process plant risks, we go back to the first symposium on Loss Prevention in the United Kingdom in 1971, where concepts in part developed for nuclear power plant risk assessment and extended to process plant have been presented. From there we follow the developments in the 1980s and the benchmarks in Europe in the 1990s revealing the large differences in outcomes when various teams work out the risks of a same plant. It showed the uncertainties intrinsic to the methodology of that time. The last 2 decades have seen various kinds of improvements but also awareness that other factors, such as human failure and organizational ones are important to include. The last subchapter is highlighting approaches partly based on machine learning and artificial intelligence that will make use of “big data,” even enabling dynamic operational risk assessment.

ACS Style

Hans J. Pasman; William J. Rogers. Logic based methods for dynamic risk assessment. Methods in Chemical Process Safety 2020, 61 -122.

AMA Style

Hans J. Pasman, William J. Rogers. Logic based methods for dynamic risk assessment. Methods in Chemical Process Safety. 2020; ():61-122.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hans J. Pasman; William J. Rogers. 2020. "Logic based methods for dynamic risk assessment." Methods in Chemical Process Safety , no. : 61-122.

Journal article
Published: 20 December 2019 in Process Safety and Environmental Protection
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Risk matrices are widely used to present results of qualitative and semi-quantitative risk assessment for risk management decision making. There are different types of risk matrix category definitions according to the function and risk acceptance criteria. This paper reviews some general weaknesses of current risk matrices and proposes a method to improve the reading ambiguity of linguistically graded qualitative risk matrices. Main topic of this paper is the type of risk matrix that grades event consequence and frequency categories in linguistic terms. Because different people understand the meaning of these terms differently, the aim is to convert subjective quantified term inputs produced by a number of experts independently as much as possible to objective values creating at the same time a clearer and more discriminative result. In other words, the method involves asking various expert users independently to estimate numerical intervals of linguistic grades of event consequence and frequency on a continuous scale while maintaining risk acceptance levels. It is applying a second-generation fuzzy logic technique to express linguistic terms in numbers, called computing with words. This interval type-2 fuzzy system has evolved lately as a decision-making support tool and appears to be well suited to handle uncertainty intrinsic to qualitative linguistic grades, fusing different individual expert estimates in an objective way and to facilitate the reading resolution by introducing gliding numerical scales instead of discrete categories. Examples are given to illustrate the method as well as the use of the technique to aggregate a number of different qualitative risk matrix types into one unified risk matrix. The latter is useful in case a corporate-wide risk matrix exists to standardize risk management across the company, but older versions may still be around which should be fused with the newer ones.

ACS Style

Yizhi Hong; Hans J. Pasman; Noor Quddus; M. Sam Mannan. Supporting risk management decision making by converting linguistic graded qualitative risk matrices through interval type-2 fuzzy sets. Process Safety and Environmental Protection 2019, 134, 308 -322.

AMA Style

Yizhi Hong, Hans J. Pasman, Noor Quddus, M. Sam Mannan. Supporting risk management decision making by converting linguistic graded qualitative risk matrices through interval type-2 fuzzy sets. Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 2019; 134 ():308-322.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Yizhi Hong; Hans J. Pasman; Noor Quddus; M. Sam Mannan. 2019. "Supporting risk management decision making by converting linguistic graded qualitative risk matrices through interval type-2 fuzzy sets." Process Safety and Environmental Protection 134, no. : 308-322.

Journal article
Published: 01 September 2018 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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The purpose of a risk assessment is to make a decision whether the risk of a given situation is within an acceptable range, and, if not, how we can reduce it to a tolerable level. For many cases, this can be done in a semi-quantitative fashion. For more complex or problematic cases a quantitative approach is required. Anybody who has been involved in such a study is aware of the difficulties and pitfalls. Despite proven software, many choices of parameters must be made and many uncertainties remain. The thoroughness of the study can make quite a difference in the result. Independently, analysts of the same project can arrive at results that differ by orders of magnitude, especially if uncertainties are not included. Because for important decisions on capital projects there are always proponents and opponents, there is often a tense situation in which conflict is looming. Therefore, to strengthen trust in an assessment, knowledge about uncertainties, ways to handle those, and further methods to verify and intrinsically validate risk assessments are critically important. The paper will first briefly review a standard procedure introduced for safety cases on products that must provide more or less a guarantee that the risk of use is below a certain value. Next will be the various approaches of how to deal with uncertainties in a quantitative risk assessment and the follow-on decision process. Because expert estimates are often in high need to obtain some solution, various ways of expert elicitation and its limitations are considered. Special attention will be paid to the highly uncertain aspect of human reliability influenced by organizational factors and conditions. Over the last few years several new developments have been made to achieve, to a certain extent, a hold on so-called deep uncertainty. The paper will be concluded with some practical recommendations of how to judge the validity of risk assessments and how to reduce bias in the decision-making process.

ACS Style

Hans Pasman; William Rogers. How trustworthy are risk assessment results, and what can be done about the uncertainties they are plagued with? Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2018, 55, 162 -177.

AMA Style

Hans Pasman, William Rogers. How trustworthy are risk assessment results, and what can be done about the uncertainties they are plagued with? Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2018; 55 ():162-177.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hans Pasman; William Rogers. 2018. "How trustworthy are risk assessment results, and what can be done about the uncertainties they are plagued with?" Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55, no. : 162-177.

Journal article
Published: 01 September 2018 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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Risk assessment is essential for various purposes such as facility siting, safeguarding, and licensing. Hazard identification (HAZID), which suffers greatly from incompleteness, is still the weakest link in risk assessment. Of course, this recognition is not new and many efforts have been spent to improve the situation, of which some have been rather successful. To find out what can go wrong, creative divergent thinking is required. Hazard identification should result in scenario definition. In that respect, applying the present tools as HAZOP and FMEA there is still a great emphasis on the material and equipment aspects. In contrast, underlying management and leadership failure in its many forms reflecting in organizational and human failure, due to complexity, attracts much less attention. Unlike in HAZID, in accident investigation the occurrence of an event with nasty consequences is no doubt a fact, so there must be one or more causes and the traces will lead to them. Over the years, methods for accident and incident investigation have gone through a significant evolution. From the early-on simplistic domino stone model and the human operator always at fault, via models of latent failure due to failing management involvement and via extensive root cause analysis (RCA) to a system approach. Hence, in accident investigation, management failure appearing in the many possible forms of human and organizational factors, obtained already 30 years ago with the RCA technique much attention, while it nowadays culminates in the socio-technical system approach. So, the question arises whether for improved HAZID we can learn from the accident investigation experience. In addition, safer design and advances from static risk assessment towards more accurate predictive operational dynamic risk assessment and management, will also be enabled by possibilities offered by big data and analytics. Digitization, automation and simulation, hence computerization, will be of great help in improving the identification of hazards and tracing the corresponding scenarios. The paper reviews the developmental history of both accident investigation and hazard identification methodology; incidentally it will identify commonality and differences. On the basis of the comparison and of recent advances in computerization, the paper will investigate to what extent beneficial modifications and additions can be made to obtain a higher degree of completeness in HAZID.

ACS Style

Hans J. Pasman; William J. Rogers; M. Sam Mannan. How can we improve process hazard identification? What can accident investigation methods contribute and what other recent developments? A brief historical survey and a sketch of how to advance. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2018, 55, 80 -106.

AMA Style

Hans J. Pasman, William J. Rogers, M. Sam Mannan. How can we improve process hazard identification? What can accident investigation methods contribute and what other recent developments? A brief historical survey and a sketch of how to advance. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2018; 55 ():80-106.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hans J. Pasman; William J. Rogers; M. Sam Mannan. 2018. "How can we improve process hazard identification? What can accident investigation methods contribute and what other recent developments? A brief historical survey and a sketch of how to advance." Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 55, no. : 80-106.

Journal article
Published: 01 July 2018 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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ACS Style

Nima Khakzad; Paul Amyotte; Valerio Cozzani; Genserik Reniers; Hans Pasman. How to address model uncertainty in the escalation of domino effects? Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2018, 54, 49 -56.

AMA Style

Nima Khakzad, Paul Amyotte, Valerio Cozzani, Genserik Reniers, Hans Pasman. How to address model uncertainty in the escalation of domino effects? Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2018; 54 ():49-56.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Nima Khakzad; Paul Amyotte; Valerio Cozzani; Genserik Reniers; Hans Pasman. 2018. "How to address model uncertainty in the escalation of domino effects?" Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 54, no. : 49-56.

Research article
Published: 12 October 2017 in Journal of Fire Sciences
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Violent decomposition and explosion of ammonium nitrate induced by a fire present potentially a serious threat to personnel, facilities, and nearby community. One of the most recent incidents involving ammonium nitrate occurred on 17 April 2013, in West, Texas, killing 15 people and injuring more than 250 people; this incident has caused heated discussion again on the safety issues associated with ammonium nitrate including firefighting issues. In terms of fire protection, water suppression systems have been widely used in chemical process facilities as an active protection layer, and they have been successful in tackling most of the fires. However, where water is the only agent to fight a fire in an ammonium nitrate store, acting as a cooling and hence combustion extinguishing agent, it does not limit the oxidant supply as this is contained within the ammonium nitrate molecule. Under some circumstances, the addition of water may also favor the conditions for explosion. In this article, the possible role of water interfering physically and to some extent chemically with ammonium nitrate stock in a fire is discussed, calling for more research to develop an optimal procedure to fight ammonium nitrate fertilizer fires.

ACS Style

Zhe Han; Hans J Pasman; M Sam Mannan. Extinguishing fires involving ammonium nitrate stock with water: Possible complications. Journal of Fire Sciences 2017, 35, 457 -483.

AMA Style

Zhe Han, Hans J Pasman, M Sam Mannan. Extinguishing fires involving ammonium nitrate stock with water: Possible complications. Journal of Fire Sciences. 2017; 35 (6):457-483.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Zhe Han; Hans J Pasman; M Sam Mannan. 2017. "Extinguishing fires involving ammonium nitrate stock with water: Possible complications." Journal of Fire Sciences 35, no. 6: 457-483.

Journal article
Published: 01 August 2017 in Process Safety and Environmental Protection
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ACS Style

Ian Cameron; Sam Mannan; Erzsebet Nemeth; SunHwa Park; Hans Pasman; William Rogers; Benjamin Seligmann. Process hazard analysis, hazard identification and scenario definition: Are the conventional tools sufficient, or should and can we do much better? Process Safety and Environmental Protection 2017, 110, 53 -70.

AMA Style

Ian Cameron, Sam Mannan, Erzsebet Nemeth, SunHwa Park, Hans Pasman, William Rogers, Benjamin Seligmann. Process hazard analysis, hazard identification and scenario definition: Are the conventional tools sufficient, or should and can we do much better? Process Safety and Environmental Protection. 2017; 110 ():53-70.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Ian Cameron; Sam Mannan; Erzsebet Nemeth; SunHwa Park; Hans Pasman; William Rogers; Benjamin Seligmann. 2017. "Process hazard analysis, hazard identification and scenario definition: Are the conventional tools sufficient, or should and can we do much better?" Process Safety and Environmental Protection 110, no. : 53-70.

Journal article
Published: 30 September 2016 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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Since the Seveso disaster 40 years ago, risk management methods as well as challenges to the process industry have increased along with changes in the public's risk perception globally. The Seveso incident brought to attention some critical issues, such as lack of knowledge on runaway reaction scenarios, hazards of formation of dioxins, lack of regulatory requirements, poor communication and coordination, and little or no emergency response or evacuation plans. Regulations related to process safety and risk management have evolved with time as compared to earlier when there were no specific regulations for controls of such major hazards as became evident during the Seveso incident. Meanwhile, the third improved version of the EU Directive inspired by the incident has been implemented. Although in general over the years occupational safety has vastly improved, major losses have still occurred and in fact formed the motivation to issue the new versions of the Directive. This paper highlights two limitations of the Seveso III Directive – lack of implementation of leading indicators and limited application of hazard and risk identification (for example little or no consideration of the hazards of intermediate products). Some existing gaps like lack of learning from previous incidents, scale-up issues, limitations of experiments related to real scenarios (e.g., vapour cloud explosion), uncertainties involved in complex systems and their gradual degradation by their use are described. These gaps necessitate developing and using advanced methods and an holistic approach such as resilience and advanced mathematic-statistical methods to resolve these issues. This work presents a resilience-based analysis of the Seveso incident and lays the foundation for development of a Process Resilience Analysis Framework. Implementation of this framework would advance current risk assessment and management techniques through integration of technical and social factors. The paper concludes with some cardinal rules for a systems approach to risk management and the significance of risk governance.

ACS Style

Prerna Jain; Hans J. Pasman; Simon P. Waldram; William J. Rogers; M. Sam Mannan. Did we learn about risk control since Seveso? Yes, we surely did, but is it enough? An historical brief and problem analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2016, 49, 5 -17.

AMA Style

Prerna Jain, Hans J. Pasman, Simon P. Waldram, William J. Rogers, M. Sam Mannan. Did we learn about risk control since Seveso? Yes, we surely did, but is it enough? An historical brief and problem analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2016; 49 ():5-17.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Prerna Jain; Hans J. Pasman; Simon P. Waldram; William J. Rogers; M. Sam Mannan. 2016. "Did we learn about risk control since Seveso? Yes, we surely did, but is it enough? An historical brief and problem analysis." Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 49, no. : 5-17.

Journal article
Published: 01 May 2015 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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Hans Pasman; William Rogers. The bumpy road to better risk control: A Tour d'Horizon of new concepts and ideas. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2015, 35, 366 -376.

AMA Style

Hans Pasman, William Rogers. The bumpy road to better risk control: A Tour d'Horizon of new concepts and ideas. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2015; 35 ():366-376.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hans Pasman; William Rogers. 2015. "The bumpy road to better risk control: A Tour d'Horizon of new concepts and ideas." Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 35, no. : 366-376.

Journal article
Published: 01 April 2014 in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
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Hans Pasman; Genserik Reniers. Past, present and future of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and the incentive it obtained from Land-Use Planning (LUP). Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 2014, 28, 2 -9.

AMA Style

Hans Pasman, Genserik Reniers. Past, present and future of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and the incentive it obtained from Land-Use Planning (LUP). Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2014; 28 ():2-9.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hans Pasman; Genserik Reniers. 2014. "Past, present and future of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and the incentive it obtained from Land-Use Planning (LUP)." Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 28, no. : 2-9.

Journal article
Published: 01 September 2013 in Reliability Engineering & System Safety
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H.J. Pasman; B. Knegtering; W.J. Rogers. A holistic approach to control process safety risks: Possible ways forward. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 2013, 117, 21 -29.

AMA Style

H.J. Pasman, B. Knegtering, W.J. Rogers. A holistic approach to control process safety risks: Possible ways forward. Reliability Engineering & System Safety. 2013; 117 ():21-29.

Chicago/Turabian Style

H.J. Pasman; B. Knegtering; W.J. Rogers. 2013. "A holistic approach to control process safety risks: Possible ways forward." Reliability Engineering & System Safety 117, no. : 21-29.