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Considering the carbon trading mechanism and consumers’ preference for low-carbon products, a game decision-making model for the low-carbon e-commerce supply chain (LCE-SC) is constructed. The influences of commission and carbon trading on the optimal decisions of LCE-SC are discussed and then verified through numerical analysis. On this basis, the influence of carbon trading on regional sustainable development is empirically analyzed. The results show that the establishment of carbon trading pilots alleviates the negative impact of unfair profit distribution. Increasing the commission rate in a reasonable range improves the profitability of LCE-SC. Nevertheless, with the enhancement of consumers’ low-carbon preference, a lower commission rate is more beneficial to carbon emission reduction. The total carbon emission is positively related to the commission rate. However, the unit carbon emission decreases first and then increases with the commission rate. The influence of the carbon price sensitivity coefficient on the service level is first positive and then negative, while the influence on the manufacturer’s profit goes the opposite. The empirical analysis confirms that the implementation of carbon trading is conducive to regional sustainable development and controlling environmental governance intensity promotes carbon productivity.
Liang Shen; Xiaodi Wang; Qinqin Liu; Yuyan Wang; Lingxue Lv; Rongyun Tang. Carbon Trading Mechanism, Low-Carbon E-Commerce Supply Chain and Sustainable Development. Mathematics 2021, 9, 1717 .
AMA StyleLiang Shen, Xiaodi Wang, Qinqin Liu, Yuyan Wang, Lingxue Lv, Rongyun Tang. Carbon Trading Mechanism, Low-Carbon E-Commerce Supply Chain and Sustainable Development. Mathematics. 2021; 9 (15):1717.
Chicago/Turabian StyleLiang Shen; Xiaodi Wang; Qinqin Liu; Yuyan Wang; Lingxue Lv; Rongyun Tang. 2021. "Carbon Trading Mechanism, Low-Carbon E-Commerce Supply Chain and Sustainable Development." Mathematics 9, no. 15: 1717.
This study considers two incentive mechanisms, the reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) and the altruistic preference (AP). An E-commerce closed-loop supply chain consisting of a remanufacturer and a network recycling platform (the platform) is constructed to examine the recycling service and the quality improvement. Three models are developed to study how RPM and AP affect recycling decisions and models are also extended to multiple recycling periods to explore how profits and recycling quantity change with time under two incentive mechanisms. The findings show that the RPM and AP help to improve recycling service level, quality improvement level, and recycling quantity. However, under the influence of the platform's AP, the RPM is not always conducive to raising the recycling price. The influence of the platform's AP on recycling price is affected by the quality improvement cost parameter. Only when the RPM intensity is higher than the threshold, RPM can benefit remanufacturer. Consumer surplus is higher with AP and RPM both considered, so consumers can benefit from the two incentive mechanisms. The social welfare first increases and then decreases with the RPM intensity, but increases with the AP coefficient if the reference point of the remanufacturer's profit is small. Although the AP causes a decrease in the platform's profit in the early period of recycling, it can increase recycling quantity and the remanufacturer's profit over time. Moreover, both the remanufacturer and the platform can benefit from two incentive mechanisms and eventually obtain higher profits over time.
Yuyan Wang; Zhaoqing Yu; Liang Shen; Wenquan Dong. Impacts of altruistic preference and reward-penalty mechanism on decisions of E-commerce closed-loop supply chain. Journal of Cleaner Production 2021, 315, 128132 .
AMA StyleYuyan Wang, Zhaoqing Yu, Liang Shen, Wenquan Dong. Impacts of altruistic preference and reward-penalty mechanism on decisions of E-commerce closed-loop supply chain. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2021; 315 ():128132.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYuyan Wang; Zhaoqing Yu; Liang Shen; Wenquan Dong. 2021. "Impacts of altruistic preference and reward-penalty mechanism on decisions of E-commerce closed-loop supply chain." Journal of Cleaner Production 315, no. : 128132.
This paper reviews the decisions, coordination contract, and altruistic preference of an e-commerce supply chain (eSC) composed of a manufacturer and a third-party e-commerce platform (platform). The research derives optimal decisions in a decentralized model with altruistic preference; it is indicated that altruistic preference can help increase the sales price and sales service level. Although the platform’s altruistic preference is not beneficial to its own profits, it can help increase the manufacturer’s profits. Moreover, when the degree of altruistic preference is kept within a limit, the profit of the decentralized system is higher in a model with altruistic preferences, which indicates that altruistic preference can contribute toward maintaining a friendly, harmonious, and cooperative a relationship between the platform and manufacturers. Contrary to a traditional offline supply chain, where the sales price is the lowest in the centralized model, the sales price is highest in a centralized eSC model. In the proposed coordination contract, the platform with a certain degree of altruistic preference offers zero-commission sales service and charges a certain amount for a fixed professional service fee. The proposed contract is more applicable to products whose market demands are less affected by sales prices and more affected by the sales service level.
Yuyan Wang; Zhaoqing Yu; Liang Shen; Wenquan Dong. E-Commerce Supply Chain Models under Altruistic Preference. Mathematics 2021, 9, 632 .
AMA StyleYuyan Wang, Zhaoqing Yu, Liang Shen, Wenquan Dong. E-Commerce Supply Chain Models under Altruistic Preference. Mathematics. 2021; 9 (6):632.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYuyan Wang; Zhaoqing Yu; Liang Shen; Wenquan Dong. 2021. "E-Commerce Supply Chain Models under Altruistic Preference." Mathematics 9, no. 6: 632.
Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.
Yuyan Wang; Zhaoqing Yu; Liang Shen; Runjie Fan; Rongyun Tang. Decisions and Coordination in E-Commerce Supply Chain under Logistics Outsourcing and Altruistic Preferences. Mathematics 2021, 9, 253 .
AMA StyleYuyan Wang, Zhaoqing Yu, Liang Shen, Runjie Fan, Rongyun Tang. Decisions and Coordination in E-Commerce Supply Chain under Logistics Outsourcing and Altruistic Preferences. Mathematics. 2021; 9 (3):253.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYuyan Wang; Zhaoqing Yu; Liang Shen; Runjie Fan; Rongyun Tang. 2021. "Decisions and Coordination in E-Commerce Supply Chain under Logistics Outsourcing and Altruistic Preferences." Mathematics 9, no. 3: 253.
In recent years, manufacturers have been under pressure from consumers and the government in terms of environmental awareness and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The CRS behavior regulated by government subsidy is limited understood and needs attention urgently. In this study, three closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) models, including one decentralized decision-making model without fair concerns, one decentralized decision-making model with fair concerns, and one centralized decision-making model with fair concerns, were designed to for understanding the influence of government subsidy, CSR coefficient, and fairness concerns on decision-making by comparing optimal solutions of these models. Proportion of government subsidy was utilized as a coordination variable to design a joint contract of ‘government subsidy sharing and cost sharing’ and to coordinate decentralized decision-making. On this basis, two extended models, a CSR-based fairness concern model and a government decision-making model, were proposed. Finally, the models are verified by numerical experiments. Conclusions that we drew from this study. Our research shows that: (i) There is a threshold for the manufacturer's CSR, and CSR works only if it is higher than this threshold. Both the CSR behavior of manufactures and the fairness concerns of retailers can increase consumer surplus, retailer’s profit, and system profit but damage the leading enterprises' profit. CSR behavior of manufactures can effectively diminish retailer's fairness concern, but will reduce the efficiency of government subsidy to some degree which differs from past researches. (ii) The impact of retailers’ fairness concern about the profits gap is twofold. On one hand, it decreases the sales price and increases the consumer surplus in the forward supply chain. On the other hand, it decreases the price and quantity of recycling in the reverse supply chain. (iii) The centralized decision-making model has the lowest retail price of products, the highest the recycling price of waste products, and the highest system profit. (iv) After coordination, the retailer's share of profits increases as the fairness concern increases, but the feasible scope for coordination mechanisms decreases.
Yuyan Wang; Mei Su; Liang Shen; Rongyun Tang. Decision-making of closed-loop supply chain under Corporate Social Responsibility and fairness concerns. Journal of Cleaner Production 2020, 284, 125373 .
AMA StyleYuyan Wang, Mei Su, Liang Shen, Rongyun Tang. Decision-making of closed-loop supply chain under Corporate Social Responsibility and fairness concerns. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2020; 284 ():125373.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYuyan Wang; Mei Su; Liang Shen; Rongyun Tang. 2020. "Decision-making of closed-loop supply chain under Corporate Social Responsibility and fairness concerns." Journal of Cleaner Production 284, no. : 125373.
Since environmental problems are becoming increasingly prominent, macro policies and social development have placed higher requirements on manufacturing enterprises to promote green transformation and upgrading (GTU) in China. Considering that different manufacturing enterprises choose different green technology innovation levels for GTU under environmental regulation, a game model between manufacturing enterprises and the government is constructed. The relationship between the green technology innovation level (GTIL) and the environmental regulation intensity is analyzed. Through numerical examples, the influences of environmental regulation and consumer preference on system decisions are further examined. Moreover, an econometric model is constructed to explore the influence that the environmental regulation exerts on the GTIL using panel data from the Chinese manufacturing industry. Our results show that the increase in environmental regulation intensity contributes to improving GTIL and promoting the GTU of manufacturing enterprises. Furthermore, as the environmental regulation is enhanced, the sales price decreases, benefiting consumers. Consumers’ preference for high-GTIL products is conducive to GTU under environmental regulation. Empirical analysis shows that there is a U-shaped relationship between environmental regulation and the GTIL. Only when the intensity reaches a threshold can the environmental regulation be beneficial to improve the GTIL and promote the GTU of Chinese manufacturing enterprises.
Liang Shen; Runjie Fan; Yuyan Wang; Zhaoqing Yu; Rongyun Tang. Impacts of Environmental Regulation on the Green Transformation and Upgrading of Manufacturing Enterprises. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2020, 17, 7680 .
AMA StyleLiang Shen, Runjie Fan, Yuyan Wang, Zhaoqing Yu, Rongyun Tang. Impacts of Environmental Regulation on the Green Transformation and Upgrading of Manufacturing Enterprises. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020; 17 (20):7680.
Chicago/Turabian StyleLiang Shen; Runjie Fan; Yuyan Wang; Zhaoqing Yu; Rongyun Tang. 2020. "Impacts of Environmental Regulation on the Green Transformation and Upgrading of Manufacturing Enterprises." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 20: 7680.
For a low-carbon e-commerce closed-loop supply chain (LCE-CLSC), the influence of a government subsidy and a remanufacturer’s altruistic preference on the decision-making is discussed. Additionally, from the perspective of social value, decisions of LCE-CLSC are compared and analyzed. On this basis, the ‘Altruistic Preference Joint Commission’ contract is given to realize the system coordination. Finally, verify the models’ conclusions by the numerical analysis. The results are as follows: government subsidies improve the overall supply chain operational efficiency and the total social surplus. The altruistic preference behavior increases the revenue of the e-commerce platform and improves the efficiency of the LCE-CLSC, but is not advantageous to the remanufacturer. In addition, the effects of altruistic behavior on promoting the recycling of waste products are inferior to the effects of government subsidies of the same strength. Both the consumer surplus and the total social surplus are the highest under the centralized model. The increase in the consumers’ awareness of low-carbon environmental protections is seen to increase the substantiality of the contract negotiation space and the feasibility of the coordination mechanism of the ‘Altruistic Preference Joint Commission’ contract as well.
Yuyan Wang; Runjie Fan; Liang Shen; William Miller. Recycling decisions of low-carbon e-commerce closed-loop supply chain under government subsidy mechanism and altruistic preference. Journal of Cleaner Production 2020, 259, 120883 .
AMA StyleYuyan Wang, Runjie Fan, Liang Shen, William Miller. Recycling decisions of low-carbon e-commerce closed-loop supply chain under government subsidy mechanism and altruistic preference. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2020; 259 ():120883.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYuyan Wang; Runjie Fan; Liang Shen; William Miller. 2020. "Recycling decisions of low-carbon e-commerce closed-loop supply chain under government subsidy mechanism and altruistic preference." Journal of Cleaner Production 259, no. : 120883.