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In the study of environmental protection issues for more than forty years, research on the impact of financial performance on environmental protection has been one of the important branches. In the framework of principal-agent theory, this paper explores the opportunism motives in a company’s environmental protection activism and the moderating role of corporate governance using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2016. The study finds that: (1) the company’s environmental protection activism is driven by the opportunist motives of policymakers who want to mask their inability; and (2) environmental protection activism does not enhance the company’s future performance and value creation capability. Further studies find that corporate governance mechanisms play different moderating roles. Fund Shareholders play a positive governance role and reduce the correlation between financial performance and environmental protection activism. However, independence of the board of directors intensifies the opportunist motives. This paper provides new theoretical explanations for environmental protection decision-making, provides novel enlightenment for the protection of environmental protection policies in developing countries and regions.
Shengnan Li; Jianbo Niu; Sang-Bing Tsai. Opportunism Motivation of Environmental Protection Activism and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Study from China. Sustainability 2018, 10, 1725 .
AMA StyleShengnan Li, Jianbo Niu, Sang-Bing Tsai. Opportunism Motivation of Environmental Protection Activism and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Study from China. Sustainability. 2018; 10 (6):1725.
Chicago/Turabian StyleShengnan Li; Jianbo Niu; Sang-Bing Tsai. 2018. "Opportunism Motivation of Environmental Protection Activism and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Study from China." Sustainability 10, no. 6: 1725.
This paper investigates the impact of the purchase of directors' and officers' liability insurance on performance in some listed Chinese companies. We found a significant positive cumulative abnormal return for the three-day window. Considering the firm characteristics, we found that firm size, leverage and the proportion of shares listed in overseas exchanges are significantly related with CAR. We also find that the behavior of purchase of the D&O insurance can provide additional information about the lower governance risk for shareholders.
Jianbo Niu; Shengnan Li. The Effect of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance on Performance: Evidence from China. 2010 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering 2010, 1 -4.
AMA StyleJianbo Niu, Shengnan Li. The Effect of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance on Performance: Evidence from China. 2010 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering. 2010; ():1-4.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJianbo Niu; Shengnan Li. 2010. "The Effect of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance on Performance: Evidence from China." 2010 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering , no. : 1-4.
This article has been retracted by the publisher.
Shengnan Li; Jianbo Niu. Notice of Retraction: Research on the Governance Effect of Board Size: An New Explanation from Performance Variability. 2010 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering 2010, 1 -4.
AMA StyleShengnan Li, Jianbo Niu. Notice of Retraction: Research on the Governance Effect of Board Size: An New Explanation from Performance Variability. 2010 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering. 2010; ():1-4.
Chicago/Turabian StyleShengnan Li; Jianbo Niu. 2010. "Notice of Retraction: Research on the Governance Effect of Board Size: An New Explanation from Performance Variability." 2010 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering , no. : 1-4.
This article has been retracted by the publisher.
Shengnan Li; Jianbo Niu. Notice of Retraction: Corporate Governance and Governance Premium: Evidence from China. 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science 2009, 1 -4.
AMA StyleShengnan Li, Jianbo Niu. Notice of Retraction: Corporate Governance and Governance Premium: Evidence from China. 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science. 2009; ():1-4.
Chicago/Turabian StyleShengnan Li; Jianbo Niu. 2009. "Notice of Retraction: Corporate Governance and Governance Premium: Evidence from China." 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science , no. : 1-4.
We try to explore the relation among three factors: the private benefits that main shareholders can obtain from the firm, the social benefits derived from a certain ownership structure and the ownership concentration costs. Different corporations have different optimal governance mechanism. Noticing the substitute relation between the level of the management-and-shareholder-conflicts and the different governance mechanism, we take use of the data from China’ stock market and conduct an empirical analysis on the influence both of the different shareholder’s participating in governance and the ownership structure over corporate performance, and have reached two conclusions. First, in the companies with a higher level of conflicts between the management and the shareholders, the shareholder will be more active in participating in governance because the benefits earned here is much more than the company with a lower level of conflicts. Second, when the other governance mechanisms in one company perform poorly, the shareholder is less active in participating in governance because the extra benefits earned here cannot offset their costs. So only in these companies with poor governance mechanisms, the shareholders’ active monitoring can produce benefits. These conclusions can help our further research on the relationship among the shareholder supervision, ownership structure and corporate value, and we should also re-evaluate some traditional theoretical viewpoints
Weian Li; Jianbo Niu. Private interest and social interest of shareholders: empirical evidence from China. Corporate Ownership and Control 2007, 5, 254 -261.
AMA StyleWeian Li, Jianbo Niu. Private interest and social interest of shareholders: empirical evidence from China. Corporate Ownership and Control. 2007; 5 (1):254-261.
Chicago/Turabian StyleWeian Li; Jianbo Niu. 2007. "Private interest and social interest of shareholders: empirical evidence from China." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1: 254-261.