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The development of the sustainable economy has gradually become a consensus, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the key to achieving the sustainable development. However due to the implementation of CSR will increase the cost burden of enterprises, some companies are even unwilling to fulfill CSR. At this time, the government often encourages companies to fulfill CSR through subsidies, and consumers are willing to pay a higher price for CSR products. Therefore, this article focuses on the supply chain decision-making analysis problem in the sustainable supply chain. Based on consumer preference for CSR products, considering CSR and government subsidies, some relevant models are constructed to analyze decisions under different power structures and different subsidy situations, then the article compares them and finally draws relevant conclusions. The study found that the higher the consumer's preference, the higher the product sales and CSR level. In addition, government subsidies to manufacturers or consumers have the same effect. Among the three power structures, the overall benefit of supply chain is the highest in VN (Vertical Nash) power structure, so the government should play a leading role and try to narrow any possible gap of channel power.
Yong Liu; Wenwen Ren; Qian Xu; Zhi-Yang Liu. Decision analysis of supply chains considering corporate social responsibility and government subsidy under different channel power structures. Annals of Operations Research 2021, 1 -29.
AMA StyleYong Liu, Wenwen Ren, Qian Xu, Zhi-Yang Liu. Decision analysis of supply chains considering corporate social responsibility and government subsidy under different channel power structures. Annals of Operations Research. 2021; ():1-29.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Wenwen Ren; Qian Xu; Zhi-Yang Liu. 2021. "Decision analysis of supply chains considering corporate social responsibility and government subsidy under different channel power structures." Annals of Operations Research , no. : 1-29.
Purpose Social media platforms are currently facing the challenge of declining user activity. Building on the push–pull–mooring (PPM) framework, the current study developed a research model to evaluate factors that affect Facebook discontinuance. Design/methodology/approach The proposed research model assessed how push factors (e.g. Facebook fatigue and dissatisfaction), a pull factor (e.g. alternative attractiveness) and mooring factors (e.g. personal norms and habit of using Facebook) affected the discontinued usage behavior regarding Facebook. The proposed research model was validated using empirical data (n = 412) collected from Facebook users. Findings Facebook fatigue, dissatisfaction and alternative attractiveness significantly and positively affected discontinued Facebook usage. Personal norms and habit of using Facebook had a converse influence in this regard. Dissatisfaction had a stronger positive impact than Facebook fatigue and alternative attractiveness on the discontinued usage behavior regarding Facebook. Habits of using Facebook had a greater negative effect than personal norms of using Facebook on the discontinued usage behavior regarding Facebook by users. Originality/value This study extends extant literature on social media discontinuance to identify the antecedents of discontinuous usage behavior in social media. This study enriches the literature on social media discontinuance by shedding light on the different degrees of effect of the push, pull and mooring factors on discontinuous social media usage behavior.
Shaoxiong Fu; Hongxiu Li; Yong Liu. Why discontinue Facebook usage? An empirical investigation based on a push–pull–mooring framework. Industrial Management & Data Systems 2021, ahead-of-p, 1 .
AMA StyleShaoxiong Fu, Hongxiu Li, Yong Liu. Why discontinue Facebook usage? An empirical investigation based on a push–pull–mooring framework. Industrial Management & Data Systems. 2021; ahead-of-p (ahead-of-p):1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleShaoxiong Fu; Hongxiu Li; Yong Liu. 2021. "Why discontinue Facebook usage? An empirical investigation based on a push–pull–mooring framework." Industrial Management & Data Systems ahead-of-p, no. ahead-of-p: 1.
People will always consciously or unconsciously compare their cost or benefits of actions with those of others and make judgments about fairness. Aiming at consensus reaching process where decision makers have fairness concern behaviors, this paper proposes a limited cost consensus model with fairness concern. To do this, we define the fairness utility function and fairness utility level based on fairness preference theory and explore some properties. In view of this, we propose a limited cost consensus approach with fairness concern of decision makers, which can obtain a stable and balanced consensus. Through emission reduction consensus problem of Chinese manufacturing enterprises, comparative analysis and sensitivity analysis are used to explain the proposed model. Conclusions about fairness preferences, consensus cost budget, and unit compensation cost can provide significant managerial references for real-world economic and management activities.
Junliang Du; Sifeng Liu; Yong Liu. A limited cost consensus approach with fairness concern and its application. European Journal of Operational Research 2021, 1 .
AMA StyleJunliang Du, Sifeng Liu, Yong Liu. A limited cost consensus approach with fairness concern and its application. European Journal of Operational Research. 2021; ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJunliang Du; Sifeng Liu; Yong Liu. 2021. "A limited cost consensus approach with fairness concern and its application." European Journal of Operational Research , no. : 1.
There exist a variety of channel conflict problems in dual supply chain, some manufacturers and retailers often consider consumers’ reviews and adopt some measures such as rebate and revenue sharing in order to deal with these problems and expand their respective markets and gain more profits. In this paper, considering the effect of the online reviews and rebate on supply chain, we establish a dual-channel supply chain model, and exploit it to analyze the impact of the rebate and online reviews on the supply chain and discuss their optional decisions, and then we deign a coordination contract through revenue sharing.
Zhen-Juan Xia; Yong Liu; Qi Zhang. A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 2021, 1 -11.
AMA StyleZhen-Juan Xia, Yong Liu, Qi Zhang. A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management. 2021; ():1-11.
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhen-Juan Xia; Yong Liu; Qi Zhang. 2021. "A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate." Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management , no. : 1-11.
Cross‐efficiency evaluation in data envelopment analysis is an effective way to rank decision‐making units (DMUs). However, different cross‐efficiency evaluation models derived from different perspectives generate different cross‐efficiency rankings. The information resulting from the various perspectives may be valuable and should not be ignored. In this paper, we propose an innovative composite method for ranking DMUs by calculating the Shannon entropy of the obtained cross‐efficiency scores derived from the perspectives of satisfaction and consensus. Also, we adopt grey incidence analysis to compare the rankings of different cross‐efficiency models. The calculation procedure using Shannon entropy and grey incidence analysis is illustrated on an example to generate the composite ranking result and compare it to other cross‐efficiency model rankings. The cross‐efficiency ranking using both satisfaction and consensus information provides a new comprehensive perspective in group evaluation. A practical example is used to show that the cross‐efficiency results obtained from the composite perspective of satisfaction and consensus should be widely accepted in practical decision‐making.
Dongdong Wu; Yuhong Wang; Yong Liu; Jie Wu. DEA cross‐efficiency ranking method considering satisfaction and consensus degree. International Transactions in Operational Research 2021, 28, 3470 -3492.
AMA StyleDongdong Wu, Yuhong Wang, Yong Liu, Jie Wu. DEA cross‐efficiency ranking method considering satisfaction and consensus degree. International Transactions in Operational Research. 2021; 28 (6):3470-3492.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDongdong Wu; Yuhong Wang; Yong Liu; Jie Wu. 2021. "DEA cross‐efficiency ranking method considering satisfaction and consensus degree." International Transactions in Operational Research 28, no. 6: 3470-3492.
Group consensus decision-making refers to achieving a consensus result accepted by more decision makers with a certain stability. The consensus stability is mainly affected by game conflicts among decision makers. Therefore, considering super conflict analysis as the ideological basis and the minimum cost consensus model as the method basis, this paper establishes a grey target negotiation consensus model. The model can achieve game negotiation in the grey target region and determine a super continuous stable consensus bull’s-eye. Firstly, this paper proposes a generalized super conflict analysis framework in group decision-making and defines several concepts of conflict stability. Then, we integrate minimum cost consensus and grey target decision to set up a condition that meets the super conflict equilibrium and propose a grey target negotiation consensus model. Finally, an emission reduction consensus from Chinese manufacturing enterprises is applied to verify the rationality of the model.
Jun-Liang Du; Si-Feng Liu; Yong Liu. Grey Target Negotiation Consensus Model Based on Super Conflict Equilibrium. Group Decision and Negotiation 2021, 1 -30.
AMA StyleJun-Liang Du, Si-Feng Liu, Yong Liu. Grey Target Negotiation Consensus Model Based on Super Conflict Equilibrium. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2021; ():1-30.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJun-Liang Du; Si-Feng Liu; Yong Liu. 2021. "Grey Target Negotiation Consensus Model Based on Super Conflict Equilibrium." Group Decision and Negotiation , no. : 1-30.
The research and development (R&D) of industrial generic technologies (IGTs) is a collaborative innovation involving many stakeholders. The key to ensure the R&D success of IGT is how to effectively mobilize various stakeholders to take a more active approach to increase the degree of joint efforts and cooperation. Considering that the degree of effort and cooperation among the stakeholders, and the commonality of IGT and the difficulty of subsequent commercialization have an important impact on its success, in this article, we exploit the thought and methods of gray-target decision model, group negotiations, and game theory to design a government-subsidies incentive mechanism. Besides, considering the government's special role in the R&D, we introduce the stakeholders’ risk preferences of IGTs and discuss the decision-making behaviors of different stakeholders under the circumstances of either cooperation or noncooperation. At the end, we confirm the rationality and validity of our model by using a real case.
Yong Liu; Jian Li; Jia-Shu Liu; Li-Fang Wang; Jin-Hong Yi. A Government-Subsidies Incentive Mechanism for Research and Development of Industrial Generic Technologies. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 2021, PP, 1 -15.
AMA StyleYong Liu, Jian Li, Jia-Shu Liu, Li-Fang Wang, Jin-Hong Yi. A Government-Subsidies Incentive Mechanism for Research and Development of Industrial Generic Technologies. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 2021; PP (99):1-15.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Jian Li; Jia-Shu Liu; Li-Fang Wang; Jin-Hong Yi. 2021. "A Government-Subsidies Incentive Mechanism for Research and Development of Industrial Generic Technologies." IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management PP, no. 99: 1-15.
Online consumer comments can reduce the uncertainty of consumers' purchasing behaviors and provide much more important reference for consumers to make purchasing decisions, and some online consumer comments have the positive and negative effects, and then some online retailers often take different actions to respond to consumers' online comments. To describe and analyze the influence mechanism of online comments on the consumers and retailers, we establish a two‐stage theoretical model by introducing product–demand mismatch and exploit it to analyze the impact of different quality online comments on online retailer and discuss the online retailer's decisions.
Yong Liu; Wen‐Xue Gan; Wen‐Wen Ren. Influence mechanism of online consumer comments on e‐retailer. Managerial and Decision Economics 2021, 42, 1132 -1145.
AMA StyleYong Liu, Wen‐Xue Gan, Wen‐Wen Ren. Influence mechanism of online consumer comments on e‐retailer. Managerial and Decision Economics. 2021; 42 (5):1132-1145.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Wen‐Xue Gan; Wen‐Wen Ren. 2021. "Influence mechanism of online consumer comments on e‐retailer." Managerial and Decision Economics 42, no. 5: 1132-1145.
Waste electrical and electronic equipment have the potential environmental risks and resource value simultaneously. So the product recycling is very important. This paper studies on recycling problems of WEEE under the third-party recycling in a closed-loop supply chain. We take the following measures. Firstly, based on classifying the WEEE, we consider a revenue sharing and cost sharing contract as the coordination mechanism. Secondly, under centralized and decentralized decisions, we use the game analysis technology to determine the optimal pricing and profits, respectively. Finally, we conduct the number simulation to illustrate and validate the proposed models and provide managerial insights. The results show that when retailers sell new and second-hand products simultaneously, consumers become more sensitive to recycling prices, the profits of manufacturers, recyclers and CLSC increase. However, the retailers' profits decline.
Yong Liu; Zhen-Juan Xia; Qian-Qian Shi; Qian Xu. Pricing and coordination of waste electrical and electronic equipment under third-party recycling in a closed-loop supply chain. Environment, Development and Sustainability 2021, 23, 12077 -12094.
AMA StyleYong Liu, Zhen-Juan Xia, Qian-Qian Shi, Qian Xu. Pricing and coordination of waste electrical and electronic equipment under third-party recycling in a closed-loop supply chain. Environment, Development and Sustainability. 2021; 23 (8):12077-12094.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Zhen-Juan Xia; Qian-Qian Shi; Qian Xu. 2021. "Pricing and coordination of waste electrical and electronic equipment under third-party recycling in a closed-loop supply chain." Environment, Development and Sustainability 23, no. 8: 12077-12094.
Construct a two-stage evaluation index system of I–U-R collaborative innovation efficiency. Establish a DEA with shared inputs model. Measure I–U-R collaborative innovation efficiency and explore their regional differences.
Yong Liu; Zhi-Yang Liu; Jian Li. Research on efficiency and differences of regional industry-university-research synergetic innovation in China. Technology in Society 2020, 63, 101369 .
AMA StyleYong Liu, Zhi-Yang Liu, Jian Li. Research on efficiency and differences of regional industry-university-research synergetic innovation in China. Technology in Society. 2020; 63 ():101369.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Zhi-Yang Liu; Jian Li. 2020. "Research on efficiency and differences of regional industry-university-research synergetic innovation in China." Technology in Society 63, no. : 101369.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is an attempt to design a proper incentive coordination mechanism to deal with the channel conflicts between the traditional sales and online direct sales. Design/methodology/approach With respect to the problems of channel conflicts between the traditional sales and online direct sales, to optimize the sale system and get more profits, considering the influences of consumer network acceptance, the authors establish demand and profit function based on consumer's utility, respectively. What's more, we exploit the game theory to analyze the optional decisions of the supply chain under the incentive coordination condition and no incentive coordination condition, and then we discuss the supply chain's optimal pricing, demand, profit and compensation incentive levels with the different effect of consumer network acceptance. Findings The level of compensation incentive provided by the manufacturer is influenced by consumer network acceptance and product cost. The lower the consumer network acceptance, the better the compensation incentive coordination effect of manufacturers. Manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers are all important players in real supply chain relationships. When a manufacturer exists as a dominant role, it should pay full attention to the impact of consumer behavior on supply chain decisions. Practical implications The research can clarify the influence and mechanism of consumer behavior on supply chain channel conflict coordination, and deal with channel conflicts. Originality/value The proposed incentive coordination can effectively realize supply chain channel conflict resolution, and provide decision-making ideas and methods for manufacturers to develop the supply chain management of online direct sales channels.
Yong Liu; Zhi-Yang Liu; Jiao Li. Supply chain channel conflict coordination with consumer network acceptance. Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics 2020, 33, 846 -868.
AMA StyleYong Liu, Zhi-Yang Liu, Jiao Li. Supply chain channel conflict coordination with consumer network acceptance. Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics. 2020; 33 (3):846-868.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Zhi-Yang Liu; Jiao Li. 2020. "Supply chain channel conflict coordination with consumer network acceptance." Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics 33, no. 3: 846-868.
Incidences of holdouts, as group events, have appeared most frequently in many countries. The underlying cause of these occurrences of high frequency has been closely related to multiple objectives or various conflicts of interest of stakeholders. Each negotiation of holdout demolition represents a typical group consensus problem with the outcome greatly influenced by multiple objectives or variables of the decision makers. In order to effectively deal with such difficult problems, we construct a multivariate, minimum cost consensus model based on interval number programming constrained with random chances by jointly employing various approaches, such as minimum cost consensus model, multivariate planning, stochastic opportunity constrained programming and interval numbers. After the theoretical development, this paper employs the established method to solve the problem of holdout demolition of particular town A.
Yong Liu; Ting Zhou; Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest. A Multivariate Minimum Cost Consensus Model for Negotiations of Holdout Demolition. Group Decision and Negotiation 2020, 29, 1 -29.
AMA StyleYong Liu, Ting Zhou, Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest. A Multivariate Minimum Cost Consensus Model for Negotiations of Holdout Demolition. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2020; 29 (5):1-29.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Ting Zhou; Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest. 2020. "A Multivariate Minimum Cost Consensus Model for Negotiations of Holdout Demolition." Group Decision and Negotiation 29, no. 5: 1-29.
To deal with coordination problem of a supply chain consisting of two competitive suppliers and a dominant retailer, considering these factors such as cooperation effort degrees and competition on the supply chain members, we establish a two-stage model considering cooperation effort degrees and competition of the suppliers from the perspectives of decentralized decision and centralized decision and exploit it to discuss the optional decisions and explore the impact of cooperation effort degrees on the profits of supply chain members. Then, we use a group negotiation model to establish a coordination mechanism. The results reveal that the decision variables and overall profit of the supply chain of suppliers and retailers under centralized decisions are better than those under the decentralized decisions. Besides, the degree of competition and price sensitivity have positive and negative effects on the efforts of suppliers and retailers, respectively. Meanwhile, the degree of cooperation between suppliers and retailers affects the profits of supply chain members and the whole supply chain in different degrees. Finally, the proposed value-added profit distribution mechanism can effectively deal with conflict problem and guarantee supply chain members and supply chain to maximize their profits and adopt the centralized decision.
Zhi-Yang Liu; Yong Liu; Hui Li. A Coordination Mechanism of Supply Chain with a Retailer and Two Competitive Suppliers. Complexity 2020, 2020, 1 -14.
AMA StyleZhi-Yang Liu, Yong Liu, Hui Li. A Coordination Mechanism of Supply Chain with a Retailer and Two Competitive Suppliers. Complexity. 2020; 2020 ():1-14.
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhi-Yang Liu; Yong Liu; Hui Li. 2020. "A Coordination Mechanism of Supply Chain with a Retailer and Two Competitive Suppliers." Complexity 2020, no. : 1-14.
To promote social responsibilities of transnational corporation within the present world where such necessary corporation is seriously missing, this paper explores issues of decision-making and coordination of such a two-echelon supply chain that consists of a contract supplier and a dominant manufacturer. Considering the main reasons behind the lack of social responsibilities of multinational corporations, this work develops a model with punishment. Based on this model, we obtain the optimal decision for the supply-chain members under either decentralized decision-making or centralized decision-making. And we analyze whether the penalty rate will have an impact on the input of corporate social responsibility and how it will affect the self-interests of supply chain members. Ultimately, by exploring the decision variables of companies that practice stronger corporate social responsibility, we compare and analyze our models to draw several interesting and practically useful conclusions.
Yong Liu; Zhi-Yang Liu; Wen-Wen Ren; Jeffrey Yi Lin Forrest. A coordination mechanism through relational contract in a two-echelon supply chain. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 2020, 56, 102156 .
AMA StyleYong Liu, Zhi-Yang Liu, Wen-Wen Ren, Jeffrey Yi Lin Forrest. A coordination mechanism through relational contract in a two-echelon supply chain. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services. 2020; 56 ():102156.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Zhi-Yang Liu; Wen-Wen Ren; Jeffrey Yi Lin Forrest. 2020. "A coordination mechanism through relational contract in a two-echelon supply chain." Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 56, no. : 102156.
The selection of renewable energy storage technology has important significance for maintaining the supply and demand balance of renewable energy, reducing the application cost of new energy and accelerating the pace of the new energy revolution. Different from the existing research which regards the selection of energy storage technology as a multi-criteria decision-making problem, it is called as a multi-criteria group decision-making problem in this study. This paper defines the dual hesitant Pythagorean fuzzy linguistic term sets and proposes a multi criteria decision support framework for renewable energy storage technology selection from the perspective of group decision-making. Then, the empirical example considers the case of energy storage technology selection in Jiangsu Province, China. The proposed method is exploited to analyze the robustness of the results and its comparison to other methods. The case study shoes that it can help the managers scientifically choose more suitable renewable energy storage technology alternatives.
Yong Liu; Jun-Liang Du. A multi criteria decision support framework for renewable energy storage technology selection. Journal of Cleaner Production 2020, 277, 122183 .
AMA StyleYong Liu, Jun-Liang Du. A multi criteria decision support framework for renewable energy storage technology selection. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2020; 277 ():122183.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Jun-Liang Du. 2020. "A multi criteria decision support framework for renewable energy storage technology selection." Journal of Cleaner Production 277, no. : 122183.
The consumers pay more and more attention to corporate social responsibility (CSR), which has been a new competitiveness for the enterprises. This paper constructs a supply chain consisting of a dominated retailer, a socially responsible supplier and a non‐socially responsible supplier (compared with the socially responsible supplier), consider the consumer preference and exploit the game analysis technique to analyze the optimal decisions under the decentralized and concentrated decision, and then design a coordination mechanism based on value‐added profit distribution. The results show that compared with the decentralized decision, the retail price and order quantity of two products are lower, the CSR effort degree of socially responsible supplier is higher, and the performance of the whole supply chain is better under the concentrated decision. In addition, the mechanism designed can induce the socially responsible supplier to undertake CSR without damaging its profit, prompt the supply chain members to make the concentrated decisions, and promote the competitiveness of the retailer‐dominated supply chain.
Yong Liu; Qian Xu; Zhi‐Yang Liu. A coordination mechanism through value‐added profit distribution in a supply chain considering corporate social responsibility. Managerial and Decision Economics 2019, 41, 586 -598.
AMA StyleYong Liu, Qian Xu, Zhi‐Yang Liu. A coordination mechanism through value‐added profit distribution in a supply chain considering corporate social responsibility. Managerial and Decision Economics. 2019; 41 (4):586-598.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Qian Xu; Zhi‐Yang Liu. 2019. "A coordination mechanism through value‐added profit distribution in a supply chain considering corporate social responsibility." Managerial and Decision Economics 41, no. 4: 586-598.
Pricing problems are the core content of product management and supply chain management, so that how to make rational price for different products under a dual-channel supply chain has been an urgent problem to be solved. With respect to the pricing problem of two differentiated products in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a dominant manufacturer and a retailer, considering different consumer network acceptance for different products, we establish basic demand and profit functions by maximizing consumer utility. Then we exploit game theory to analyze the optimal decisions under single-channel and dual-channel of supply chains, respectively, and explore the impact of different consumer network acceptances on the optimal pricing, demand and profit of supply chains
Yong Liu; Jiao Li; Wenwen Ren; Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest. Differentiated products pricing with consumer network acceptance in a dual-channel supply chain. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 2019, 39, 100915 .
AMA StyleYong Liu, Jiao Li, Wenwen Ren, Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest. Differentiated products pricing with consumer network acceptance in a dual-channel supply chain. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications. 2019; 39 ():100915.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Jiao Li; Wenwen Ren; Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest. 2019. "Differentiated products pricing with consumer network acceptance in a dual-channel supply chain." Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 39, no. : 100915.
In a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), the right alliance can help manufacturers better manufacture green products and make more profits. Choosing the most suitable alliance partner is also critical for manufacturers. In regard to product greenness and recycling competition, this paper considers the CLSC comprised of a dominant manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. Based on the Stackelberg game and equilibrium analysis, we discuss the optimal supply chain decision-making under four different models. Then, in order to ensure supply chain (SC) members’ enthusiasm to participate in the alliance, we design a profit distribution method to distribute the total profit to SC members. The results show that manufacturer’s optimal alliance decision is related to the degree of recycling competition. When less than the threshold, C alliance(the manufacturer make an alliance with the retailer and the third-party recycler at the same time) is optimal, otherwise, MR alliance(the manufacturer and the retailer make an alliance ) is more beneficial for the manufacturer.
Yong Liu; Qian-Qian Shi; Qian Xu. Alliance Decision of Supply Chain Considering Product Greenness and Recycling Competition. Sustainability 2019, 11, 6900 .
AMA StyleYong Liu, Qian-Qian Shi, Qian Xu. Alliance Decision of Supply Chain Considering Product Greenness and Recycling Competition. Sustainability. 2019; 11 (24):6900.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Qian-Qian Shi; Qian Xu. 2019. "Alliance Decision of Supply Chain Considering Product Greenness and Recycling Competition." Sustainability 11, no. 24: 6900.
The interest conflict is an important factor affecting the supply chain (SC) performance, so it is very important to set up a reasonable coordination mechanism to eliminate the SC conflicts. Considering the fact that suppliers' effort performance level and fairness concern behavior are important factors affecting SC performance, we can develop SC models to analyze and compare SC decisions under the centralized decision and decentralized decision, and then we design a SC coordination mechanism through cost sharing. The results show that the designed coordination mechanism can effectively solve the conflict problem of SC, mobilize SC members’ motivation and initiative without damaging their profits, and realize the long-term cooperation between the retailer and multi-suppliers. It also can achieve the Pareto improvement and the sustainable development of SC.
Yong Liu; Dong-Dong Wang; Qian Xu. A supply chain coordination mechanism with suppliers’ effort performance level and fairness concern. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 2019, 53, 101950 .
AMA StyleYong Liu, Dong-Dong Wang, Qian Xu. A supply chain coordination mechanism with suppliers’ effort performance level and fairness concern. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services. 2019; 53 ():101950.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Dong-Dong Wang; Qian Xu. 2019. "A supply chain coordination mechanism with suppliers’ effort performance level and fairness concern." Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 53, no. : 101950.
Clustering analysis is a common problem in decision-making, and its process often changes with the environment. Grey incidence is a theoretical method of effective classification, which uses the degree of incidence between objects to determine the classes. However, it is difficult to obtain the clustering threshold value and analyze the dynamic changes of decision-making environment. In order to resolve the problem, grey incidence clustering and three-way decisions are exploited to construct a three-way grey incidence clustering approach with changing decision objects based on the principle of complementary advantages. Then a case of the clustering problem with dynamic objects is used to illustrate the feasibility and effectiveness of our proposed approach.
Yong Liu; Ren-Shi Zhang. A three-way grey incidence clustering approach with changing decision objects. Computers & Industrial Engineering 2019, 137, 106087 .
AMA StyleYong Liu, Ren-Shi Zhang. A three-way grey incidence clustering approach with changing decision objects. Computers & Industrial Engineering. 2019; 137 ():106087.
Chicago/Turabian StyleYong Liu; Ren-Shi Zhang. 2019. "A three-way grey incidence clustering approach with changing decision objects." Computers & Industrial Engineering 137, no. : 106087.