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Competitive endogenous audit mechanisms may help budget-constrained regulatory agencies to improve compliance with regulations. Under these mechanisms, the probability of an audit depends on relative comparisons among peers, with agencies directing resources towards those entities the agencies believe to be less compliant than other similar regulated entities. Despite their theoretical advantages, no previous empirical study explores whether any agency implements these mechanisms. We provide this evidence by examining the inspection strategies of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regional offices and state agencies charged with enforcing Clean Water Act discharge limits imposed on chemical manufacturing facilities. We find that federal inspectors appear to use competitive endogenous audit mechanisms involving relative evaluation but state inspectors apparently do not. Our empirical study represents the first necessary step for demonstrating that use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms improves compliance in practice.
Dietrich Earnhart; Lana Friesen. Use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms by federal and state inspectors within environmental protection agencies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2021, 102476 .
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, Lana Friesen. Use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms by federal and state inspectors within environmental protection agencies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2021; ():102476.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; Lana Friesen. 2021. "Use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms by federal and state inspectors within environmental protection agencies." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , no. : 102476.
This study explores the effect of environmental self-audits (‘audits’), which represent an important type of environmental management system practice, on the extent of facilities’ compliance with wastewater discharge limits. Previous studies of environmental audits explore either the presence or frequency of audits only, while ignoring the quality of audits and heterogeneous effects across facility types. Our study contributes to the economic literature by examining the role of audit quality, as measured by the comprehensiveness of the audit protocol, and the influence of facility age on the effectiveness of more frequent auditing. These two features prove important especially in combination. Our study empirically examines the U.S. chemical manufacturing sector using survey and publicly available EPA data. Empirical results reveal that more frequent audits improve the extent of compliance but only for older facilities and only when these facilities conduct high quality audits. In contrast, for newer facilities, more frequent high quality audits fail to improve compliance; worse yet, more frequent low quality audits sadly undermine compliance. Both sets of results are consistent with our hypotheses.
Dietrich Earnhart; Donna Ramirez Harrington. Effects of audit frequency, audit quality, and facility age on environmental compliance. Applied Economics 2021, 53, 3234 -3252.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, Donna Ramirez Harrington. Effects of audit frequency, audit quality, and facility age on environmental compliance. Applied Economics. 2021; 53 (28):3234-3252.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; Donna Ramirez Harrington. 2021. "Effects of audit frequency, audit quality, and facility age on environmental compliance." Applied Economics 53, no. 28: 3234-3252.
Responsibility for enforcing environmental protection laws often falls on both federal and state agencies. We investigate whether enforcement and monitoring taken by the federal agency—the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—and enforcement and monitoring actions taken by U.S. state environmental agencies differentially affect the compliance behavior of pollution point sources regulated under the U.S. Clean Water Act. Our results demonstrate that federal inspections are more effective than state inspections, yet state fines are more effective than federal fines, at inducing compliance with Clean Water Act-imposed discharge limits.
Dietrich Earnhart; Lana Friesen. Enforcement Federalism: Comparing the Effectiveness of Federal Punishment versus State Punishment. Environmental and Resource Economics 2021, 78, 227 -255.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, Lana Friesen. Enforcement Federalism: Comparing the Effectiveness of Federal Punishment versus State Punishment. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2021; 78 (2):227-255.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; Lana Friesen. 2021. "Enforcement Federalism: Comparing the Effectiveness of Federal Punishment versus State Punishment." Environmental and Resource Economics 78, no. 2: 227-255.
Peer comparisons combine descriptive and injunctive messages about social norms. In experiments, these comparisons have encouraged pro-environmental behaviors among consumers. Consumers, however, are not the only sources of environmental externalities. Firms and other organizations also damage the environment. Yet organizations may not respond to peer comparisons in the same way that consumers respond because organizations have different objectives, constraints, and decision-making processes. In a pre-registered field experiment with 328 municipal wastewater treatment facilities in Kansas, we randomly sent some facilities a certified letter that contrasted, using text and a graphic, each facility’s discharge behavior to the behaviors of other facilities in the state. We estimate the effect of these peer comparisons on the degree to which the recipient facilities complied with discharge limits under the U.S. Clean Water Act. On average, letter recipients reported discharge ratios 8% lower than non-recipients in the eighteen-month period after letters were sent (95% CI [-15%, -1%]), although we cannot detect an effect in all post-treatment quarters. We believe that the results warrant further experimental replications and extensions to examine the cost-effectiveness of reducing pollution through peer comparisons.
Dietrich Earnhart; Paul J. Ferraro. The Effect of Peer Comparisons on Polluters: A Randomized Field Experiment among Wastewater Dischargers. Environmental and Resource Economics 2020, 79, 627 -652.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, Paul J. Ferraro. The Effect of Peer Comparisons on Polluters: A Randomized Field Experiment among Wastewater Dischargers. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2020; 79 (4):627-652.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; Paul J. Ferraro. 2020. "The Effect of Peer Comparisons on Polluters: A Randomized Field Experiment among Wastewater Dischargers." Environmental and Resource Economics 79, no. 4: 627-652.
This study explores the roles of enforcement in explaining management choices tied to regulatory compliance. Within this exploration, the study pursues two research objectives. First, it discerns the separate effects of punishment certainty and punishment severity on compliance decisions; this task is generally difficult especially since it requires constructing measures of the beliefs held by individuals or regulated businesses. Second, the study compares the two effects. The study’s most important contribution is to investigate these two issues using stated choice scenarios posed to environmental management professionals working at businesses operating within the Clean Water Act regulatory framework. Results reveal that regulated facilities respond to increases in fine size and fine likelihood with equal sensitivity.
Dietrich Earnhart. Stated choices of environmental managers: The role of punishment. International Review of Law and Economics 2020, 63, 105908 .
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart. Stated choices of environmental managers: The role of punishment. International Review of Law and Economics. 2020; 63 ():105908.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart. 2020. "Stated choices of environmental managers: The role of punishment." International Review of Law and Economics 63, no. : 105908.
Many empirical studies explore the effects of regulatory enforcement on environmental behavior and performance. Within this literature, a few empirical studies explore environmental regulators’ approach to enforcement, such as the contrast between a coercive strategy and a cooperative strategy. However, very little empirical research explores the role of fairness, which we interpret broadly to include multiple dimensions, e.g., similar treatment of similarly situated regulated entities. This study empirically analyzes the effect of enforcement fairness on the extent of compliance with wastewater discharge limits imposed on U.S. chemical manufacturing facilities. For this analysis, we use a subjective measure of the degree of “fair treatment” of the regulated facilities by the environmental regulator, as perceived by facilities and reported in response to an original survey. The empirical results robustly reveal that a less fair enforcement approach leads to better environmental performance, i.e., greater compliance.
Dietrich Earnhart; Robert L. Glicksman; Donna Ramirez Harrington. The Effect of Enforcement Fairness on Environmental Performance. Environmental Management and Sustainable Development 2020, 9, 1 -34.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, Robert L. Glicksman, Donna Ramirez Harrington. The Effect of Enforcement Fairness on Environmental Performance. Environmental Management and Sustainable Development. 2020; 9 (2):1-34.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; Robert L. Glicksman; Donna Ramirez Harrington. 2020. "The Effect of Enforcement Fairness on Environmental Performance." Environmental Management and Sustainable Development 9, no. 2: 1-34.
This study employs a difference-in-differences framework to assess the effectiveness of the 2008–2012 pilot phase of the Kansas Water Right Transition Assistance Program at reducing either groundwater or surface water use. We distinguish between two program components: creek subbasins and designated High Priority Areas. Results demonstrate that water right retirement in the High Priority Areas substantially reduced groundwater use. Regardless of the program component, we find no effect on surface water use. Our conclusions are robust to various specifications. This study is the first to directly estimate the effect of water right retirement or any form of restriction on irrigation-related water rights. (JEL Q15, Q28)
Tsvetan Tsvetanov; Dietrich Earnhart. The Effectiveness of a Water Right Retirement Program at Conserving Water. Land Economics 2020, 96, 56 -74.
AMA StyleTsvetan Tsvetanov, Dietrich Earnhart. The Effectiveness of a Water Right Retirement Program at Conserving Water. Land Economics. 2020; 96 (1):56-74.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTsvetan Tsvetanov; Dietrich Earnhart. 2020. "The Effectiveness of a Water Right Retirement Program at Conserving Water." Land Economics 96, no. 1: 56-74.
Several empirical studies explore the effects of regulatory enforcement on environmental behavior and performance. Within this literature, extremely little empirical research examines the role of fairness, which we interpret broadly to include multiple dimensions, e. g. similar treatment of similarly situated regulated entities. Our study empirically examines the effect of perceived enforcement fairness on the extent of compliance with wastewater limits imposed on chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act. Our study also explores the influence of perceived fairness on the effectiveness of enforcement efforts – government inspections and enforcement actions – at inducing better compliance. For our analysis, we use a subjective measure of the degree of “fair treatment” of regulated facilities by environmental regulators, as perceived by facilities and reported as survey responses. Results reveal that a more (perceived) fair enforcement approach raises compliance, but only under limited enforcement conditions; in most instances, perceived more fair enforcement lowers compliance. As important, results show that greater perceived fairness improves the effectiveness of federal inspections and informal enforcement, but undermines the effectiveness of state inspections and formal non-penalty enforcement.
Dietrich Earnhart; Donna Ramirez Harrington; Robert Glicksman. The Effects of Enforcement on Corporate Environmental Performance: The Role of Perceived Fairness. Review of Law & Economics 2020, 17, 71 -118.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, Donna Ramirez Harrington, Robert Glicksman. The Effects of Enforcement on Corporate Environmental Performance: The Role of Perceived Fairness. Review of Law & Economics. 2020; 17 (1):71-118.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; Donna Ramirez Harrington; Robert Glicksman. 2020. "The Effects of Enforcement on Corporate Environmental Performance: The Role of Perceived Fairness." Review of Law & Economics 17, no. 1: 71-118.
This paper examines the influence of the environmental enforcement approach on the effects of government interventions on corporate environmental management. The paper contrasts a potentially innovative cooperative approach with the standard coercive approach. Empirical results show that the effectiveness of enforcement at inducing better environmental management depends on the overall regulatory enforcement approach. For example, greater cooperation undermines the effectiveness of more severe enforcement forms. Specifically, as the environmental enforcement approach becomes more cooperative, the effectiveness of federal inspections and monetary penalties decreases. These results generally demonstrate that a cooperative enforcement approach proves less effective than a coercive approach. (JEL D22, K32, Q52, Q58)
Zach Raff; Dietrich Earnhart. EFFECT OF COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES ON WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT. Economic Inquiry 2018, 56, 1357 -1379.
AMA StyleZach Raff, Dietrich Earnhart. EFFECT OF COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES ON WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT. Economic Inquiry. 2018; 56 (2):1357-1379.
Chicago/Turabian StyleZach Raff; Dietrich Earnhart. 2018. "EFFECT OF COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES ON WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT." Economic Inquiry 56, no. 2: 1357-1379.
Dietrich Earnhart; Lana Friesen. The Effects of Regulated Facilities' Perceptions About the Effectiveness of Government Interventions on Environmental Compliance. Ecological Economics 2017, 142, 282 -294.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, Lana Friesen. The Effects of Regulated Facilities' Perceptions About the Effectiveness of Government Interventions on Environmental Compliance. Ecological Economics. 2017; 142 ():282-294.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; Lana Friesen. 2017. "The Effects of Regulated Facilities' Perceptions About the Effectiveness of Government Interventions on Environmental Compliance." Ecological Economics 142, no. : 282-294.
Twenty-five years ago, an unprecedented economic-political transition began in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Since then, a meaningful literature has examined businesses’ environmental-management efforts during the transition. Over the same period as the transition, many firms in developed countries were integrating environmental components into their business strategies and finding this integration profitable. A growing body of research explores the topic of corporate environmental strategy. Given the rising importance of this topic in developed economies, its seems highly important to reassess the literature on businesses’ environmental-protection efforts during the transition in order to explore corporate environmental strategies in transition economies where the business benefits may be less clear and domestic consumer pressure for better corporate environmental stewardship is limited. Given the lack of clarity, exploration of corporate environmental strategies in transition economies is important. Guided by a simple conceptual framework, this article reviews and assesses the full body of the empirical literature in order to explore the drivers behind corporate environmental strategies in transition economies. The discussion that follows considers a broad array of drivers: internal factors, market pressures, government, and civil society. The empirical evidence suggests a positive role for foreign ownership and foreign customer pressure, and a stronger role for governmental factors: capacity to monitor, greater enforcement, permit issuance, and higher emission charge rates. The review reveals that many key factors, such as investor pressure, domestic customer pressure, and corporate culture, are weakly explored, if not fully ignored, by empirical studies.
Dietrich Earnhart. Corporate Environmental Strategies in Transition Economies: Survey of the Literature. Eastern European Economics 2017, 55, 111 -145.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart. Corporate Environmental Strategies in Transition Economies: Survey of the Literature. Eastern European Economics. 2017; 55 (2):111-145.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart. 2017. "Corporate Environmental Strategies in Transition Economies: Survey of the Literature." Eastern European Economics 55, no. 2: 111-145.
The Porter hypothesis asserts that properly designed environmental regulation motivates firms to innovate, which ultimately improves profitability. Specifically, the Porter hypothesis posits that more stringent environmental regulation, i.e., greater regulatory stringency, leads to greater profitability. In contrast, the conventional “costly regulation” hypothesis posits that greater regulatory stringency weakens profitability mostly by driving up abatement costs. This study empirically tests these two hypotheses. Of course, regulatory stringency is difficult to measure. More important, regulatory stringency as codified in legislated acts and promulgated rules does not necessarily reflect regulatory stringency in practice, which we deem as “effective regulatory stringency”. Measurement of “effective regulatory stringency” is even more challenging. With this challenge in mind, we divide “effective regulatory stringency” into its two constituent components—(1) legal requirements and (2) regulatory scrutiny—the latter representing government efforts to ensure compliance with the legal requirements. For our analysis, we examine legal requirements in the form of facility-specific effluent limits and regulatory scrutiny in the form of government monitoring inspections. For our empirical analysis, we analyze the U.S. Clean Water Act under which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency imposes numeric wastewater discharge limits on permitted facilities and conducts wastewater-related inspections. As its primary contribution, our study separately examines the effects of legal requirements and regulatory scrutiny on firm-level profitability in order to appreciate the influence of “effective regulatory stringency”.
Dietrich Earnhart; Dylan G. Rassier. “Effective regulatory stringency” and firms’ profitability: the effects of effluent limits and government monitoring. Journal of Regulatory Economics 2016, 50, 111 -145.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, Dylan G. Rassier. “Effective regulatory stringency” and firms’ profitability: the effects of effluent limits and government monitoring. Journal of Regulatory Economics. 2016; 50 (2):111-145.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; Dylan G. Rassier. 2016. "“Effective regulatory stringency” and firms’ profitability: the effects of effluent limits and government monitoring." Journal of Regulatory Economics 50, no. 2: 111-145.
This study examines the extent of environmental management practiced by U.S. chemical manufacturing facilities, as measured by the number of environmental internal audits conducted by facilities annually. In particular, this study focuses on the effects of firm-level organizational structure on facility-level environmental management practices. For its theoretical analysis, the study employs the framework of signaling, including both signals sent to customers and signals sent to regulators. For its empirical analysis, the study exploits unique data gathered by a survey distributed to all U.S. chemical manufacturing permitted to discharge wastewater as of 2001; the survey data provide information on audits conducted annually between the years 1999 and 2001. As one example, empirical results reveal a difference in auditing behavior based on whether facilities are owned by firms operating within a single state or multiple states.
Dietrich Earnhart; J. Mark Leonard. Environmental audits and signaling: The role of firm organizational structure. Resource and Energy Economics 2016, 44, 1 -22.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, J. Mark Leonard. Environmental audits and signaling: The role of firm organizational structure. Resource and Energy Economics. 2016; 44 ():1-22.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; J. Mark Leonard. 2016. "Environmental audits and signaling: The role of firm organizational structure." Resource and Energy Economics 44, no. : 1-22.
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Dietrich Earnhart; Robert L. Glicksman. Extent of Cooperative Enforcement: Effect of the Regulator-Regulated Facility Relationship on Audit Frequency. Strategic Behavior and the Environment 2015, 5, 111 -156.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, Robert L. Glicksman. Extent of Cooperative Enforcement: Effect of the Regulator-Regulated Facility Relationship on Audit Frequency. Strategic Behavior and the Environment. 2015; 5 (2):111-156.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; Robert L. Glicksman. 2015. "Extent of Cooperative Enforcement: Effect of the Regulator-Regulated Facility Relationship on Audit Frequency." Strategic Behavior and the Environment 5, no. 2: 111-156.
Dietrich H. Earnhart; Robert L. Glicksman. Coercive vs. cooperative enforcement: Effect of enforcement approach on environmental management. International Review of Law and Economics 2015, 42, 135 -146.
AMA StyleDietrich H. Earnhart, Robert L. Glicksman. Coercive vs. cooperative enforcement: Effect of enforcement approach on environmental management. International Review of Law and Economics. 2015; 42 ():135-146.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich H. Earnhart; Robert L. Glicksman. 2015. "Coercive vs. cooperative enforcement: Effect of enforcement approach on environmental management." International Review of Law and Economics 42, no. : 135-146.
Dylan G. Rassier; Dietrich Earnhart. Effects of environmental regulation on actual and expected profitability. Ecological Economics 2015, 112, 129 -140.
AMA StyleDylan G. Rassier, Dietrich Earnhart. Effects of environmental regulation on actual and expected profitability. Ecological Economics. 2015; 112 ():129-140.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDylan G. Rassier; Dietrich Earnhart. 2015. "Effects of environmental regulation on actual and expected profitability." Ecological Economics 112, no. : 129-140.
Many companies are adopting environmentally friendly management practices in developed countries. However, the benefits of a corporate environmental strategy are less clear in emerging (developing and transition) economies, where environmental regulations may be poorly enforced and social pressures to comply are weak. Thus it is important for business leaders, policymakers, and environmental activists to understand the causes and consequences of corporate environmental strategy in these economies so that they are able to implement effective strategies, develop useful policies, and promote meaningful activities, respectively. Drawing on both the theoretical and empirical literature, this article examines a broad array of drivers behind corporate environmental strategies including internal characteristics of firms, market pressures, and pressures from government and civil society. The empirical findings for developing economies (i.e., those whose physical and human resources, along with institutions, are still developing) suggest that government and civil society provide weak incentives for corporate environmental compliance, foreign ownership and foreign customer pressure improve environmental management practices, and information disclosure programs offer some promise for improving corporate environmental performance. The empirical findings for transition economies (i.e., those transitioning from reliance on the government’s allocation of resources to market-based allocations) also suggest a positive, albeit weaker, role for foreign ownership and foreign customer pressure in improving firms’ environmental performance. However, the findings also indicate that government policies, such as stricter enforcement, granting of permits, and higher rates for emission charges, are more effective in transition economies than in developing economies. (JEL: D21, D22, K32, M14, O13, P28, P31, Q53, Q56)
Dietrich H. Earnhart; Madhu Khanna; Thomas P. Lyon. Corporate Environmental Strategies in Emerging Economies: Figure 1. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 2014, 8, 164 -185.
AMA StyleDietrich H. Earnhart, Madhu Khanna, Thomas P. Lyon. Corporate Environmental Strategies in Emerging Economies: Figure 1. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. 2014; 8 (2):164-185.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich H. Earnhart; Madhu Khanna; Thomas P. Lyon. 2014. "Corporate Environmental Strategies in Emerging Economies: Figure 1." Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 8, no. 2: 164-185.
This study empirically examines the extent of environmental management practiced by US chemical manufacturing facilities, as reflected in the number of environmental internal audits conducted annually. As its focus, this study analyzes the effects of firm-level organizational structure on facility-level environmental management practices. For this empirical analysis, the study exploits unique data from a survey distributed to all U.S. chemical manufacturing permitted to discharge wastewater in 2001; the data reflect internal audits conducted during the years 1999-2001. Empirical results reveal differences in auditing behavior based on whether facilities are owned by publicly held or non-publicly held firms, owned by U.S.-based or non-U.S.-based firms, and owned by larger or smaller firms.
Dietrich Earnhart; J. Mark Leonard. Determinants of environmental audit frequency: The role of firm organizational structure. Journal of Environmental Management 2013, 128, 497 -513.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, J. Mark Leonard. Determinants of environmental audit frequency: The role of firm organizational structure. Journal of Environmental Management. 2013; 128 ():497-513.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; J. Mark Leonard. 2013. "Determinants of environmental audit frequency: The role of firm organizational structure." Journal of Environmental Management 128, no. : 497-513.
This paper analyzes the effect of systems to manage environmental aspects on environmental performance at individual polluting facilities. Regulated polluting facilities are increasingly embracing pollution minimization strategies that involve the adoption of broadly defined systems to manage environmental aspects. Despite a meaningful empirical literature, whether or not these systems lead to better environmental performance remains an open question. This study seeks to assess the possible connection between systems to manage environmental aspects and improved environmental performance. It also seeks to identify the factors determining the extent of the adopted system of management and the factors’ direct effects on environmental performance. For this empirical analysis, the study examines the extent of systems to manage environmental aspects employed by and the level of wastewater discharged by U.S. chemical manufacturing facilities during 2001.
Dietrich Earnhart. Effect of Systems to Manage Environmental Aspects on Environmental Performance. Sustainability 2013, 5, 2557 -2588.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart. Effect of Systems to Manage Environmental Aspects on Environmental Performance. Sustainability. 2013; 5 (6):2557-2588.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart. 2013. "Effect of Systems to Manage Environmental Aspects on Environmental Performance." Sustainability 5, no. 6: 2557-2588.
This study explores the specific deterrence generated by punishment in the context of regulatory violations with a focus on the distinction between upward revisions to future punishment parameters—likelihood and severity—and the experience of being penalized. In order to avoid the pitfalls of empirically analyzing actual choices made by regulated entities, e.g., measuring entities’ beliefs regarding the likelihood and size of future penalties, our study examines behavior associated with a stated choice scenario presented within a survey distributed to the environmental managers of facilities regulated under the US Clean Water Act. This choice of respondents strengthens the external validity of our empirical results. Based on a variety of statistical methods, our empirical results strongly and robustly reject the standard hypothesis that specific deterrence stems solely from upward revisions to punishment parameters while supporting the alternative hypothesis of experiential deterrence, whereby facilities focus on recent experiences to shape their compliance behavior.
Dietrich Earnhart; Lana Friesen. Can Punishment Generate Specific Deterrence Without Updating? Analysis of a Stated Choice Scenario. Environmental and Resource Economics 2013, 56, 379 -397.
AMA StyleDietrich Earnhart, Lana Friesen. Can Punishment Generate Specific Deterrence Without Updating? Analysis of a Stated Choice Scenario. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2013; 56 (3):379-397.
Chicago/Turabian StyleDietrich Earnhart; Lana Friesen. 2013. "Can Punishment Generate Specific Deterrence Without Updating? Analysis of a Stated Choice Scenario." Environmental and Resource Economics 56, no. 3: 379-397.