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Chunxiang Guo
Sichuan University

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Conference paper
Published: 31 July 2021 in Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management
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Consumer’s uncertain return behavior has brought great challenges to dual-channel retailers’ order decisions. Based on consumers return behavior and random market demand, this paper establishes newsboy models under independent operation strategy and inventory sharing strategy, and studies the optimal order decisions of dual channels. Then by comparing the optimal results under different strategies, the optimal strategy of the dual-channel retailer is determined. Eventually, dual-channel return rates effects on channels are discussed. The results show that (1) The inventory sharing strategy is better in terms of minimum order quantities or maximum profits; (2) When the return rate of one channel remains constant, a certain channels return rate hurts its own order quantity. When the return rate of one channel increases, a certain channels return rate does not always hinder the increase of its own order quantity; (3) The profit of a certain channel is more easily affected by its return rate, and the condition where it earns profits becomes more stringent with the increase of another channels return rate.

ACS Style

Ke Wan; Chunxiang Guo. Research on Order Strategy Considering Consumer’s Return Behavior Under Inventory Sharing. Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management 2021, 669 -681.

AMA Style

Ke Wan, Chunxiang Guo. Research on Order Strategy Considering Consumer’s Return Behavior Under Inventory Sharing. Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management. 2021; ():669-681.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Ke Wan; Chunxiang Guo. 2021. "Research on Order Strategy Considering Consumer’s Return Behavior Under Inventory Sharing." Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management , no. : 669-681.

Journal article
Published: 13 February 2021 in Computers & Industrial Engineering
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Due to the disadvantages of economic scale and industry status, the purchase order of a small and medium enterprise (SME) cannot often reach the minimum order quantity set by a strong supplier, and it is difficult for an SME to make vertical purchase cooperation with strong suppliers. Therefore, a joint procurement model is proposed in the horizontal cooperation among SMEs. The model considers multiple objective and multiple realistic constraints. To solve the proposed multi-objective model, the improved genetic algorithm is designed to determine the optimal purchased quantity in SMEs. Finally, a numerical experiment is conducted to validate the feasibility of the proposed model and algorithm. As the results illustrated, the joint procurement model and the improved genetic algorithm are efficient for SMEs under the weak procurement environment. The gaps among the optimal Pareto solutions are relatively small in contrast to the initial solution. Besides, a sensitivity analysis is also performed to prove that the algorithm is effectively solving the real-world joint procurement problem.

ACS Style

Tan Yuyang; Zhao Wenchao; Guo Chunxiang. The joint procurement model and algorithm for small and medium enterprises. Computers & Industrial Engineering 2021, 155, 107179 .

AMA Style

Tan Yuyang, Zhao Wenchao, Guo Chunxiang. The joint procurement model and algorithm for small and medium enterprises. Computers & Industrial Engineering. 2021; 155 ():107179.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Tan Yuyang; Zhao Wenchao; Guo Chunxiang. 2021. "The joint procurement model and algorithm for small and medium enterprises." Computers & Industrial Engineering 155, no. : 107179.

Journal article
Published: 02 November 2020 in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
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The absence of rationality in online public discussions leads to many negative problems, such as cyber violence, which often causes serious psychological harm to the people involved in public opinions. The participants in online discussions constitute a complex network system; however, until now, there are few studies that have proposed a definition and measurement of network rationality from a systematic perspective, which makes us unable to assess the rationality of a network reasonably. In this paper, we propose a definition and measurement of network rationality. Then, we build a model based on the fraction of rational nodes and homophily to simulate the generation of social networks, and we reveal their influence on network rationality and irrational information diffusion on a network. Our preliminary results show that a network with higher rationality will create a ”virtuous circle” more easily than a network with lower rationality, even if they have exactly the same initial number of rational nodes. In addition, the higher the rationality of a network is, the weaker the influence of the irrational information on the network will be.

ACS Style

Hao Gong; Chunxiang Guo; Yu Liu. Measuring network rationality and simulating information diffusion based on network structure. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 2020, 564, 125501 .

AMA Style

Hao Gong, Chunxiang Guo, Yu Liu. Measuring network rationality and simulating information diffusion based on network structure. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. 2020; 564 ():125501.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hao Gong; Chunxiang Guo; Yu Liu. 2020. "Measuring network rationality and simulating information diffusion based on network structure." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 564, no. : 125501.

Original article
Published: 01 August 2020 in Expert Systems
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In group assessment, the focus is on finding high‐authority experts to improve the reliability of assessment results. In this study, we propose an authority updating algorithm while considering the power and judgement reliability of an expert on the basis of social networks and post‐evaluations. A network power index is established and used to reflect the power of an expert while considering social networks. The measurement of the judgement reliability of an expert considers the post‐evaluation of the objects selected by experts, thereby more scientifically reflecting the reliability of experts. The analysis shows the following: although the social‐network structure influences the authority of experts, the influence weakens when the assessment group is a highly or even fully connected group; the network effect may increase the authority of some experts and reduce that of others, and it will weaken as the network connectivity increases; moreover, the judgement reliability and authority of an expert while considering post‐evaluation can encourage him/her to make fair assessments and strive to reduce his/her motivation and cognitive biases.

ACS Style

Ruili Shi; Chunxiang Guo; Xin Gu. Authority updating: An expert authority evaluation algorithm considering post‐evaluation and power indices in social networks. Expert Systems 2020, 38, 1 .

AMA Style

Ruili Shi, Chunxiang Guo, Xin Gu. Authority updating: An expert authority evaluation algorithm considering post‐evaluation and power indices in social networks. Expert Systems. 2020; 38 (1):1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Ruili Shi; Chunxiang Guo; Xin Gu. 2020. "Authority updating: An expert authority evaluation algorithm considering post‐evaluation and power indices in social networks." Expert Systems 38, no. 1: 1.

Conference paper
Published: 30 June 2020 in Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Data Engineering and Communication Technology
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Faced with the uncertainty of demand in the market, more and more retailers prefer to adopt the new selling method known as presale, especially premium presale. Based on the behavioral characteristics of strategic and myopic consumers, this paper firstly establishes a two-stage model of presale and spot sale, then investigates the influence of the reference price effect on retailer’s decision-making behavior. Secondly, we research a new optimized presale scheme with dual-driven factors of price and advertising. We express the only presale price to maximize the profit of the retailer in different scenarios. And we find that the retailer’s profit is deeply affected by the intensity of reference price effect. Weak reference effect is harmful to the retailer’s profit while high level of it is inversely profitable. Besides, increasing the reference price by advertising indeed improves the retailer’s profit. And the retailer will benefit from consumers’ strategic waiting behavior adopting this dual-driven strategy if the quantity of strategic consumers in the market is sufficient.

ACS Style

Qiyang Zhou; Chunxiang Guo. Presale Scheme Optimization of Short Life Cycle Products Considering Reference Price Effect. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Data Engineering and Communication Technology 2020, 68 -80.

AMA Style

Qiyang Zhou, Chunxiang Guo. Presale Scheme Optimization of Short Life Cycle Products Considering Reference Price Effect. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Data Engineering and Communication Technology. 2020; ():68-80.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Qiyang Zhou; Chunxiang Guo. 2020. "Presale Scheme Optimization of Short Life Cycle Products Considering Reference Price Effect." Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Data Engineering and Communication Technology , no. : 68-80.

Conference paper
Published: 30 June 2020 in Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Data Engineering and Communication Technology
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Nowadays, advance selling has become increasingly popular as one of the essential sales strategies. Due to the continuous development of e-commerce and remanufactured products, it is urgent for merchants to decide how to price the product properly. This paper establishes a two-stage pricing model for the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain in advance selling mode and analyzes the impact of market competition and consumers’ purchasing behavior on pricing strategies. Then we found that (1) The retailer’s optimal price is lower when the market competition is relatively significant. (2) When the recovery rate rises, the optimal price remains steady, but the profits of the retailer and the manufacturer both increase. (3) The advance selling price is generally higher than the regular selling price. However, the emergence of remanufactured products hugely increases the regular selling price.

ACS Style

Xinyuan Cui; Jiayi Wang; Yuyu Geng; Chunxiang Guo. Optimal Pricing of the Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain in Advance Selling Mode. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Data Engineering and Communication Technology 2020, 93 -105.

AMA Style

Xinyuan Cui, Jiayi Wang, Yuyu Geng, Chunxiang Guo. Optimal Pricing of the Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain in Advance Selling Mode. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Data Engineering and Communication Technology. 2020; ():93-105.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Xinyuan Cui; Jiayi Wang; Yuyu Geng; Chunxiang Guo. 2020. "Optimal Pricing of the Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain in Advance Selling Mode." Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Data Engineering and Communication Technology , no. : 93-105.

Journal article
Published: 26 April 2020 in Sustainability
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The low-carbon economy has become the focus of global attention and scientific measurement standards with the concepts of low energy consumption, low pollution, and sustainable development. More and more attentions are paid to the research of low-carbon supply chains. Based on a two-level low-carbon supply chain in the context of carbon trading, a Stackelberg game model was established for government subsidies to determine a coordinated and balanced solution for supply chains in situations dominated by manufacturers. The optimal strategies for low-carbon technology innovation are analyzed within the context of governmental subsidies. This study’s conclusions are as follows: (1) When government subsidies are in place, regardless of who the government subsidies are meant for, manufacturers and retailers that do not generate carbon emissions will transfer the subsidies to the companies that generate carbon emissions by adjusting wholesale prices and retail prices to maximize their own profits. (2) When consumer prices are sensitive, the government’s optimal subsidy intensity increases as consumers’ low-carbon preferences increase. When consumer prices are not sensitive, the government should not provide any subsidies. (3) When consumers’ low-carbon preferences are weak, the retail price of products will decrease with the increase in subsidies; when consumers’ low-carbon preferences are strong, the opposite dynamic occurs.

ACS Style

Yinjie Zhang; Chunxiang Guo; Liangcheng Wang. Supply Chain Strategy Analysis of Low Carbon Subsidy Policies Based on Carbon Trading. Sustainability 2020, 12, 3532 .

AMA Style

Yinjie Zhang, Chunxiang Guo, Liangcheng Wang. Supply Chain Strategy Analysis of Low Carbon Subsidy Policies Based on Carbon Trading. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (9):3532.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Yinjie Zhang; Chunxiang Guo; Liangcheng Wang. 2020. "Supply Chain Strategy Analysis of Low Carbon Subsidy Policies Based on Carbon Trading." Sustainability 12, no. 9: 3532.

Journal article
Published: 01 January 2020 in Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization
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ACS Style

Jun Huang; Ying Peng; Ruwen Tan; Chunxiang Guo. Alliance strategy of construction and demolition waste recycling based on the modified shapley value under government regulation. Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization 2020, 1 .

AMA Style

Jun Huang, Ying Peng, Ruwen Tan, Chunxiang Guo. Alliance strategy of construction and demolition waste recycling based on the modified shapley value under government regulation. Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization. 2020; ():1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Jun Huang; Ying Peng; Ruwen Tan; Chunxiang Guo. 2020. "Alliance strategy of construction and demolition waste recycling based on the modified shapley value under government regulation." Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization , no. : 1.

Journal article
Published: 17 November 2019 in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
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The improvement of China’s new energy automobile technology is one of the most pressing issues for the government and manufacturers, given that the existing new energy automobile subsidy policy is about to be withdrawn completely. Considering that the manufacturer has the private information of the initial technology level of new energy vehicles, its technology can be improved by means of technological innovation. Using principal–agent and regulation theory, this paper studies how the government designs incentive contracts to motivate manufacturers to strive to upgrade new energy automotive technology. The study has obtained a quantitative incentive contract under full information and a quantitative screening contract with asymmetric information, which provides an effective reference for the design of government subsidy contracts. It was found that the existence of asymmetric information reduces the expected net utility of the government in incentive projects, and the technology upgrading of low-level manufacturers is insufficient, but will not affect the technology upgrading of high-level manufacturers who will get information rent. The conclusion has good reference value and guiding significance for government policy-making with asymmetric information.

ACS Style

Dong Cai; Chunxiang Guo; Yue Tan; Cai; Guo; Tan. Design of Incentive Contract for Technological Innovation of New Energy Vehicles with Asymmetric Information. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2019, 16, 4544 .

AMA Style

Dong Cai, Chunxiang Guo, Yue Tan, Cai, Guo, Tan. Design of Incentive Contract for Technological Innovation of New Energy Vehicles with Asymmetric Information. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2019; 16 (22):4544.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Dong Cai; Chunxiang Guo; Yue Tan; Cai; Guo; Tan. 2019. "Design of Incentive Contract for Technological Innovation of New Energy Vehicles with Asymmetric Information." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, no. 22: 4544.

Journal article
Published: 14 October 2019 in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
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In order to investigate the issues of the recycling and remanufacturing of construction and demolition waste (C&D waste), this paper develops a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a recycler, considering both the retailer’s fairness concern psychology and governmental regulations. Four mathematical models are developed for the calculations, and the models are solved through game theory. In both the decentralized and centralized scenarios, the members’ strategies are discussed and the optimal values of decision variables are determined. A numerical study is carried out for sensitivity analyses to verify the accuracy of the theoretical conclusions. The results reveal that retailer fairness concerns lead to a decrease in the wholesale price of building materials and negatively affect manufacturers’ profits. Additionally, governmental regulations can effectively increase the recycling amount and improve the utilization rate of C&D waste, and promote a virtuous cycle of the recycling and remanufacturing of C&D waste.

ACS Style

Deng Li; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo; Ruwen Tan. Pricing Strategy of Construction and Demolition Waste Considering Retailer Fairness Concerns under a Governmental Regulation Environment. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2019, 16, 3896 .

AMA Style

Deng Li, Ying Peng, Chunxiang Guo, Ruwen Tan. Pricing Strategy of Construction and Demolition Waste Considering Retailer Fairness Concerns under a Governmental Regulation Environment. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2019; 16 (20):3896.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Deng Li; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo; Ruwen Tan. 2019. "Pricing Strategy of Construction and Demolition Waste Considering Retailer Fairness Concerns under a Governmental Regulation Environment." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, no. 20: 3896.

Journal article
Published: 23 May 2019 in Sustainability
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The generation of construction and demolition waste (CDW) is a problem for societies aspiring to sustainability. In this regard, governments have the responsibility to support the CDW recycling through subsidies. However, the information asymmetry, as well as the “dynamic nature” of the CDW recycling market, results in a number of barriers for the government to promote CDW recycling. In this paper, we establish a mathematical model that includes the government and the recycling enterprise in the presence of dual information asymmetry including the unknown recycling technology level and unobservable recycling efforts in one-stage and two-stage cooperation. Using the incentive theory, the static and dynamic optimal recycling incentive contracts of the government were designed, and the optimal decisions of the recycler were identified. A numerical simulation revealed that by designing reasonable contracts, the government can encourage the recycler to report the true technical level and achieve information screening. Furthermore, the subsidy of the high-tech recycler remained unchanged under different circumstances. However, the subsidy of the low-tech recycler was closely related to the probability of misreporting and the proportion of technology types. This finding suggests that the government and recycler are inclined towards long-term dynamic cooperation.

ACS Style

Qidan Hu; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo; Dong Cai; Peiyang Su. Dynamic Incentive Mechanism Design for Recycling Construction and Demolition Waste under Dual Information Asymmetry. Sustainability 2019, 11, 2943 .

AMA Style

Qidan Hu, Ying Peng, Chunxiang Guo, Dong Cai, Peiyang Su. Dynamic Incentive Mechanism Design for Recycling Construction and Demolition Waste under Dual Information Asymmetry. Sustainability. 2019; 11 (10):2943.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Qidan Hu; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo; Dong Cai; Peiyang Su. 2019. "Dynamic Incentive Mechanism Design for Recycling Construction and Demolition Waste under Dual Information Asymmetry." Sustainability 11, no. 10: 2943.

Journal article
Published: 08 February 2019 in Sustainability
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With the emphasis on environmental protection issues, countries have introduced a number of circular economy-related policies aimed at guiding enterprises to green development and green innovation. At the same time, they are encouraged to strengthen the combination of forward logistics and reverse logistics, providing an effective way to improve resource shortages and reduce environmental pollution. However, the quality of recycled products in reverse logistics is often uncertain, which not only increases the risk of production decisions of remanufacturers, but also affects the sales of new products in the forward logistics to a certain extent. Based on the uncertainty of recycling quality of waste products and the controllability of remanufacturing technology level, this paper studies the impact of various regulatory environments on the operation of a two-way logistics system. We solve the decision model of the system through game theory. The results show that the government’s policy can improve product recycling quality and remanufacturing technology. However, recycling rewards and punishments, remanufacturing technology subsidies, and recycling payment factors need to be within a certain range to ensure the effectiveness of the trading market. When the recycling regulation has been implemented, it is beneficial for manufacturers to choose to improve their remanufacturing technology level. This means that the combined effect of multiple policies is more conducive to the operation of a two-way logistics system.

ACS Style

Yue Tan; Chunxiang Guo. Research on Two-Way Logistics Operation with Uncertain Recycling Quality in Government Multi-Policy Environment. Sustainability 2019, 11, 882 .

AMA Style

Yue Tan, Chunxiang Guo. Research on Two-Way Logistics Operation with Uncertain Recycling Quality in Government Multi-Policy Environment. Sustainability. 2019; 11 (3):882.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Yue Tan; Chunxiang Guo. 2019. "Research on Two-Way Logistics Operation with Uncertain Recycling Quality in Government Multi-Policy Environment." Sustainability 11, no. 3: 882.

Journal article
Published: 18 July 2018 in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
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With the development of the construction industry, increasing concern over construction and demolition waste (CDW) has initiated a wave of environmental regulation by the government in order to reduce the environmental impact and ensure sustainable development. Research on behavioral decision-making can offer a theoretical basis for the government and individuals. This paper aims to study the behavioral decision-making of stakeholders in CDW recycling under environmental regulation. Considering the limited rationality of stakeholders and the difference in reference points, an evolutionary game model including contractors and manufacturers of construction materials is proposed based on the prospect theory of behavioral economics. The results indicate that, only when the perceived benefits of one or both stakeholders for participation under the environmental regulation exceed those for non-participation, can the CDW recycling system eventually evolve to a stable state in which both stakeholders choose to participate. In addition, factors such as the initial strategy, production cost, technology, subsidies, recycling benefits, and the degree of perception of the stakeholders, exert certain influences on the stable state. To attain the required stable state, the government should increase the subsidies for the stakeholders and strengthen the publicity regarding recycling effects to improve the perceived benefits.

ACS Style

Hong Shen; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo. Analysis of the Evolution Game of Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Behavior Based on Prospect Theory under Environmental Regulation. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2018, 15, 1518 .

AMA Style

Hong Shen, Ying Peng, Chunxiang Guo. Analysis of the Evolution Game of Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Behavior Based on Prospect Theory under Environmental Regulation. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2018; 15 (7):1518.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hong Shen; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo. 2018. "Analysis of the Evolution Game of Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Behavior Based on Prospect Theory under Environmental Regulation." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 15, no. 7: 1518.