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Public information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public information, that is, mass communication and personalized recommendation. Moreover, the public can choose to acquire or not acquire a strategy. Then, this study conducts an evolutionary game between the government and the public to analyze the influence of public information on the public in China. Our objective is to find how the evolutionary path changes between the two players when strategies are changing. Then, a simulation analysis is presented in six scenarios to illustrate the results. The results show that the two players can converge to different stable statuses under different situations.
Hongsen Luo; Ying Gao; Fulei Shi. An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China. Complexity 2021, 2021, 1 -11.
AMA StyleHongsen Luo, Ying Gao, Fulei Shi. An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China. Complexity. 2021; 2021 ():1-11.
Chicago/Turabian StyleHongsen Luo; Ying Gao; Fulei Shi. 2021. "An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China." Complexity 2021, no. : 1-11.
In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. In this paper, a differential game model is proposed for industrial pollution management, in which public participation is taken into consideration. Then, a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) solution is obtained among the government, enterprises, and the public. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the public participation will take a positive part in forcing enterprises to reduce emissions. Furthermore, with the increase of the probability of the public reporting the illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises, the probability of enterprises' active emission reduction will also greatly increase
Chuansheng Wang; Fulei Shi; Cuiyou Yao. A Differential Game of Industrial Pollution Management considering Public Participation. Journal of Mathematics 2020, 2020, 1 -8.
AMA StyleChuansheng Wang, Fulei Shi, Cuiyou Yao. A Differential Game of Industrial Pollution Management considering Public Participation. Journal of Mathematics. 2020; 2020 ():1-8.
Chicago/Turabian StyleChuansheng Wang; Fulei Shi; Cuiyou Yao. 2020. "A Differential Game of Industrial Pollution Management considering Public Participation." Journal of Mathematics 2020, no. : 1-8.
In recent years, mounting attention has been paid to ecological environmental management in coal mining areas in China. This paper conducts a system dynamics (SD) model for ecological environmental management in coal mining areas. Firstly, the whole causal loop diagram of the system is built to illustrate the general system. Secondly, five subsystems are presented according to the causal loop diagram. Then, given the stable investment for ecological environmental management in coal mining areas, our objective is to find a better allocation that can get the best ecological environmental quality in coal mining areas. Notably, we present six allocations of the investment for ecological environmental management in coal mining areas. The results show that, in allocation 4, we can get the best ecological environmental quality in coal mining areas. That is, the best improvement of mining environment can be achieved by distributing the treatment cost highly on the proportion of investment in green vegetation.
Fulei Shi; Haiqing Cao; Chuansheng Wang; Cuiyou Yao. A System Dynamics Model for Ecological Environmental Management in Coal Mining Areas in China. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2020, 17, 2115 .
AMA StyleFulei Shi, Haiqing Cao, Chuansheng Wang, Cuiyou Yao. A System Dynamics Model for Ecological Environmental Management in Coal Mining Areas in China. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020; 17 (6):2115.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFulei Shi; Haiqing Cao; Chuansheng Wang; Cuiyou Yao. 2020. "A System Dynamics Model for Ecological Environmental Management in Coal Mining Areas in China." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 6: 2115.
In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control.
Chuansheng Wang; Fulei Shi; Wang; Shi. An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2019, 16, 2775 .
AMA StyleChuansheng Wang, Fulei Shi, Wang, Shi. An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2019; 16 (15):2775.
Chicago/Turabian StyleChuansheng Wang; Fulei Shi; Wang; Shi. 2019. "An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, no. 15: 2775.