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Xiaojing Liu
Business School, Jiangsu Normal University, Xuzhou 221116, China

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Journal article
Published: 22 October 2020 in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
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In the market, once consumers have a low-carbon preference, they will choose green low-carbon products. The market demand for green products is not only related to product price, but also consumers’ low-carbon preference. In this way, enterprise has to consider the cost of carbon emissions in the process of production and operation. In this paper, we consider a two-level supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The supply chain system can determine the price of products and the level of carbon emission reduction through different supply chain contracts: wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract. However, the power control structure of a manufacturer and a retailer is different, which will further affect the decision-making strategy of the supply chain system. We set up four models (Wholesale Price—NM and NR, and Revenue-Sharing—SR and SM) of the supply chain with carbon emission reduction, and calculated and analyzed. The results show that firstly, regardless of whether the manufacturer’s power control structure or the retailer power structure is dominant, the manufacturer wholesale price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price, and it is inversely proportional to the revenue-sharing proportion. Secondly, under the two power control structures, the carbon emission level of the manufacturer with a contract on revenue-sharing is always lower than on wholesale price, and it gradually decreases with the increase of the revenue-sharing proportion of the manufacturers. Thirdly, when the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price. Under the manufacturer’s power control structure, when the revenue-sharing ratio is small, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is higher than on wholesale price; when the revenue-sharing ratio is large, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is lower than on wholesale price. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by an example, and the sensitivity of the parameters is analyzed.

ACS Style

Xiaojing Liu; Wenyi Du; Yijie Sun. Green Supply Chain Decisions Under Different Power Structures: Wholesale Price vs. Revenue Sharing Contract. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2020, 17, 7737 .

AMA Style

Xiaojing Liu, Wenyi Du, Yijie Sun. Green Supply Chain Decisions Under Different Power Structures: Wholesale Price vs. Revenue Sharing Contract. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020; 17 (21):7737.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Xiaojing Liu; Wenyi Du; Yijie Sun. 2020. "Green Supply Chain Decisions Under Different Power Structures: Wholesale Price vs. Revenue Sharing Contract." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 21: 7737.

Journal article
Published: 14 March 2020 in Sustainability
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This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.

ACS Style

Chang Su; Xiaojing Liu; Wenyi Du. Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies. Sustainability 2020, 12, 2281 .

AMA Style

Chang Su, Xiaojing Liu, Wenyi Du. Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (6):2281.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Chang Su; Xiaojing Liu; Wenyi Du. 2020. "Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies." Sustainability 12, no. 6: 2281.

Journal article
Published: 29 April 2019 in Journal of Cleaner Production
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To alleviate water shortage, several water transfer projects have been constructed in China. To further develop the supply chain management of water resources, the Eastern and Central Routes of China's South-to-North Water Transfer Project are considered as two water suppliers. The two suppliers provide water for two distributors in northern China. Based on a two-stage Stackelberg game, we develop a chain-to-chain competition model in three alternating scenarios including under wholesale price contracts, two-part pricing contracts and mixed pricing contracts, and derive the optimal pricing and ordering strategies. We find that each water supply chain member can earn a higher profit under the two-part pricing contract with appropriate parameters compared to that under the wholesale price contract. When the competition is weak, the performance of the supply chain subsystem under the two-part pricing contract is better than that under the wholesale pricing contract. On the contrary, when the competition is strong, the performance of the supply chain under the two-part pricing contract is lower than that under the wholesale price contract. With the two-part pricing contract used for both water supply chains, the two suppliers are in the prisoners' dilemma. The study expands the theory of supply chain management under competition and provides insights for the sustainability of water resource management.

ACS Style

Wenyi Du; Yubing Fan; Xiaojing Liu; Seong C. Park; Xiaowo Tang. A game-based production operation model for water resource management: An analysis of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project in China. Journal of Cleaner Production 2019, 228, 1482 -1493.

AMA Style

Wenyi Du, Yubing Fan, Xiaojing Liu, Seong C. Park, Xiaowo Tang. A game-based production operation model for water resource management: An analysis of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project in China. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2019; 228 ():1482-1493.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Wenyi Du; Yubing Fan; Xiaojing Liu; Seong C. Park; Xiaowo Tang. 2019. "A game-based production operation model for water resource management: An analysis of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project in China." Journal of Cleaner Production 228, no. : 1482-1493.