Jose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos

Dr. Jose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos

FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ACTUARIALES, Universidad Anáhuac México, Huixquilucan, México, Mexico
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 March 2014 in TOP
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JLJose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos
Jose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos
HJHéctor Jasso-Fuentes
Héctor Jasso-Fuentes
BEBeatris Adriana Escobedo-Trujillo
Beatris Adriana Escobedo-Trujillo

4 December 2014 in International Journal of Control
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HJHéctor Jasso-Fuentes
Héctor Jasso-Fuentes
JLJose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos
Jose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos
In this paper, we propose an application of the so-called games against nature for giving solution to an ergodic control problem governed by a general class of Markov diffusion processes whose coefficients depend on an unknown and non-observable parameter. To this end, we assume that the values of the parameter are taken by means of ‘actions’ made by some opposite player of the controller (the nature). Then, the problem reduces to finding optimality for the controller given that the nature has chosen its best strategy. Such a control is also known as the worst case optimal control. Our analysis is based on the use of the dynamic programming technique by showing, among other facts, the existence of classical (twice differentiable) solutions of the so called Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation. We also provide an example on economic welfare to illustrate our results.

1 January 2014 in Journal of Dynamics and Games
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BEBeatris Adriana Escobedo-Trujillo
Beatris Adriana Escobedo-Trujillo
JLJose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos
Jose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos
This paper deals with nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with an additive structure and long-run average payoffs. Our main objective is to give conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in the set of relaxed stationary strategies. Such conditions also ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium within the set of stationary Markov (deterministic) strategies, and that the values of the average payoffs for these equilibria coincide almost everywhere with respect to Lebesgue's measure. This fact generalizes the results in the controlled (single player game) case found by Raghavan [47] and Rosenblueth [48]. We use relaxation theory and standard dynamic programming techniques to achieve our goals. We illustrate our results with an example motivated by a manufacturing system.


3 July 2020 in Mathematics
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JLJose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos
Jose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos
EGEkaterina Viktorovna Gromova
Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova
EMEkaterina Sergeevna Miroshnichenko
Ekaterina Sergeevna Miroshnichenko
This work presents a two-player extraction game where the random terminal times follow (different) heavy-tailed distributions which are not necessarily compactly supported. Besides, we delve into the implications of working with logarithmic utility/terminal payoff functions. To this end, we use standard actuarial results and notation, and state a connection between the so-called actuarial equivalence principle, and the feedback controllers found by means of the Dynamic Programming technique. Our conclusions include a conjecture on the form of the optimal premia for insuring the extraction tasks; and a comparison for the intensities of the extraction for each player under different phases of the lifetimes of their respective machineries.

1 September 2018 in International Game Theory Review
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MGMario A. García-Meza
Mario A. García-Meza
EGEkaterina Viktorovna Gromova
Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova
JLJose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos
Jose Daniel Lopez-Barrientos