The aims of this article are, first, to describe the Swedish authorities’ strategy for dealing with the sudden onset of novel coronavirus in early 2020 and, second, to explain why that strategy differed markedly from those in nearly all other European countries. From an early stage, the Swedish government delegated decision making to the Public Health Agency, and its goal was to mitigate the effects of the virus rather than to suppress its spread. Society was never closed down in the same way as elsewhere. Using data from media reports and other publications, we argue that the agency was insulated from pressure to change course, even as the number of deaths associated with covid-19 rose far above those in Sweden’s Nordic neighbours, by four conditions: (1) the structure of national public administration; (2) an outburst of nationalism in parts of the media; (3) the uneven impact of the virus; and (4) a political leadership that was willing to delegate responsibility for policy almost entirely. We conclude by briefly comparing the coronavirus strategy to previous episodes of Swedish policy exceptionalism. This emerging pattern, we suggest, raises normative questions about the functioning of Swedish democracy.
This article discusses the effects of standard corruption measurement, as used in comparative research, for its accuracy in estimating and understanding corruption. Implicitly, standard measurements treat corruption as a one-dimensional phenomenon (measured by a single score) that can vary in incidence between countries (or other geographical entities), but not in form. Such measurements also tend to equate corruption with bribery. This article argues that the degree to which one-dimensional bribery-focused measurements constitute a suitable proxy for corruption differs across countries (i.e., the measurement discrepancy is not random across countries). In particular, these measurements are ill-suited to capture corruption in established democracies with highly developed economies, where corruption is expected to center on gaining access to and influence within strong state institutions rather than on bribery. Sweden, a “least-corrupt” case, is used to illustrate the effects of relying on such measurements in such a setting, and to show that whereas bribery might be a relatively rare event, undue influence and interest conflicts can be a frequent occurrence.
This article provides a conceptual framework for studies of areas of politics and public policy in which political corruption is most likely to emerge (danger zones). The use of principal-agent theory in qualitative case studies is recommended. This approach gives attention to context, to the specifics of institutional design, and to individual choice as found in the "least corrupt" countries of the world.
This article studies two Swedish organizations with key roles in the facilitation and promotion of ethics management vis-à-vis other public-sector organizations. The study offers insights into how organizations combine and prioritize ethics management measures, involve submanagement employees, and consider external stakeholders, in contexts of democratic governance and public concern about corruption. Our findings suggest that these types of bird’s-eye view organizations studied are important as they are in a position less prone to ad hoc scandal-driven responses. They can thus promote strategies that consider a combination of aspects and avoid a narrow rules-based focus.
Political parties are indispensable actors in representative democracy. However, trust in parties has declined in many democracies. Ethics management is a potential mechanism for parties to keep or strengthen public trust. Previous research about how parties have developed internal ethics mechanisms to promote organisational integrity is scant. This article explores how Swedish parliamentary parties use ethical strategies to uphold standards of conduct for their members. Sweden is a high trust society, but its citizens perceive risks of corrupt influence as relevant. Amongst representative institutions, parties score the lowest levels of trust. Therefore, Swedish parties are interesting to study in order to understand how they uphold integrity standards and assure voters that they are ethical organisations. We show that parties increasingly use formal ethics guidelines to set integrity standards within their organisations and integrity pledges for candidates. Parties also use relatively well-developed monitoring instruments but reactively rather than proactively. Tools to enforce integrity are few and often concentrated on formal expulsion procedures, which are rarely used. Swedish parties have during the last 15 years incrementally developed their ethics management processes. It remains to be seen to what extent these changes will transcend formal rules and strengthen integrity in the long run.