Using relatively simple and widely used models, we illustrate how carbon emission concerns could be integrated into operational decision-making with regard to procurement, production, and inventory management. We show how, by associating carbon emission parameters with various decision variables, traditional models can be modified to support decision-making that accounts for both cost and carbon footprint. We examine how the values of these parameters as well as the parameters of regulatory emission control policies affect cost and emissions. We use the models to study the extent to which carbon reduction requirements can be addressed by operational adjustments, as an alternative (or a supplement) to costly investments in carbon-reducing technologies. We also use the models to investigate the impact of collaboration among firms within the same supply chain on their costs and carbon emissions and study the incentives firms might have in seeking such cooperation. We provide a series of insights that highlight the impact of operational decisions on carbon emissions and the importance of operational models in evaluating the impact of different regulatory policies and in assessing the benefits of investments in more carbon efficient technologies. Note to Practitioners-Firms worldwide, responding to the threat of government legislation or to concerns raised by their own consumers or shareholders, are undertaking initiatives to reduce their carbon footprint. It is the conventional thinking that such initiatives will require either capital investments or a switch to more expensive sources of energy or input material. In this paper, we show that firms could effectively reduce their carbon emissions without significantly increasing their costs by making only operational adjustments and by collaborating with other members of their supply chain. We describe optimization models that can be used by firms to support operational decision making and supply chain collaboration, while taking into account carbon emissions. We analyze the effect of different emission regulations, including strict emission caps, taxes on emissions, cap-and-offset, and cap-and-trade, on supply chain management decisions. In particular, we show that the presence of emission regulation can significantly increase the value of supply chain collaboration.

In this note, we study the concurrent determination of pricing and inventory replenishment decisions for a perishable product in an infinite horizon. Demands in consecutive periods are independent and influenced by prices charged in each period. In particular, we treat price as a decision variable to maximize the total discounted profit. We analyze the optimal solution-structure of a two-period lifetime problem and from insights gained in numerical experiments, develop a base-stock/list-price heuristic policy for products with arbitrary fixed lifetimes. Experiments show this policy to be effective.

Problem definition: We consider the effects of strategic inventory (SI) in the presence of chain-to-chain competition in a two-period model. Academic/practical relevance: Established findings suggest that SI may alleviate double marginalization and improve the efficiency of a decentralized distribution channel. However, no studies consider the role of SI under chain-to-chain competition. Methodology: We build a two-period model consisting of two competing supply chains, each with an upstream manufacturer and an exclusive retailer. The retailers compete on either price or quantity. We characterize the firms’ strategies under the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We consider cases where contracts are either observable or unobservable across supply chains. Results: (1) SI still exists under chain-to-chain competition. Retailers may carry more inventory when the competition becomes fiercer, which further intensifies the supply chain competition. (2) Different from the existing findings, SI may backfire and hurt all firms. Interestingly, firms may benefit from a higher inventory holding cost. (3) Under supply chain competition, the prisoner’s dilemma can arise if competition intensity is intermediate; in other words, manufacturers are better off without strategic inventory, and yet they cannot help allowing strategic inventory, which is the unique equilibrium. Managerial implications: Despite its appeal among firms of a single supply chain, the role of SI is altered or even reversed by chain-to-chain competition. Conventional wisdom on SI should be applied with caution.