I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition of behaviorist or functional reductive views on consciousness that still predominate within cognitive science. If Nagel-Chalmers-Block-style non-reductive naturalism about first-person consciousness (h-consciousness) holds true, then, eventually we should be able to understand how such consciousness operates and how it gets produced (this is not the same as bridging the explanatory gap or solving Chalmers’s hard problem of consciousness). If so, the consciousness it involves can in principle be engineered.
Standard computing will be characterized as a functional extension of syntax. Using BICA claim of continuity between human-animal-robot cognitive architectures, we will define strong semantics as the ability of a cognitive architectures to consult cognitive maps, in particular phenomenal content maps (Damasio, 2010). This follows the work on semantic maps, yet the maps we postulate are based on phenomenal markers not syntax and predicative logic. We define extra strong semantic maps (and extra strong computing in general) as those that go beyond human capabilities. The goal of strong semantic computing in autonomous robotics should be to ‘know what is going on’ (Sanz, 2012) before engaging in detailed logical analysis. Such sort of Gestalt computing is needed in advanced autonomous robotics, especially robots functioning in human environments.
1 March 2020 in Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness
Church-Turing Lovers are sex robots that attain every functionality of a human lover, at the desired level of granularity. Yet they have no first-person consciousness—there is “nobody home.” When such a lover says, “I love you,” there are all the intentions to please you, even computer emotions. Would you care whether your significant other is a Church-Turing Lover? Does one care about one’s lover only insofar as his/her functionalities are involved, or does one care how the lover feels. Church-Turing Lovers demonstrate how even epiphenomenal experience provides reasons to care about other people’s first-person consciousness. In a related argument, I propose the notion of the Uncanny Valley of Perfection. I systematize the standards for humanoid robots as follows: minimally humanoid (teddy bears); bottom of the Uncanny Valley (repulsive sex dolls); Silver Standard (almost human-looking), Gold Standard (hard to distinguish from humans at the right level of granularity); Platinum Standard (slightly improved on humans); the Uncanny Valley of Perfection (too much better than humans); the Slope of the Angels (no longer humanoid, viewed with awe).