In industrial environments there are critical devices, so their correct operation must be ensured. In particular, having a secure record of the different events related to these devices is essential. Thus, this record can be used in future forensic investigations in case of accidents or production failures. In this sense, blockchain technology can bring reliability to the event log. In this paper, ChronoEOS 2.0, an extension of ChronoEOS, is presented. This new version can record the events that occur in multiple industrial robotic arms by deploying a Smart Contract in the EOSIO blockchain so that all events are immutably recorded in the blockchain. Furthermore, the new version allows using a unique fingerprint of the robot before registering an event in the blockchain. This fingerprint depends only on the characteristics of the operation and configuration of the robot. For this reason, ChronoEOS 2.0 not only increase the ability of ChronoEOS in terms of handling multiple devices but also increases the security and reliability of the operations. Finally, in this study, we verify that the new improvements have little impact on the hosting resources (RAM and Network are not altered, while CPU consumption is slightly higher due to the device fingerprinting module).
Deep neural network models have been developed in different fields, bringing many advances in several tasks. However, they have also started to be incorporated into tasks with critical risks. That worries researchers who have been interested in studying possible attacks on these models, discovering a long list of threats from which every model should be defended. The weight modification attack is presented and discussed among researchers, who have presented several versions and analyses about such a threat. It focuses on detecting multiple vulnerable weights to modify, misclassifying the desired input data. Therefore, analysis of the different approaches to this attack helps understand how to defend against such a vulnerability. This work presents a new version of the weight modification attack. Our approach is based on three processes: input data clusterization, weight selection, and modification of the weights. Data clusterization allows a directed attack to a selected class. Weight selection uses the gradient given by the input data to identify the most-vulnerable parameters. The modifications are incorporated in each step via limited noise. Finally, this paper shows how this new version of fault injection attack is capable of misclassifying the desired cluster completely, converting the 100% accuracy of the targeted cluster to 0–2.7% accuracy, while the rest of the data continues being well-classified. Therefore, it demonstrates that this attack is a real threat to neural networks.