Board composition has received increasingly more attention from scholars as an important determinant of environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance. Two factors of board composition receive attention as they strongly relate to sustainability issues: gender diversity and board independence. The aim of this study is to test whether the presence of a critical mass of women in boardrooms correlates with firm ESG performance. In addition, we aim to study whether women receiving appointment as executive rather than nonexecutive directors may positively influence ESG performance. Using a sample of Italian companies listed on the Mercato Telematico Azionario during 2003–2019, the empirical results show that a critical mass of at least three female directors is necessary to improve ESG performance and that executive women directors represent a crucial component of board mechanisms, in terms of aligning the needs of stakeholders, since they increase ESG performance. Because the advising and monitoring functions impact firm value, we support the idea that female directors in strategic positions in the boardroom may benefit ESG performance. Thus, we support the idea of increasing women's presence on corporate boards and across executive leadership as a measure and a signal of how firms can respond to ESG challenges.

This paper investigates the relationship between the ESG score and market values. Specifically, we test the moderating role of CSR committee defined as organizational subcommittees of boards of directors that make social and environmental recommendations to the boards of directors and support members in their CSR‐related tasks. We built a panel data set with all the listed companies in STOXX Europe 600, covering the period 2014–2020. Firms' data come from Refinitiv Eikon database which contains financial and ESG scores data of all EU listed companies. Our sample of firm‐level data contains a dataset of 600 European listed companies which are part of the STOXX Europe 600 Index. We included ESG data of STOXX Europe 600 Index components in the period 2014–2020. Our dataset contains a total of 4800 firm‐year observations. We found a negative relationship between ESG score and stock prices while the presence of CSR committee as moderating variable generates no significant evidence of ESG score. The presence of CSR committee is not considerably supporting ESG in achieving higher market performance. The CSR committee plays an essential role in monitoring management activities. This may support management practitioners in better understanding and reacting to stakeholder expectations.

Public private partnerships (PPPs) are a well-known instrument used worldwide by public administration (PA) to build public infrastructure using private knowhow and financial resources, and sharing risks. In recent years, PPPs have been widely adopted to develop energy efficiency projects between public and private sectors. In this context, a successful project requires a contractual arrangement based on energy performance contracting (EPC) that balances the interests of the two parties. This paper aims to answer two questions: how to share the benefits between the contractual parties and reach an optimal long-term contractual agreement; and which type of contract ensures a consistent risk transfer to the private partner, allowing the PA an “off balance” accounting treatment. The research questions are answered through the development of a mathematical equation able to calculate the optimal percentage of benefits sharing between partners in a long-term contractual agreement. The results are tested with a simulation based on a case study about the energy efficiency project of an Italian hospital. The paper is innovative because it provides suggestions to improve the EPC-PPP contractual structure and realize a balanced agreement between the public and private partners. Moreover, it analyzes the different allocation of risks in EPC contracts to identify the implication for the PA in terms of on-off balance accounting treatment in energy efficiency investment. We show how a successful long-term EPC-PPP can benefit from a mixed contractual structure in which profit-sharing percentage changes during the contract’s life to ensure the same net present value (NPV) to both public and private partners. This paper supports public decision making in order to choose contracts that are able to transfer energy and management risks. Moreover, it helps to understand the balance between public and private interests in a long-term EPC-PPP contract.