Balázs M. Mezei

Prof. Dr. Balázs M. Mezei

Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 November 2022 in Religions
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Balázs M. MezeiBalázs M. Mezei
Balázs M. Mezei
In this article, I delineate a notion of phenomenology, which differs in many ways from earlier approaches. I term this understanding apocalyptic in the sense that this phenomenology discloses not only the essences of particular things, logical entities, ideas, and transcendental processes, but beyond them, it reveals reality in its essential openness to newness. The term apocalupsis refers not simply to the unveiling of something unknown earlier, but more importantly to the central determinant of reality in that it discloses irreducible newness. I show that the phenomenon of self-disclosure or revelation was at the center of the work of the first phenomenologists, such as Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl; I emphasize the notion of phenomenological revelation in the thought of Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger. In this context, I offer an interpretation of the phenomenologies of Emmanuel Lévinas, Michel Henry, and Jean-Luc Marion. I argue that the notion of nouveauté novatrice of Miklos Vetö is a phenomenologically inspired insight into the nature of the essence of phenomenology. I claim that newness is the core of reality engendering a new conception of phenomenology as a philosophy of reality–a phenomenology aptly termed neology, a development of what is known as “the phenomenological movement”.

22 October 2022 in European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
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Balázs M. MezeiBalázs M. Mezei
Balázs M. Mezei
In this article I offer an interpretation of the fundamental problem of phenomenology in terms of a philosophy of revelation proposing in this way the renewal of the last important development of Western philosophy both in terms of its metaphysical aspiration and scientific relevance. After the general introduction, I outline the philosophical problem of revelation. I show how this philosophy influenced early phenomenology. I explain the underlying subject matter in the history of phenomenology, i.e. the notion of disclosure. I also outline what I term “apocalyptic phenomenology” in order to focus on the understanding of revelation. In this part I offer details of the notion of newness and the appropriate method applied here. Finally, I summarize the scientific relevance of my approach in the context of logic, methodology, disciplinarity with a special emphasis on the study of religion.

9 March 2023 in ACM Transactions on Algorithms
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Balázs M. MezeiBalázs M. Mezei
Balázs M. Mezei
MWMarcin Wrochna
Marcin Wrochna
SŽStanislav Živný
Stanislav Živný
We study polynomial-time approximation schemes (PTASes) for constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) such as Maximum Independent Set or Minimum Vertex Cover on sparse graph classes. Baker’s approach gives a PTAS on planar graphs, excluded-minor classes, and beyond. For Max-CSPs, and even more generally, maximisation finite-valued CSPs (where constraints are arbitrary non-negative functions), Romero, Wrochna, and Živný [SODA’21] showed that the Sherali-Adams LP relaxation gives a simple PTAS for all fractionally-treewidth-fragile classes, which is the most general “sparsity” condition for which a PTAS is known. We extend these results to general-valued CSPs, which include “crisp” (or “strict”) constraints that have to be satisfied by every feasible assignment. The only condition on the crisp constraints is that their domain contains an element that is at least as feasible as all the others (but possibly less valuable). For minimisation general-valued CSPs with crisp constraints, we present a PTAS for all Baker graph classes—a definition by Dvořák [SODA’20] that encompasses all classes where Baker’s technique is known to work, except for fractionally-treewidth-fragile classes. While this is standard for problems satisfying a certain monotonicity condition on crisp constraints, we show this can be relaxed to diagonalisability —a property of relational structures connected to logics, statistical physics, and random CSPs.

5 October 2021 in Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses
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Balázs M. MezeiBalázs M. Mezei
Balázs M. Mezei
In this article I overview Paul Ricœur’s understanding of divine revelation on the basis of some of his relevant writings. I argue that Ricœur’s hermeneutics of revelation has two aspects: on the one hand Ricœur’s explains the complex ways of acquiring and interpreting divine revelation especially with respect to the Bible; on the other hand, he acknowledges that revelation, originating in God’s freedom, is immediately given. In Ricœur’s view, the understanding of this immediacy is tainted by the presence of evil in human understanding which hinders the realization of revelation itself. As a critique of this standpoint I argue that the immediate givenness of revelation is logically and phenomenologically presupposed in our interpretations. Any hermeneutics of revelation entails a phenomenology of revelation. This phenomenology contains both the self-founding of human beings and, at the same time, the recognition of the absoluteness of the divine. Husserl’s phenomenology offers a way to the understanding of the immediacy of revelation through his central term of Eigenheitlichkeit. Ricœur understands this term not as genuine reality but rather as appartenance, ‘belonging to’, and reshapes its meaning in line with a hermeneutical naturalism. This explains his difficulty to conceive properly the sovereignty of revelation and the importance of phenomenology in the understanding of its immediate character.

21 March 2009 in European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
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Balázs M. MezeiBalázs M. Mezei
Balázs M. Mezei
In this paper I highlight two opposing models of the notion of divine revelation: the propositional and the radical. The propositional understanding of revelation was central to theology and philosophy until the 19th century. Since then, a number of other models of revelation have emerged. I define as radical the understanding of revelation which emphasizes two features of revelation: 1) God’s existence is *per se* revelatory; 2) God’s revelation is *per se* self-revelation. I propose too an assessment of the notion of propositional revelation as presented by Richard Swinburne. And I offer detailed analyses of two representatives of the early understanding of divine revelation as self-revelation: the views of Bernard Bolzano and Anton Günther. Bolzano, the renowned mathematician, was also a philosopher of religion; and Günther, one of the most ingenious writers in Austrian philosophy, was not only a theologian but also a philosopher comparable to the important figures of 19th century German thought.

9 June 2021
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Balázs M. MezeiBalázs M. Mezei
Balázs M. Mezei
This chapter investigates the notion of revelation in the work of the main representatives of the phenomenological movement. This movement has a crucial importance in understanding the philosophical landscape today. Emerging from Austrian and German sources, phenomenology became the leading philosophical school in Europe by the mid-twentieth century. Later developments led to the emergence of French phenomenology, which has defined Continental thought in more than one way. The persistent focus of the phenomenological movement has been the nature and content of religious experience or the religious phenomenon. And while some of the phenomenologists, like Jean-Paul Sartre, proposed a different course for this kind of thinking, the problem of religion has become central to most of the phenomenological authors. This explains the fact that the phenomenological notion of divine disclosure or revelation has always been in the centre of this movement. One can even say that the philosophical problem of revelation is the central subject matter in the history of phenomenology beginning with Franz Brentano through Max Scheler, Paul Ricœur, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Jean-Luc Marion. The work of these and other authors has exerted a tremendous influence on contemporary philosophy. However, the problem of revelation per se is the crucial problem of philosophy, as is demonstrated by the history and problematic of the phenomenological movement. This chapter offers an overview of this history and also an outline of the problem of revelation from the point of view of what can be termed ‘apocalyptic phenomenology’.