Seoungpil Ahn

Dr. Seoungpil Ahn

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 November 2015 in Financial Innovation
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Seoungpil AhnSeoungpil Ahn
Seoungpil Ahn
JCJaiho Chung
Jaiho Chung
The wealth effect of limiting shareholder rights via anti-takeover provisions(ATPs) is a contentious issue. By taking the differential effect hypothesis perspective, our study aims to provide additional evidence about the relation between ATPs and acquisition performance. We examine the interaction of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) with firm characteristics and governance environment in explaining the cross-section of bidder announcement returns. Using a sample of 3,340 completed acquisitions by 1,217 firms during 1996–2006, we test the association between ATPs, firm characteristics, and governance environments with bidder returns. We find that ATPs hurt acquisition performance only when acquirers hold a high level of excess cash. Similarly, ATPs are associated with lower bidder returns only when industry competition is weak and public pension fund ownership is low as well. By contrast, when industry competition is intense and/or public pension fund ownership is high, ATPs do not hurt bidder returns. The complementarity among ATPs, excess cash, industry competition, and public pension fund ownership suggests that ATPs per se do not necessarily result in value-destroying acquisitions for all firms. We address the endogeneity issue of unknown variables by using a proxy for firm prestige and draw the same conclusions.

11 August 2016 in Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting
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Seoungpil AhnSeoungpil Ahn
Seoungpil Ahn
GHGwangheon Hong
Gwangheon Hong
Equity private placement is the newest method of corporate financing strategy. The private equity financing under SEC Rule 144A is exploding and yet not much is known about the motivation behind private equity placement by public firms. Considering that privately placed firms have no bonding benefit, private equity investors would discount their capital by the amount of expected consumption of private benefits. Therefore, the issuers are unable to lower the cost of capital nor increase managerial perquisites. One possible motivation for private placement then is that firms offering the private DR increase their private benefits with the capital raised subsequently. Our approach is new to literature by incorporating both benefit (conceal private information) and cost (informational monopoly) associated with private equity financing.

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Seoungpil AhnSeoungpil Ahn
Seoungpil Ahn
The value of takeover defenses changes with different firm characteristics. In the paper, I examine the interactions of firm characteristics with the value of takeover defenses. The results show that the relationship between firm value and takeover defenses differs in firm age, monitoring costs, advising needs, and their interactions. Takeover defenses are not necessarily more detrimental for older firms. Instead, takeover defenses are more harmful for older firms with higher monitoring costs, but the adverse impact is positively moderated for older firms with higher advising needs. Thus, the influence of firm age on the value of takeover defenses depends on a firm’s monitoring costs and advising needs. The findings of the paper present consistent evidence that takeover defenses have a heterogeneous impact for firms with different firm characteristics.

21 February 2025 in Business and Economic Research
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Seoungpil AhnSeoungpil Ahn
Seoungpil Ahn
This study examines the spillover effect of the volatility index on the stock return of the Korean stock market. Empirical analysis utilizes the US volatility index (VIX) in the return format and the KOSPI daily return data for the twenty years from January 2002 to December 2021. Using the time-series models, I find that the VIX is negatively associated with the KOSPI stock return. Further, the result shows that the influence of the VIX becomes weakened in the later period after the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the negative relation between the VIX return and the KOSPI return remains persistent, suggesting that the VIX serves as a preceding indicator for the Korean stock market.

22 July 2015 in Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting
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Seoungpil AhnSeoungpil Ahn
Seoungpil Ahn
For a sample of diversified firms, I investigate the impact of the segment reporting rule change from SFAS No. 14 to SFAS No. 131 in 1997. This change in segment-reporting rules to SFAS No. 131 potentially allows more precise estimation of diversification discount. I probe the changes in the diversification discount before and after the reporting rule change in 1997. I find that there is a substantial increase in the diversification discount under SFAS No. 131. Further analysis indicates that the changes in the diversification discount are unrelated to the changes in firm value or investment efficiency. Instead, the measures of diversity appear to be more associated with the changes in excess value. This indicates that excess value is not a clean measure of diversification discount.

3 November 2025 in Account and Financial Management Journal
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Seoungpil AhnSeoungpil Ahn
Seoungpil Ahn
I examine the impact of takeover defences on acquirer performance during merger wave. Previous literature reports poor acquisition performance associated with governance provisions. Using a sample of 4,545 completed deals, I find that the negative relation between takeover defenses and acquisition returns exists only when mergers occur during the period of merger wave. The result in the paper shows that the adverse impact of takeover defenses is conditional on the time period. The finding suggests that the capital market does not fully anticipate the behavior of acquirers during the merger wave driven by the technological and regulatory shocks.