Adapting to some level of climate change has become unavoidable. However, there is surprisingly limited systematic knowledge about whether and how adaptation policies have diffused and could diffuse in the future. Most existing adaptation studies do not explicitly examine policy diffusion, which is a form of interdependent policy‐making among jurisdictions at the same or across different levels of governance. To address this gap, we offer a new interpretation and assessment of the extensive adaptation policy literature through a policy diffusion perspective; we pay specific attention to diffusion drivers and barriers, motivations, mechanisms, outputs, and outcomes. We assess the extent to which four motivations and related mechanisms of policy diffusion—interests (linked with learning and competition), rights and duties (tied to coercion), ideology, and recognition (both connected with emulation)—are conceptually and empirically associated with adaptation. We also engage with adaptation policy characteristics, contextual conditions (e.g., problem severity) and different channels of adaptation policy diffusion (e.g., transnational networks). We demonstrate that adaptation policy diffusion can be associated with different mechanisms, yet many of them remain remarkably understudied. So are the effects of adaptation policy diffusion in terms of changes in vulnerability and resilience. We thus identify manifold avenues for future research, and provide insights for practitioners who may hope to leverage diffusion mechanisms to enhance their adaptation efforts.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change > Institutions for Adaptation

The advancing internationalisation of environmental politics has triggered increasing interest in factors that lead countries to participate in international environmental agreements. But do partisan differences matter for such ratification decisions? An analysis of the ratification responses of 21 OECD countries toward 64 treaties shows that partisan environmentalism matters for ratification behaviour whereas left–right differences do not play a significant role. More precisely, while the likelihood of ratification increases when overall government positions are more pro-environment, pro-environment veto players and environmental ministers are not found to play a role. These results hold against a number of controls and correcting for potential error in the measurement of party positions.

The European Union requires its member states to establish national targets for the biofuel content of all diesel and petrol supplies for transport placed on the market. This study explores the adoption of this European Union policy across South-Eastern and Eastern Europe between 2003 and 2012. In theoretical terms, we are specifically interested in examining the role of interest groups for policy adoption. We argue that the oil industry in general and the producers of biofuels in particular will support the establishment of national biofuel targets because they expect economic gains. By contrast, we expect environmental groups with international and regional ties to oppose such targets because biofuels have come under attack for their potential environmental impact including deforestation, a loss in biodiversity, and food insecurity. Empirically, we concentrate on policy adoptions in 21 South-Eastern and Eastern European states with varied relations to the European Union and the Energy Community. Our analysis supports our main arguments in suggesting that a stronger presence of environmental groups decreases the chances of adopting national biofuel targets across our country sample while producer interests tend to increase adoptions. This finding holds true also when controlling for a country’s European Union membership and accession perspective, membership in the Energy Community, and additional domestic-level factors. These results add more generally to our understanding about compliance with European Union policies and environmental governance.

Climate politics and governance across the globe involve an increasing number of interest groups such as from business and civil society. Against this backdrop, it matters a great deal whether interest group mobilization is able to influence climate policy-making. First, there is an increasing number of climate policy supporters like nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and green businesses lobbying in favour of additional climate policies. Second, there is also strong mobilization of groups from energy-intensive and fossil fuel industries lobbying against potentially costly climate policies. In this paper, we investigate the potential effects of these mobilization patterns. More precisely, we ask whether there is any systematic effect of competing interest group mobilization on national climate policy production. To this end, we harness arguments from literatures on interest group mobilization and climate policy-making. Empirically, we exploit a comprehensive global dataset on the adoption of national climate laws and interest group mobilization (over 4,000 organizations) between 1997 and 2016. The results show that the increasing mobilization of climate policy supporters is positively related to national climate policy production. Climate policy opponents are able to weaken this effect, but are hardly able to block new climate laws. The results add to our understanding of climate politics focusing on the role of business organizations and NGOs. This is highly policy relevant for both analysts and practitioners given that the Paris Agreement relies heavily on national policy efforts.