There are predictions that in future rapid technological development could result in a significant shortage of paid work. A possible option currently debated by academics, policy makers, trade unions, employers and mass media, is a shorter working week for everyone. In this context, two important research questions that have not been asked so far are: what is the minimum amount of paid employment needed to deliver some or all of the well-being and mental health benefits that employment has been shown to bring? And what is the optimum number of working hours at which the mental health of workers is at its highest? To answer these questions, this study used the UK Household Longitudinal Study (2009-2018) data from individuals aged between 16 and 64. The analytical sample was 156,734 person-wave observations from 84,993 unique persons of whom 71,113 had two or more measurement times. Fixed effects regressions were applied to examine how changes in work hours were linked to changes in mental well-being within each individual over time. This study found that even a small number of working hours (between one and 8 h a week) generates significant mental health and well-being benefits for previously unemployed or economically inactive individuals. The findings suggest there is no single optimum number of working hours at which well-being and mental health are at their highest - for most groups of workers there was little variation in wellbeing between the lowest (1-8 h) through to the highest (44-48 h) category of working hours. These findings provide important and timely empirical evidence for future of work planning, shorter working week policies and have implications for theorising the future models of organising work in society.

Objectives To compare the mental health and life satisfaction of those employed in the gig work and contingent work with those in full-time or part-time work and the unemployed in the UK during the COVID-19 pandemic. To explore the possible mechanisms of latent and manifest benefits of employment, such as financial precarity and loneliness. Design Cross-sectional survey. Participants A representative sample of 17 722 employed and unemployed British adults, including 429 gig workers. People with disability, retirees and full-time students are not included in the sample. Main outcome measures Mental health (General Health Questionnaire-12 score) and life satisfaction (a direct question from UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS)) as outcomes. Self-reported loneliness (four widely used questions from UKHLS) and financial precarity (a direct question from UKHLS) as mediators. Results Gig workers reported mental health and life satisfaction worse than those employed full time and part time, but better than the unemployed. Mediation analyses showed that gig workers’ worse mental health and life satisfaction than other workers were explained by their higher levels of loneliness and financial precarity, while gig workers’ better mental health and life satisfaction than the unemployed were explained by their less financial precarity. Conclusions Informal and freelance economy provided manifest benefits of employment to gig workers compared with unemployment but lacked latent benefits of employment. Public policies should provide social support to freelance and contingent workers to reduce their loneliness and improve their psychological well-being, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Background: The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has led many Ukrainians to fight for their country, either in the regular army or as civilian members of voluntary territorial defense forces. There is, however, a dearth of knowledge on the mental health of combatants in this conflict. Prior research on the mental health of combatants is unlikely to translate to the situation at hand because such research is focused on combatants fighting abroad and neglects civilian combatants. Methods: This study provides the first attempt to investigate the mental health of Ukrainian combatants in the regular army and voluntary territorial defense forces by analyzing the prevalence rates of common mental health issues, as well as their demographic and socioeconomic predictors. Results: Between March 19 and 31, 2022, the initial period of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a sample of 178 Ukrainian combatants (104 in the regular army and 74 civilian combatants) participated in a survey on symptoms of anxiety (GAD-2), depression (PHQ-2), and insomnia (ISI). Conclusions: A sizable portion of Ukrainian combatants reached cut-off levels for clinical symptoms of anxiety (44·4%), depression (43·3%), and insomnia (12·4%). Importantly, the mental health of Ukrainian combatants varied between professional soldiers and civilian combatants, as well as by gender, marital status, by whether or not they were located in Russian-occupied/active-combat areas, and dependent on whether they were personally involved in combat. This study provides early evidence on the mental health of Ukrainian combatants, pointing to their urgent need for mental health assistance in the ongoing war.

Although substantial research shows that in Britain some ethnic minority women have significantly lower labor force participation (LFP) rates than White British women, even after controlling for demographic characteristics and education levels, little is known about the reasons underlying the remaining ethnic differences. Using nationally representative data (2010–2011), I investigate the role of gender role attitudes in explaining the ethnic as well as generational differences in women’s LFP rates. The results show that after controlling for demographic characteristics and education levels, LFP rates of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are significantly lower than that of White British women and about half of the ethnic gap can be explained by differences in gender role attitudes. Moreover, I show that the ethnic gap is less pronounced for second generation Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Indian women whose LFP rates are significantly higher than those of their first generation counterparts. Importantly, the higher LFP rates of second generation South Asian women can be largely explained by their relatively less traditional gender role attitudes. Drawing on my results, public policies could provide appropriate childcare services and flexible work arrangements to alter traditional gender role attitudes, thereby improving minority women’s labor market opportunities.