Yiping Cheng

Dr. Yiping Cheng

School of Automation and Intelligence, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, China
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 May 2023 in Frontiers in Endocrinology
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Journal Article
Open access
Yiping ChengYiping Cheng
Yiping Cheng
QZQiang Zhang
Qiang Zhang
HLHaizhen Li
Haizhen Li
GZGuangshuai Zhou
Guangshuai Zhou
PSPing Shi
Ping Shi
CXchao xu
chao xu
Introduction: Non-alcoholic fatty liver disease (NAFLD) is characterized by excess accumulation of triglycerides within the liver. However, whether the circulating levels of triglycerides and cholesterol transported in triglyceride-rich lipoproteins (remnant cholesterol, remnant-C) are related to the occurrence of NAFLD has not yet been studied. This study aims to assess the association of triglycerides and remnant-C with NAFLD in a Chinese cohort of middle aged and elderly individuals.Methods: All subjects in the current study are from the 13,876 individuals who recruited in the Shandong cohort of the REACTION study. We included 6,634 participants who had more than one visit during the study period with an average follow-up time of 43.34 months. The association between lipid concentrations and incident NAFLD were evaluated by unadjusted and adjusted Cox proportional hazard models. The potential confounders were adjusted in the models including age, sex, hip circumference (HC), body mass index (BMI), systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, fasting plasma glucose (FPG), diabetes status and cardiovascular disease (CVD) status.Results: In multivariable-adjusted Cox proportional hazard model analyses, triglycerides (hazard ratio[HR], 95% confidence interval [CI]:1.080,1.047-1.113;p<0.001), high-density lipoprotein cholesterol (HDL-C) (HR, 95% CI: 0.571,0.487-0.670; p1.69 mmol/L, HDL-C<1.03 mmol/L in men or<1.29 mmol/L in women) was also associated with NAFLD (HR, 95% CI: 1.343,1.177-1.533; p<0.001). Remnant-C levels were higher in females than in males and increased with increasing BMI and in participants with diabetes and CVD compared with those without diabetes or CVD. After adjusting for other factors in the Cox regression models, we found that serum levels of TG and remnant-C, but not TC or LDL-C, were associated with NAFLD outcomes in women group, non-cardiovascular disease status, non-diabetes status and middle BMI categories (24 to 28 kg/m2).Discussion: In the middle aged and elderly subset of the Chinese population, especially those who were women, non-CVD status, non-diabetes status and middle BMI status (24 to 28 kg/m2), levels of triglycerides and remnant-C, but not TC or LDL-C, were associated with NAFLD outcomes independent of other risk factors.

25 January 2017 in Neural Processing Letters
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Yiping ChengYiping Cheng
Yiping Cheng

1 March 2007 in Frontiers of Electrical and Electronic Engineering in China
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Yiping ChengYiping Cheng
Yiping Cheng

20 January 2025 in Preprints.org
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Yiping ChengYiping Cheng
Yiping Cheng
This paper addresses the issue of gridlocks in the approval of prime ministers in semi-presidential countries and presidential countries with prime ministers, focusing on the case of South Korea. A game-based scheme for prime minister approval specifically designed for presidential systems like Korea's is then proposed, along with two supporting provisions. The scheme has an adjustable parameter tentatively set at 3/5 to ensure a balanced system, and it also introduces a new form of cohabitation — hard cohabitation — where the prime minister is not nominated by the president. The supporting provisions aim to cope with two challenges likely to arise from hard cohabitation: potential cabinet instability and difficulties in cooperation between the president and the prime minister. By correcting the misuse of the transition model in a previous version of this paper, we address several issues identified earlier and introduce a mechanism not present in that version: the ability for parliament to replace the prime minister following a parliamentary election. The provisions are now concise, elegant, and rigorous. The reform package proposed here is thus believed to be smooth, fair, and effective, and is strongly hoped to be adopted by South Korea or other similar countries in the future.

29 July 2025 in Preprints.org
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Yiping ChengYiping Cheng
Yiping Cheng
This paper builds on efforts to adapt a game-based constitutional scheme, originally designed for Korea-like presidential systems, to semi-presidential systems, introducing two innovative schemes: Scheme A and Scheme B. Initially, we assumed the prime minister selection procedure for a vacant office could be directly transposed, but refinements led to a parallel process with relative timing, improving rigor over the original sequential, absolute-timing approach. Applying the game-based concept to the prime minister replacement procedure yields constructive vote of no-confidence. A novel concept of formal legislative confidence, grounded in a systematic theory, is then inspired, and is integrated into other procedural elements of the proposed schemes. This concept standardizes presidential dismissal authority across provisions. A ``presidential bias'' parameter shapes the schemes: Scheme A, with zero bias, mirrors a typical semi-presidential system, incorporating a Request for Successor (RFS) mechanism to unify parliamentary dissolution while minimizing its frequency. Scheme B, with a bias ranging from 0 to 1/8, adopts a presidential-leaning structure featuring a 9/16 cohabitation threshold, and excludes RFS, resulting in an indissoluble parliament. We recommend Scheme A for robust governance in fragmented parliaments and Scheme B for stable, presidential-leaning systems. As refined version, Scheme B renders the original scheme obsolete. Both proposed schemes offer innovative alternatives to traditional selection, confidence and removal mechanisms in semi-presidential systems.

4 December 2025 in Preprints.org
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Yiping ChengYiping Cheng
Yiping Cheng
This paper presents a fully articulated semi-presidential constitutional scheme (Scheme C) that embraces parliamentary fragmentation and minority governments as the new normal rather than pathologies requiring cure. Evolved from Schemes A and B, it strengthens prime-ministerial counterweights against the assembly. The scheme fuses (i) Westminster-style executive continuity and prime-ministerial dissolution initiative, (ii) French-style presidential authority in foreign and defence policy plus a robust legislative veto, (iii) synchronised presidential-legislative elections complemented by semi-mid-term legislative contests, and (iv) a game-based investiture rule paired with an innovative two-tier no-confidence procedure, both anchored in formal legislative confidence. Scheme C thereby achieves an unprecedented synthesis: more parliamentary than classic president-parliamentary or premier-presidential systems, more stable than Westminster models amid fragmented legislatures, and endowed with stronger mid-term democratic correctives than existing benchmarks. Its architecture simultaneously shields the prime minister from presidential overreach, the president from parliamentary extortion, and the state from governmental paralysis or authoritarian drift---even under unified political control of both branches. Scheme C is thus advanced not as theoretical speculation but as a coherent, stress-tested model ready for adoption in contemporary democracies facing persistent legislative fragmentation.