Purpose: This paper aims to address the following research question: Is loan funding to female entrepreneurs in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco affected by self-selection from borrowers or/and discrimination from lenders? This paper sheds light on empirical literature review, which displays mixed evidence.Design/methodology/approach: The authors use a pooled sample of 3,896 businesses in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia drawn from the 2013 World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES). Despite selection biases and overweighing, the sample provides descriptive statistics upon gender ownership and gender management (human capital characteristics and financial data). The authors design two regression logistic models with interaction to investigate loan demand and loan granting with respect to self-selection vs discrimination. Female management is disentangled from female ownership with respect to entrepreneurship.Findings: Neither self-selection nor discrimination affects female owners compared with their male counterparts, whereas female managers do self-select themselves. In as much as the WBES female subsample include several biases, the authors eventually emphasise the importance of the non-surveyed informal sector, which includes most (micro-)businesses, and loan funding provided by the microfinance industry to these female businesses. Microfinance fills the gap for working capital but not for fixed assets. The size of the business is a major factor explaining both self-selection and discrimination.Research limitations/implications: Findings of this study have important policy implications for closing the gender gap in accessing finance. In addition to supply-side factors, demand-side factors should be addressed. Informality also needs to be addressed, as many micro and small enterprises owned or managed by women are informal entities without registration or/and social protection. One way to increase women's demand for financial services is to introduce financial products to meet their needs (e.g. social protection basic coverage). Governments can help develop these new products by strengthening the microfinance industry with a favourable regulatory and institutional framework. The authors also wonder about the extension of this study. Thus, a new cross-sectional analysis of the most recent surveys in the North African region would allow the authors to enlarge the overall sample and measure the evolution of the gender gap over time.Originality/value: So far, funding female entrepreneurship remained little investigated in these North African countries. Several sampling biases in the WBES – small businesses underestimation and manufacturing industry overweighting, which have been overlooked so far, explain the absence of self-selection and discrimination. In contrast, size plays an important role. Hence, the focus on microenterprises (the informal sector) and the microfinance industry suggests indeed that female entrepreneurs operating in small businesses have to cope with both self-selection and discrimination.

Nous présentons les hypothèses relatives aux deux principales théories financières de la structure d’endettement des PME — compromis et financement hiérarchique — en mettant l’accent sur les imperfections du financement : fiscalité, coûts d’agence et asymétrie d’information. Nous testons ces hypothèses, la variable expliquée étant le taux d’endettement total, grâce à un modèle linéaire de données de panel, sur un échantillon de 1 520 PME françaises observées durant la période 2000-2004. Selon nos résultats, à l’exception des garanties qui conditionnent l’accès au crédit, la théorie du compromis est infirmée au regard de la relation entre l’endettement et la taille ainsi que l’âge des PME ; la relation entre l’endettement et le taux d’investissement ainsi que le crédit interentreprises confirme la théorie du financement hiérarchique. We present the assumptions for two main theories of the financial structure of SMEs debt financing, i.e. tradeoff theory and pecking order theory ; with a focus on the imperfections of funding : taxation, agency costs and asymmetric information. We test these assumptions, the dependent variable being the total debt ratio, thanks to a linear panel data model applied upon a sample of 1520 French SMEs over 2000-2004. According to our results, except for the guarantees upon which access to credit is granted, tradeoff theory is reversed with respect to the relationship between debt, and the size and age of SMEs, whereas the relationship between debt and the investment rate, and trade credit support the pecking order theory. Se presentan los supuestos para los dos principales teorías sobre la estructura de la deuda financiera de las PyMEs, endeudamiento óptimo y financiación jerárquica – con especial atención a las imperfecciones del financiamiento : impuestos, costes de agencia y la información asimétrica. Ponemos a prueba estas hipótesis, la variable dependiente es la ratio de deuda total, gracias a un modelo lineal con datos de panel, una muestra de 1.520 pymes francesas observadas en el período 2000-2004. Según nuestros resultados, a excepción de las garantías sobre los cuales se concede el acceso al crédito, la teoría del endeudamiento óptimo se invierte con respecto a la relación entre la deuda y el tamaño y edad de las PyMEs, mientras que la relación entre la deuda y la tasa de inversión y el crédito comercial apoyan la teoría de la financiación jerárquica. In Anlehnung an die zwei massgeblichen Theorien zur Finanzierung von KMU – Kompromiss und hierarchische Finanzierung – präsentieren wir die Hypothesen in Bezug auf die Unvollkommenheit der Finanzierung : Steuern, Agenturkosten und asymmetrische Information. Die Hypothesen mit der Schuldenquote werden anhand von Paneldaten aus den Jahren 2000 bis 2004 von 1520 französischen KMU mittels eines linearen Modelles getestet. Mit Ausnahme von Garantien, die den Zugang zu Krediten ermöglichen, zeigen die Resultate auf, dass die Kompromisstheorie die Beziehung zwischen Verschuldung und der Grösse sowie des Alters der KMU entkräften. Die Beziehung zwischen Verschuldung, Investitionsquote sowie zwischenbetrieblichen Krediten bestätigen die Theorie der hierarchischen Finanzierung.

Two main theories of the capital structure are tested upon a balanced panel dataset of 2,370 French SMEs during nine years over the period 2003-2007 and the period 2008-2010, assessing the impact of the 2008 crisis accordingly. Trade-off theory is based on the optimisation of a target debt ratio, whereas pecking order theory argues that decision-making is sequential and that firms prefer internal funding to debt, due to asymmetry of information. Unlike other studies devoted to French SMEs, estimates come from a dynamic panel model (Generalised Method of Moments) applied to mature businesses. Profitability, guarantees upon which access to credit is granted, and trade credit confirm trade-off theory. Relationships between debt and the lagged debt ratio, growth opportunities, credit risk and control over ownership support the pecking order theory, which passes better the tests. Hence, no unified theory of the capital structure has yet emerged.

Longstanding evidence in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries shows a high prevalence of unemployment and informality among a large fraction of population, and at the same time gender disparities in labour force participation and occupational mobility. Why is there such persistent labour‐market segmentation? What is the impact and potential of various formalisation policies? An overview of the informal economy across three middle‐income MENA countries (Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia) is provided with respect to taxonomy, coverage and drivers. Transition matrices and multinomial logistic regressions are applied to longitudinal microdata from Labour‐Market Panel Surveys, focusing on workers' occupational mobility in relation to their previous status, age cohort, gender and other demographics. Persistent segmentation and low occupational mobility in all countries suggest that informal employment is not driven by choice on the labour supply side but by structural constraints on the demand side. Existing formalisation policies based on distinct stick and carrot strategies, and targeting of existing businesses and workers achieve rather modest impacts. One recommendation to supplement policies for decent jobs creation is to promote social and solidarity enterprises and extend microfinance to informal enterprises.

Malgré leur importance numérique et le rôle qui leur est dévolu dans le cadre de la stratégie de promotion du secteur privé en Tunisie, les petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) ne répondent pas aux exigences des banques afin de satisfaire leur besoin de financement. L’estimation du tout premier modèle de déséquilibre appliquée à la Tunisie repose sur un panel de 1 275 PME observées entre 2001 et 2006. Il montre que la demande de crédit bancaire n’est pas déterminée par les facteurs « endogènes », tels le niveau d’activité et les ressources internes disponibles des entreprises, mais plutôt par des facteurs « exogènes », tels le coût de financement et les garanties exigées par les banques. Les exigences des banques, surtout en matière de garanties, expliquent en grande partie l’insuffisance des concours octroyés par rapport aux besoins exprimés et se traduisent par une proportion moyenne d’environ 80 % de ces entreprises qui sont - partiellement ou totalement - rationnées.