Kun Li

Dr. Kun Li

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 February 2019 in Applied Energy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YQYong Qin
Yong Qin
Kun LiKun Li
Kun Li
ZLZhanhao Liang
Zhanhao Liang
BLBrendan Lee
Brendan Lee
FZFuyong Zhang
Fuyong Zhang
DRDragan Rodriguez
Dragan Rodriguez

27 April 2015 in Physical Review E
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
Kun LiKun Li
Kun Li
RCRui Cong
Rui Cong
TWTe Wu
Te Wu
LWlong wang
long wang
Social exclusion, keeping free riders from benefit sharing, plays an important role in sustaining cooperation in our world. Here we propose two different exclusion regimes, namely, peer exclusion and pool exclusion, to investigate the evolution of social exclusion in finite populations. In the peer exclusion regime, each excluder expels all the defectors independently, and thus bears the total cost on his own, while in the pool exclusion regime, excluders spontaneously form an institution to carry out rejection of the free riders, and each excluder shares the cost equally. In a public goods game containing only excluders and defectors, it is found that peer excluders outperform pool excluders if the exclusion costs are small, and the situation is converse once the exclusion costs exceed some critical points, which holds true for all the selection intensities and different update rules. Moreover, excluders can dominate the whole population under a suitable parameters range in the presence of second-order free riders (cooperators), showing that exclusion has prominent advantages over common costly punishment. More importantly, our finding indicates that the group exclusion mechanism helps the cooperative union to survive under unfavorable conditions. Our results may give some insights into better understanding the prevalence of such a strategy in the real world and its significance in sustaining cooperation.

17 March 2022 in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Kun LiKun Li
Kun Li
HXHaocheng Xu
Haocheng Xu
XLXiao Liu
Xiao Liu

1 May 2019 in Applied Mathematics and Computation
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZKZengxin Kang
Zengxin Kang
LZLei Zhang
Lei Zhang
Kun LiKun Li
Kun Li

1 December 2015 in Physics Letters A
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XSXiukai Sui
Xiukai Sui
RCRui Cong
Rui Cong
Kun LiKun Li
Kun Li
LWlong wang
long wang

17 February 2016 in Scientific Reports
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Kun LiKun Li
Kun Li
ASAttila Szolnoki
Attila Szolnoki
RCRui Cong
Rui Cong
LWlong wang
long wang
Resources are often limited, therefore it is essential how convincingly competitors present their claims for them. Beside a player’s natural capacity, here overconfidence and bluffing may also play a decisive role and influence how to share a restricted reward. While bluff provides clear, but risky advantage, overconfidence, as a form of self-deception, could be harmful to its user. Still, it is a long-standing puzzle why these potentially damaging biases are maintained and evolving to a high level in the human society. Within the framework of evolutionary game theory, we present a simple version of resource competition game in which the coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing is fundamental, which is capable to explain their prevalence in structured populations. Interestingly, bluffing seems apt to evolve to higher level than corresponding overconfidence and in general the former is less resistant to punishment than the latter. Moreover, topological feature of the social network plays an intricate role in the spreading of overconfidence and bluffing. While the heterogeneity of interactions facilitates bluffing, it also increases efficiency of adequate punishment against overconfident behavior. Furthermore, increasing the degree of homogeneous networks can trigger similar effect. We also observed that having high real capability may accommodate both bluffing ability and overconfidence simultaneously.