Nicholas Tsitsianis

Dr. Nicholas Tsitsianis

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 February 2009 in Journal of Economic Psychology
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Journal Article
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GCGuglielmo Maria Caporale
Guglielmo Maria Caporale
YGYannis Georgellis
Yannis Georgellis
Nicholas TsitsianisNicholas Tsitsianis
Nicholas Tsitsianis
YYYa Ping Yin
Ya Ping Yin

22 August 2005 in British Journal of Industrial Relations
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Journal Article
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FGFrancis Green
Francis Green
Nicholas TsitsianisNicholas Tsitsianis
Nicholas Tsitsianis
Trends in job satisfaction in Britain and Germany are described, and potential explanations investigated. Contrary to what might be expected from popular commentary, changing job insecurity does not explain the fall in job satisfaction in either country. It is found that intensification of work effort and declining task discretion account for the fall in job satisfaction in Britain. In Germany there was a modest fall in the proportion of people working the number of hours that they wanted to. However, while working too many or too few hours is a significant source of job dissatisfaction, the changes were too small to account for the fall in job satisfaction.

6 November 2008 in Social Indicators Research
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Journal Article
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YGYannis Georgellis
Yannis Georgellis
Nicholas TsitsianisNicholas Tsitsianis
Nicholas Tsitsianis
YYYa Ping Yin
Ya Ping Yin

1 March 2007 in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
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Journal Article
Closed access
YGYannis Georgellis
Yannis Georgellis
JSJohn Sessions
John Sessions
Nicholas TsitsianisNicholas Tsitsianis
Nicholas Tsitsianis

1 October 2010 in Critical Perspectives on Accounting
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Journal Article
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TATord Andersson
Tord Andersson
PGPauline Gleadle
Pauline Gleadle
CHColin Haslam
Colin Haslam
Nicholas TsitsianisNicholas Tsitsianis
Nicholas Tsitsianis

19 July 2022 in Journal of Applied Accounting Research
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Journal Article
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MKMohammed Sulaiman Hassan Kasbar
Mohammed Sulaiman Hassan Kasbar
Nicholas TsitsianisNicholas Tsitsianis
Nicholas Tsitsianis
ATAndroniki Triantafylli
Androniki Triantafylli
CHColin Haslam
Colin Haslam
Purpose: The study aims to predict and understand the conditions under which the association between corporate governance and a company's financial performance is positive or meaningful by empirically accounting for agency conflicts. This study is motivated by the fact that the separation between ownership and control creates agency conflicts between company owners and managers. Therefore, strong corporate governance systems are expected to align the interests of conflicting parties whereby companies become more likely to improve their financial performance. However, previous research did not yield consistent results in this regard.Design/methodology/approach: Given the latent nature of corporate governance and agency conflicts, this study uses principal component and exploratory factor analyses to proxy for corporate governance and agency conflicts, respectively. Using dynamic panel data modelling, the authors estimate the change in the relationship between corporate governance and a company's financial performance as a function of the change in the level of agency conflict using data from the UK on 78 non-financial companies listed in the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE100) index between 1999 and 2014.Findings: The corporate governance quality of companies is significantly differed. Moreover, companies operating at high levels of agency conflict outperform the companies' counterparts operating in low levels of agency conflict only when the former improves the corporate governance quality. This implies that financial performance improves by approximately 11% if companies improve corporate governance quality due to an increase in the level of agency conflicts.Research limitations/implications: Lack of data on ownership structure for the study period (1999–2014) was the main reason the authors excluded it from the analysis. Additionally, the lack of reliable and quantifiable corporate governance data on small-medium sized enterprises limits findings on large non-financial companies.Practical implications: The authors propose a framework/tool for the impact of the level of corporate governance compliance on financial performance conditional upon the level of agency conflicts whose importance has largely been neglected by the empirical literature. By providing the right “lens” to de-fragmentise the corporate governance mechanisms and estimate empirically the unobserved agency conflicts, researchers, practitioners and investors are able to get further insights on the composing elements of financial performance and evaluate it more objectively. Managers can allocate companies' resources more efficiently and thus improve financial performance. The auditors can get further background information when they compile their report on company's directors. The study's findings offer valuable suggestions for accounting and corporate governance regulators to further put forward and improve accounting standards so as to enhance existing regulations and internal mechanisms which, in turn, could decrease the scope for managerial opportunistic behaviour as the latter can be empirically estimated through our framework.Social implications: The findings point out the need for a revised framework accounting for the principal-agent (mis)alignment and the engrained information asymmetries. By acknowledging the level of corporate governance compliance and agency conflict, managers and shareholders should actively strive for the effectiveness of companies, the efficiency of the stock markets and the minimisation of the agency costs. Furthermore, policymakers can look into the development of a code of corporate governance to effectively regulate firms rather than enforcing rigid laws that may not be value relevant. With all these settings in place, the likelihood of corporate failures, corporate scandals as well as corporate violations with the ensuing penalties is set to be reduced. Hence, valuable resources, social capital and effort can be directed into more productive activities.Originality/value: This study adds to the existing literature by offering empirical and explicit evidence on the dynamic association between corporate governance, agency conflicts and financial performance against a backdrop of high demand for strong corporate governance practices/codes. To the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no study that has yet empirically examined the moderating effect of the level of agency conflicts, given the level of corporate governance compliance on financial performance for listed and internationally aligned companies.