Esther Duflo
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Esther Duflo

Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA

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Academic Career Length

28Years (1999-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 July 2013 in Science
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ABAbhijit Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
ACArun G. Chandrasekhar
Arun G. Chandrasekhar
EDEsther Duflo
Esther Duflo
MJMatthew O. Jackson
Matthew O. Jackson
Introduction: How do the network positions of the first individuals in a society to receive information about a new product affect its eventual diffusion? To answer this question, we develop a model of information diffusion through a social network that discriminates between information passing (individuals must be aware of the product before they can adopt it, and they can learn from their friends) and endorsement (the decisions of informed individuals to adopt the product might be influenced by their friends’ decisions). We apply it to the diffusion of microfinance loans, in a setting where the set of potentially first-informed individuals is known. We then propose two new measures of how “central” individuals are in their social network with regard to spreading information; the centrality of the first-informed individuals in a village helps significantly in predicting eventual adoption. Methods: Six months before a microfinance institution entered 43 villages in India and began offering microfinance loans to villagers, we collected detailed network data by surveying households about a wide range of interactions. The microfinance institution began by inviting “leaders” (e.g., teachers, shopkeepers, savings group leaders) to an informational meeting and then asked them to spread information about the loans. Using the network data, the locations in the network of these first-informed villagers (or injection points), and data regarding the villagers’ subsequent participation, we estimate the parameters of our diffusion model using the method of simulated moments. The parameters of the model are validated by showing that the model correctly predicts the evolution of participation in each village over time. The model yields a new measure of the effectiveness of any given node as an injection point, which we call communication centrality. Finally, we develop an easily computed proxy for communication centrality, which we call diffusion centrality. Results: We find that a microfinance participant is seven times as likely to inform another household as a nonparticipant; nonetheless, information transmitted by nonparticipants is important and accounts for about one-third of the eventual informedness and participation in the village because nonparticipants are much more numerous. Once information passing is accounted for, an informed household’s decision to participate is not significantly dependent on how many of its neighbors have participated. Communication centrality, when applied to the set of first-informed individuals in a village, substantially outperforms other standard network measures of centrality in predicting microfinance participation in this context. Finally, the simpler proxy measure—diffusion centrality—is strongly correlated with communication centrality and inherits its predictive properties. Discussion: Our results suggest that a model of diffusion can distinguish information passing from endorsement effects, and that understanding the nature of transmission may be important in identifying the ideal places to inject information.

1 June 2003 in The World Bank Economic Review
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EDEsther Duflo
Esther Duflo
This article evaluates the impact of a large cash transfer program in South Africa on children's nutritional status and investigates whether the gender of the recipient affects that impact. In the early 1990s the benefits and coverage of the South African social pension program were expanded for the black population. In 1993 the benefits were about twice the median per capita income in rural areas. More than a quarter of black South African children under age five live with a pension recipient. Estimates suggest that pensions received by women had a large impact on the anthropometric status (weight for height and height for age) of girls but little effect on that of boys. No similar effect is found for pensions received by men. This suggests that the efficiency of public transfer programs may depend on the gender of the recipient.

3 February 2012 in Science
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LBLori Beaman
Lori Beaman
EDEsther Duflo
Esther Duflo
RPRohini Pande
Rohini Pande
PTPetia Topalova
Petia Topalova
Girl Power: The potential of affirmative action policies to reduce overall outcomes because of lower individual performance has been discussed widely and at length. But do quotas or preferential treatment of applicants alter the pool of candidates? Balafoutas and Sutter (p. 579 ; see the Perspective by Villeval ) used an existing laboratory-based task to assess the change in composition of winning candidates and the overall outcome as a function of three affirmative action policies. Policies designed to encourage more women to enter a competitive environment served to recruit enough high-performing individuals to ensure that the efficiency in performing the task was preserved. Beaman et al. (p. 582 , published online 12 January) examined the effects of a constitutionally mandated reservation of village-council and council-leader positions for women in West Bengal after two election cycles (1998 and 2003). The program appeared to narrow the gender gap in aspirations of parents for their children and of children for themselves; in addition, teenage girls spent more time in school and less on household chores. Beliefs and attitudes changed only after the second set of elections—that is, after a longer exposure to female role models—complementing the more rapid policy changes instituted by women council leaders after the first round of elections.

17 May 2010 in BMJ
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ABAbhijit Vinayak Banerjee
Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee
EDEsther Duflo
Esther Duflo
RGRachel Glennerster
Rachel Glennerster
DKDhruva Kothari
Dhruva Kothari
Objective To assess the efficacy of modest non-financial incentives on immunisation rates in children aged 1-3 and to compare it with the effect of only improving the reliability of the supply of services.Design Clustered randomised controlled study. Setting Rural Rajasthan, India.Participants 1640 children aged 1-3 at end point.Interventions 134 villages were randomised to one of three groups: a once monthly reliable immunisation camp (intervention A; 379 children from 30 villages); a once monthly reliable immunisation camp with small incentives (raw lentils and metal plates for completed immunisation; intervention B; 382 children from 30 villages), or control (no intervention, 860 children in 74 villages). Surveys were undertaken in randomly selected households at baseline and about 18 months after the interventions started (end point).Main outcome measures Proportion of children aged 1-3 at the end point who were partially or fully immunised.Results Among children aged 1-3 in the end point survey, rates of full immunisation were 39% (148/382, 95% confidence interval 30% to 47%) for intervention B villages (reliable immunisation with incentives), 18% (68/379, 11% to 23%) for intervention A villages (reliable immunisation without incentives), and 6% (50/860, 3% to 9%) for control villages. The relative risk of complete immunisation for intervention B versus control was 6.7 (4.5 to 8.8) and for intervention B versus intervention A was 2.2 (1.5 to 2.8). Children in areas neighbouring intervention B villages were also more likely to be fully immunised than those from areas neighbouring intervention A villages (1.9, 1.1 to 2.8). The average cost per immunisation was $28 (1102 rupees, about £16 or €19) in intervention A and $56 (2202 rupees) in intervention B.Conclusions Improving reliability of services improves immunisation rates, but the effect remains modest. Small incentives have large positive impacts on the uptake of immunisation services in resource poor areas and are more cost effective than purely improving supply.Trial registration IRSCTN87759937.

1 September 2015 in American Economic Review
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EDEsther Duflo
Esther Duflo
PDPascaline Dupas
Pascaline Dupas
MKMichael Kremer
Michael Kremer
A seven-year randomized evaluation suggests education subsidies reduce adolescent girls' dropout, pregnancy, and marriage but not sexually transmitted infection (STI). The government's HIV curriculum, which stresses abstinence until marriage, does not reduce pregnancy or STI. Both programs combined reduce STI more, but cut dropout and pregnancy less, than education subsidies alone. These results are inconsistent with a model of schooling and sexual behavior in which both pregnancy and STI are determined by one factor (unprotected sex), but consistent with a two-factor model in which choices between committed and casual relationships also affect these outcomes. (JEL I12, I18, I21, J13, J16, O15)

1 November 2017 in Journal of Economic Perspectives
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ABAbhijit Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
RBRukmini Banerji
Rukmini Banerji
JBJames Berry
James Berry
EDEsther Duflo
Esther Duflo
HKHarini Kannan
Harini Kannan
MWMichael Walton
Michael Walton
The promise of randomized controlled trials is that evidence gathered through the evaluation of a specific program helps us—possibly after several rounds of fine-tuning and multiple replications in different contexts—to inform policy. However, critics have pointed out that a potential constraint in this agenda is that results from small “proof-of-concept” studies run by nongovernment organizations may not apply to policies that can be implemented by governments on a large scale. After discussing the potential issues, this paper describes the journey from the original concept to the design and evaluation of scalable policy. We do so by evaluating a series of strategies that aim to integrate the nongovernment organization Pratham’s “Teaching at the Right Level” methodology into elementary schools in India. The methodology consists of reorganizing instruction based on children’s actual learning levels, rather than on a prescribed syllabus, and has previously been shown to be very effective when properly implemented. We present evidence from randomized controlled trials involving some designs that failed to produce impacts within the regular schooling system but still helped shape subsequent versions of the program. As a result of this process, two versions of the programs were developed that successfully raised children’s learning levels using scalable models in government schools. We use this example to draw general lessons about using randomized control trials to design scalable policies.