Kai Vogeley

Kai Vogeley

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Kai Vogeley

Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital of Cologne, Cologne, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

27Years (2000-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 July 2013 in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
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Journal Article
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LSLeonhard Schilbach
Leonhard Schilbach
BTBert Timmermans
Bert Timmermans
VRVasudevi Reddy
Vasudevi Reddy
ACAlan Costall
Alan Costall
GBGary Bente
Gary Bente
KVKai Vogeley
Kai Vogeley
In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing the “dark matter” of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really “go social”; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.

7 December 2006 in Schizophrenia Bulletin
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Journal Article
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KVK. Vogeley
K. Vogeley
CKC. Kupke
C. Kupke
The subjective experience of time is a fundamental constituent of human consciousness and can be disturbed under conditions of mental disorders such as schizophrenia or affective disorders. Besides the scientific domain of psychiatry, time consciousness is a topic that has been extensively studied both by theoretical philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. It can be shown that both approaches exemplified by the philosophical analysis of time consciousness (Husserl) and the neuroscientific theory of cross-temporal contingencies (binding of cognitive processes over time) as the neurophysiological basis of human consciousness implemented in the prefrontal cortex (Fuster) converge in 2 respects. Firstly, a tripartite conception of consciousness divides human cognition in 3 different temporal domains comprising retention, presentation, and protention (Husserl) and the past, the present, and the future corresponding to working memory, interference control, and preparatory set (Fuster). Secondly, both concepts refer to the present as an extended duration that integrates information from the recent past and the future. We propose that the integration of phenomenological and neuroscientific approaches can stimulate the development of enriched pathophysiological concepts of mental disorders. This approach appears to be particularly fruitful with respect to schizophrenia that is interpreted as a structural disturbance of time consciousness.

1 December 2009 in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
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KVKai Vogeley
Kai Vogeley
ARAndreas Roepstorff
Andreas Roepstorff

1 January 2012 in Frontiers in Psychology
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Journal Article
Open access
UPUlrich J. Pfeiffer
Ulrich J. Pfeiffer
LSLeonhard Schilbach
Leonhard Schilbach
MJMathis Jording
Mathis Jording
BTBert Timmermans
Bert Timmermans
GBGary Bente
Gary Bente
KVKai Vogeley
Kai Vogeley
Social gaze provides a window into the interests and intentions of others and allows us to actively point out our own. It enables us to engage in triadic interactions involving human actors and physical objects and to build an indispensable basis for coordinated action and collaborative efforts. The object-related aspect of gaze in combination with the fact that any motor act of looking encompasses both input and output of the minds involved makes this non-verbal cue system particularly interesting for research in embodied social cognition. Social gaze comprises several core components, such as gaze-following or gaze aversion. Gaze-following can result in situations of either “joint attention” or “shared attention.” The former describes situations in which the gaze-follower is aware of sharing a joint visual focus with the gazer. The latter refers to a situation in which gazer and gaze-follower focus on the same object and both are aware of their reciprocal awareness of this joint focus. Here, a novel interactive eye-tracking paradigm suited for studying triadic interactions was used to explore two aspects of social gaze. Experiments 1a and 1b assessed how the latency of another person’s gaze reactions (i.e., gaze-following or gaze version) affected participants’ sense of agency, which was measured by their experience of relatedness of these reactions. Results demonstrate that both timing and congruency of a gaze reaction as well as the other’s action options influence the sense of agency. Experiment 2 explored differences in gaze dynamics when participants were asked to establish either joint or shared attention. Findings indicate that establishing shared attention takes longer and requires a larger number of gaze shifts as compared to joint attention, which more closely seems to resemble simple visual detection. Taken together, novel insights into the sense of agency and the awareness of others in gaze-based interaction are provided.

1 October 2010 in Neural Networks
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Journal Article
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KVKai Vogeley
Kai Vogeley
GBGary Bente
Gary Bente

3 July 2017 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
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Journal Article
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KVKai Vogeley
Kai Vogeley
It is the aim of this article to present an empirically justified hypothesis about the functional roles of the two social neural systems, namely the so-called ‘mirror neuron system’ (MNS) and the ‘mentalizing system’ (MENT, also ‘theory of mind network’ or ‘social neural network’). Both systems are recruited during cognitive processes that are either related to interaction or communication with other conspecifics, thereby constituting intersubjectivity. The hypothesis is developed in the following steps: first, the fundamental distinction that we make between persons and things is introduced; second, communication is presented as the key process that allows us to interact with others; third, the capacity to ‘mentalize’ or to understand the inner experience of others is emphasized as the fundamental cognitive capacity required to establish successful communication. On this background, it is proposed that MNS serves comparably early stages of social information processing related to the ‘detection’ of spatial or bodily signals, whereas MENT is recruited during comparably late stages of social information processing related to the ‘evaluation’ of emotional and psychological states of others. This hypothesis of MNS as a social detection system and MENT as a social evaluation system is illustrated by findings in the field of psychopathology. Finally, new research questions that can be derived from this hypothesis are discussed. This article is part of the themed issue ‘Physiological determinants of social behaviour in animals’.