1 May 2008 in Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering
A careful program of subsurface sampling and cone penetration test soundings was employed to characterize the geologic conditions beneath the failed portion of the 17th Street Canal levee in New Orleans, where a 150 m long section of the levee and floodwall translated up to ∼16 m when flood waters rose to 1–2 m of the wall’s crest on August 29, 2005, during Hurricane Katrina. The subsurface conditions are characterized by discrete layers of fill placed upon the historic cypress swamp, which is underlain by a deeper, prehistoric cypress swamp. These swamp deposits were consolidated beneath the levee, and in the area of the 2005 failure, the swamp materials infilled a natural depression believed to be an old slough, which dipped below the sheetpile tips for a distance of about 50 m , which corresponds to where the breach appears to have initiated. Detailed examination of the recovered soils suggest that recent hurricanes periodically inundated the swamps with saline and/or brackish water, which cause a mass...
22 November 2011 in Groundwater
1 May 2011 in Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering
As a part of an earthquake hazard mapping program being undertaken by the U.S. Geological Survey in the St. Louis metropolitan area, surficial geologic mapping and subsurface geotechnical data have been compiled into a three-dimensional geographic information system (GIS). The potential for soil liquefaction was then spatially evaluated by using subsurface information from 562 boreholes for an assumed M7.5 earthquake emanating from the New Madrid Seismic Zone. Geotechnical data (standard penetration test N-values, overburden pressure, and depth-to-groundwater) and the scenario peak ground accelerations (PGA=0.1, 0.20, and 0.30 g) were applied to evaluate the factor of safety (FS) against earthquake-induced liquefaction. The liquefaction potential index (LPI) method was used in these evaluations because it allows for calculations of FS with depth for 10–25 discrete stratigraphic horizons overlying the bedrock across the St. Louis metropolitan area. LPI values were derived from the correlation between calc...
1 May 2008 in Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering
The system of flood protection surrounding New Orleans and its adjoining parishes prior to Hurricane Katrina evolved over a period of 280 years . The earliest drainage works sought to elevate the river’s natural levees and excavate drainage canals leading towards Bayou St. John, the only natural break across the Metairie-Gentilly distributary ridge. An extensive zone of Cypress Swamps occupied the levee flank depression between the ridge and Lake Pontchartrain. 58 km of drainage canals were excavated across the natural levee backslope and through the swamp depressions bordering the lake between 1833 and 1878. These canals sought to drain the lower portions of the city, which suffered periodic outbreaks of yellow fever, which killed more than 100,000 people during the 19th century. The city has not suffered flooding from the Mississippi River since 1895, most damaging floods having emanated from hurricane surge off of Lake Pontchartrain. Since 1559, 177 hurricanes have struck the Louisiana coastline. A sys...
18 March 2016 in Environmental Earth Sciences
1 August 2010 in Environmental & Engineering Geoscience
The Taum Sauk Pumped Storage Powerplant in Reynold County, Missouri (USA) was constructed between 1960 and 1963 to store water for generation during peak daytime power demands. The plant consists of a lower reservoir, which is sited along the East Fork of the Black River, and an upper reservoir, which is formed by a kidney-shaped rock-fill dike approximately 50 to 87 ft (15.2 to 26.5 m) high, capped by a 10-ft (3.05 m) concrete parapet wall set on crest that is 12 ft (3.66 m) wide. The Upper Reservoir held 4,600 acre-ft (5.67 billion liters) when filled. A variety of design/construction flaws, an instrumentation programming error, and human errors contributed to a catastrophic failure of the Upper Reservoir on December 14, 2005. Malfunctioning and improperly programmed and/or placed sensors failed to indicate that the reservoir was full and did not shut down the facility's remaining pump unit until water had been overflowing for 6 to 7 minutes. This overflow undermined the parapet wall and scoured the underlying embankment, leading to a complete failure within that time frame. The peak discharge from this outbreak flood was estimated to be 289,000 cfs (8,184 m3/s), obliterating most of Johnson Shut-ins State Park, where, miraculously, only five people were injured. The flood pulse was significantly mollified by capture within Lower Taum Sauk Reservoir, and the maximum discharge over the Lower Taum Sauk Dam was limited to just 1,600 cfs (45.3 m3/s), precluding any significant downstream damage.