Antonio Damasio

Antonio Damasio

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Antonio Damasio

Brain and Creativity Institute, University of Southern California

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

34Years (1993-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 January 2013 in Nature Reviews Neuroscience
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ADAntonio Damasio
Antonio Damasio
GCGil B. Carvalho
Gil B. Carvalho

12 May 2009 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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MIMary Helen Immordino-Yang
Mary Helen Immordino-Yang
AMAndrea McColl
Andrea McColl
HDHanna Damasio
Hanna Damasio
ADAntonio Damasio
Antonio Damasio
In an fMRI experiment, participants were exposed to narratives based on true stories designed to evoke admiration and compassion in 4 distinct categories: admiration for virtue (AV), admiration for skill (AS), compassion for social/psychological pain (CSP), and compassion for physical pain (CPP). The goal was to test hypotheses about recruitment of homeostatic, somatosensory, and consciousness-related neural systems during the processing of pain-related (compassion) and non-pain-related (admiration) social emotions along 2 dimensions: emotions about other peoples' social/psychological conditions (AV, CSP) and emotions about others' physical conditions (AS, CPP). Consistent with theoretical accounts, the experience of all 4 emotions engaged brain regions involved in interoceptive representation and homeostatic regulation, including anterior insula, anterior cingulate, hypothalamus, and mesencephalon. However, the study also revealed a previously undescribed pattern within the posteromedial cortices (the ensemble of precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, and retrosplenial region), an intriguing territory currently known for its involvement in the default mode of brain operation and in self-related/consciousness processes: emotions pertaining to social/psychological and physical situations engaged different networks aligned, respectively, with interoceptive and exteroceptive neural systems. Finally, within the anterior insula, activity correlated with AV and CSP peaked later and was more sustained than that associated with CPP. Our findings contribute insights on the functions of the posteromedial cortices and on the recruitment of the anterior insula in social emotions concerned with physical versus psychological pain.

1 April 2012 in Cerebral Cortex
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ADAntonio Damasio
Antonio Damasio
HDHanna Damasio
Hanna Damasio
DTDaniel Tranel
Daniel Tranel
It has been convincingly established, over the past decade, that the human insular cortices are involved in processing both body feelings (such as pain) and feelings of emotion. Recently, however, an interpretation of this finding has emerged suggesting that the insular cortices are the necessary and sufficient platform for human feelings, in effect, the sole neural source of feeling experiences. In this study, we investigate this proposal in a patient whose insular cortices were destroyed bilaterally as a result of Herpes simplex encephalitis. The fact that all aspects of feeling were intact indicates that the proposal is problematic. The signals used to assemble the neural substrates of feelings hail from different sectors of the body and are conveyed by neural and humoral pathways to complex and topographically organized nuclei of the brain stem, prior to being conveyed again to cerebral cortices in the somatosensory, insular, and cingulate regions. We suggest that the neural substrate of feeling states is to be found first subcortically and then secondarily repeated at cortical level. The subcortical level would ensure basic feeling states while the cortical level would largely relate feeling states to cognitive processes such as decision-making and imagination.

15 December 2020 in Cognitive Neuroscience
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ADAntonio Damasio
Antonio Damasio
Let me begin by thanking Doerig et al. for including my work in their survey of empirical theories of consciousness (although I am a bit spooked by being assigned the number 13!), especially given ...

24 March 2021 in BioEssays
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GCGil B. Carvalho
Gil B. Carvalho
ADAntonio Damasio
Antonio Damasio

17 February 2023 in Neural Computation
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ADAntonio Damasio
Antonio Damasio
HDHanna Damasio
Hanna Damasio
In this view, we address the problem of consciousness, and although we focus on its human presentation, we note that the phenomenon is present in numerous nonhuman species and use findings from a variety of animal studies to explain our hypothesis for how consciousness is made.Consciousness occurs when mind contents, such as perceptions and thoughts, are spontaneously identified as belonging to a specific organism/owner. Conscious minds are said to have a self that experiences mental events. We hypothesize that the automatic identification that associates minds and organisms is provided by a continuous flow of homeostatic feelings. Those feelings arise from the uninterrupted process of life regulation and correspond to both salient physiological fluctuations such as hunger, pain, well-being, or malaise, as well as to states closer to metabolic equilibrium and best described as feelings of life/existence, such as breathing or body temperature. We also hypothesize that homeostatic feelings were the inaugural phenomena of consciousness in biological evolution and venture that they were selected because the information they provided regarding the current state of life regulation conferred extraordinary advantages to the organisms so endowed. The “knowledge” carried by conscious homeostatic feelings provided “overt” guidance for life regulation, an advance over the covert regulation present in nonconscious organisms. Finally, we outline a mechanism for the generation of feelings based on a two-way interaction between interoceptive components of the nervous system and a particular set of nonneural components of the organism's interior, namely, viscera and circulating chemical molecules involved in their operations. Feelings emerge from this interaction as continuous and hybrid phenomena, related simultaneously to two series of events. The first is best described by the terms neural/representational/and mental and the second by the terms nonneural/visceral/and chemical. We note that this account offers a solution for the mind-body problem: homeostatic feelings constitute the “mental” version of bodily processes.