16 June 2011 in The Milbank Quarterly
1 May 2014 in Journal of Health Economics
10 December 2016 in The European Journal of Health Economics
State-of-the-art risk equalization models undercompensate some risk groups and overcompensate others, leaving systematic incentives for risk selection. A natural approach to reducing the under- or overcompensation for a particular group is enriching the risk equalization model with risk adjustor variables that indicate membership in that group. For some groups, however, appropriate risk adjustor variables may not (yet) be available. For these situations, this paper proposes an alternative approach to reducing under- or overcompensation: constraining the estimated coefficients of the risk equalization model such that the under- or overcompensation for a group of interest equals a fixed amount. We show that, compared to ordinary least-squares, constrained regressions can reduce under/overcompensation for some groups but increase under/overcompensation for others. In order to quantify this trade-off two fundamental questions need to be answered: “Which groups are relevant in terms of risk selection actions?” and “What is the relative importance of under- and overcompensation for these groups?” By making assumptions on these aspects we empirically evaluate a particular set of constraints using individual-level data from the Netherlands (N = 16.5 million). We find that the benefits of introducing constraints in terms of reduced under/overcompensations for some groups can be worth the costs in terms of increased under/overcompensations for others. Constrained regressions add a tool for developing risk equalization models that can improve the overall economic performance of health plan payment schemes.
1 December 2013 in Journal of Health Economics
1 June 2016 in Health Affairs
One of the most prominent features of the Affordable Care Act has been the promotion of individual health plans chosen by consumers in the Marketplaces. These plans are subject to regulation and paid by risk-adjusted capitation, a set of policies known as managed competition. Individual health insurance markets, however, are vulnerable to what economists describe as efficiency problems stemming from adverse selection, and Marketplaces are no exception. Health plans have incentives to discriminate against services used by people with certain chronic illnesses, including mental health conditions. Parity regulations, which dictate coverage for mental health benefits on par with medical and surgical benefits, can eliminate discrimination in coverage but redirect discrimination toward hard-to-regulate tactics from managed care such as restrictive network design and provider payment. This article reviews policy options to contend with ongoing selection issues. "Better enforcement" of parity has less chance of success than more fundamental but feasible changes in the way plans are paid or in the way competition among plans is structured.
1 October 2004 in American Journal of Public Health
Objectives. We used 1997 Medicare data to replicate an earlier study that used data from 1986 to examine racial differences in usage of specific medical procedures or tests among elderly persons. Methods. We used 1997 physician claims data to obtain a random sample of 5% of Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older. We used this sample to study 30 procedures and tests that were analyzed in the 1986 study, as well as several new procedures that became more widely used in the early 1990s. Results. Racial differences remain in the rates of use of these procedures; in general, Blacks have lower rates of use than do Whites. Between 1986 and 1997, the ratio of White to Black use moved in favor of Blacks for all but 4 of the established procedures studied. Conclusions. The White–Black gap in health care use under Medicare is narrowing.