1 August 2011 in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
In the literature related to the study of sport, the idea of phenomenology appears with various meanings. The aim of this paper is to sketch the nature, methods and central concepts of phenomenology, and thereby to distinguish philosophical phenomenology from its empirical applications. We shall begin by providing an overview of what we think phenomenology is and is not, by introducing the following points: we distinguish phenomenology from phenomenalism; the ontological from the ontic; transcendental subjectivity from subjectivity; phenomenology from phenomenography; and phenomenology from other kinds of empirical qualitative methodology. Next, we examine the two most important British studies to include overviews of phenomenological work in relation to sociology of sport. We then take a critical view of the work of one research paper that gives a particularly clear description of the method of ‘empirical phenomenology’. Throughout, we insist on the simple basics: that phenomenology is not simply the study of empirical phenomena, is not a form of subjectivism, is not about someone's personal experience or personal perspective, and that it is not to be confused with ‘qualitative research methods’. We further insist that, if a researcher wishes to use the name ‘phenomenology’ for his or her research, he or she should explain just what it is (about the method or the concepts, or the outcomes) that informs or results from the research programme, in order to justify the name.
3 May 2020 in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
This paper addresses some problems arising with respect to the male/female binary division that has traditionally been central to most sports. One strategy for dealing with this problem is to remove the binary and allow athletes of different sexes to compete together. Firstly, since there are different ways of ‘mixing’ athletes together, a distinction between two major kinds will be introduced: ‘mixed sports’ (sports with an allocated position for a number of males and females in a team, which retains the binary) and ‘unisex sports’ (sport participation of all athletes together based on merit, with no need to distinguish between sexes). Secondly, I shall offer a strategy for the modification of existing sports and the creation of new sports that would accommodate athletes of different sexes in ‘unisex sports’. This means paying attention to how sports are constructed and which abilities/skills they test. For unisex sports, two kinds of logic are suggested: ‘balance of abilities/skills logic’ proposes that we should seek a balance of what we presently understand as female and male (together with sex-neutral) abilities/skills to be included in the sporting challenge; whereas ‘complexity logic’ proposes the creation or modification of sports so as to test for a wider spectrum of abilities/skills.
12 July 2021 in European Journal of Sport Science
The aim of this paper is to examine the basis of eligibility rules in sport by exhibiting the logic of categorisation, with its associated ethical problems. We shall be concerned mainly with pre‐competition categories – age, sex, weight and dis/ability – because they are directly relevant to sports performance and are relatively stable inequalities. We shall prefer to use the term “categorisation”, although we mean by it just what others might mean by classification, to refer to divisions, classes, groups, etc. The paper argues that we have categories only because we consider it desirable to offer some groups protected status in order to enable and promote inclusion and fairness. This desirability condition determines eligibility. Only then do issues arise of which sub‐categories we should have, and how they are to be policed. There will always be categories in sport, as a minimum to protect athletes based on age groupings, from children to veterans. But since every categorisation brings its own problems, we need to ensure that we keep them balanced, so that sport can strive for maximum inclusion of different kinds of athletes, and maximum fairness. This requires us to step back from the many particular debates in order to rethink the logic of the whole categorisation process.
30 April 2015 in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
The gradual appearance and relative stabilisation of the names of different kinds of martial activities in different cultures and contexts has led to confusion and to an unhelpful and unjustifiable elision of meanings, which merges different modes of combat and other martial activities. To gain a clearer perspective on this area, we must enquire into the criteria according to which the various kinds of martial activities are (or should be) classified. Our assessment of the literature suggests that there is no satisfactory and well-justified overall cross-cultural account of the classification of martial activities. This paper provides a revisionary classification and offers an explanation and a justification of the five main categories identified: close combat, warrior arts, martial paths, martial arts and martial sports; as well as some minor ones, such as martial training, martial therapy, martial display, martial games and martial dance.
2 January 2022 in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
It is difficult to develop good arguments when the central terms of the discussion are unclear – as with the current confused state of sex and gender terminology. Sports organisations and sports researchers often talk in gender terms when they mean sex; or use the sex and gender vocabularies interchangeably. We propose the use of terminology that distinguishes sex from gender. Historically, sport has been based on sex, as seen in various sex verification procedures specifying female eligibility, based on the determination of sex by biological criteria. We think that this should be reflected in the vocabulary used for the two sport categories (‘male’ and ‘female’, not ‘women’ and ‘men’); and for referring to the binary as the sex binary (not the gender binary); and for calling the procedures sex verification (not gender verification).
18 June 2020 in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
Jane English, a pioneer in feminist sport philosophy, mentioned one simple idea that has received insufficient attention, but its consequences are of great importance for decreasing discrimination in sport. English suggested that female athletes should be allowed to ‘move up’ to the male category and compete against male athletes if they wished to. She drew this strategy from boxing, in which boxers in lower weight categories can choose to ‘move up’—to compete in a higher category (although this is not permitted in reverse—boxers cannot ‘move down’). This strategy could be used in other sports and for other categories, but it is not often chosen. It would suggest that talented athletes do not always need ‘category protection’—they do not need to be protected more than necessary, which raises the question of the justification of the category in the first place. On investigation, some justifications may have less to do with sport-rationality, than with reasons such as paternalism, ableism, ageism or sexism, or organizational reasons. I shall clarify the notion of ‘categories’ in sport, and distinguish four types of categories with respect to their openness: ‘open’ category, ‘semi-open’ category, ‘closed’ category, and ‘overlapping’ categories. This paper advocates the wider use of open and semi-open or at least overlapping categories (where possible), and it argues against the excessive use of closed categories—those made by prescribing set limits. The benefit is clear: athletes who are skilled enough to compete in the higher category should be allowed to ‘move up’, if they wish. With respect to sex/gender, this strategy would partly help to diminish the strength of the binary distinction, and so it can be considered a first and easy step towards a more integrated sport.