Cecilia Heyes
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Cecilia Heyes

University of Oxford

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2011 in Psychological Bulletin
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CHCecilia Heyes
Cecilia Heyes
"Automatic imitation" is a type of stimulus-response compatibility effect in which the topographical features of task-irrelevant action stimuli facilitate similar, and interfere with dissimilar, responses. This article reviews behavioral, neurophysiological, and neuroimaging research on automatic imitation, asking in what sense it is "automatic" and whether it is "imitation." This body of research reveals that automatic imitation is a covert form of imitation, distinct from spatial compatibility. It also indicates that, although automatic imitation is subject to input modulation by attentional processes, and output modulation by inhibitory processes, it is mediated by learned, long-term sensorimotor associations that cannot be altered directly by intentional processes. Automatic imitation provides an important tool for the investigation of the mirror neuron system, motor mimicry, and complex forms of imitation. It is a new behavioral phenomenon, comparable with the Stroop and Simon effects, providing strong evidence that even healthy adult humans are prone, in an unwilled and unreasoned way, to copy the actions of others.

29 April 2014 in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
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RCRichard Cook
Richard Cook
GBGeoffrey Bird
Geoffrey Bird
CCCaroline Catmur
Caroline Catmur
CPClare Press
Clare Press
CHCecilia Heyes
Cecilia Heyes
This article argues that mirror neurons originate in sensorimotor associative learning and therefore a new approach is needed to investigate their functions. Mirror neurons were discovered about 20 years ago in the monkey brain, and there is now evidence that they are also present in the human brain. The intriguing feature of many mirror neurons is that they fire not only when the animal is performing an action, such as grasping an object using a power grip, but also when the animal passively observes a similar action performed by another agent. It is widely believed that mirror neurons are a genetic adaptation for action understanding; that they were designed by evolution to fulfill a specific socio-cognitive function. In contrast, we argue that mirror neurons are forged by domain-general processes of associative learning in the course of individual development, and, although they may have psychological functions, they do not necessarily have a specific evolutionary purpose or adaptive function. The evidence supporting this view shows that (1) mirror neurons do not consistently encode action “goals”; (2) the contingency- and context-sensitive nature of associative learning explains the full range of mirror neuron properties; (3) human infants receive enough sensorimotor experience to support associative learning of mirror neurons (“wealth of the stimulus”); and (4) mirror neurons can be changed in radical ways by sensorimotor training. The associative account implies that reliable information about the function of mirror neurons can be obtained only by research based on developmental history, system-level theory, and careful experimentation.

1 March 2010 in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
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CHCecilia Heyes
Cecilia Heyes

20 June 2014 in Science
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CHCecilia M. Heyes
Cecilia M. Heyes
CFChris D. Frith
Chris D. Frith
Learning to read minds starts early: No parent needs reminding that children are born with a surprising set of abilities. But children still need many hours of guidance and instruction. Heyes and Frith review one particular social cognitive skill: reading the minds of others (or at least working out what other people are thinking and feeling). An unrefined capacity for “mind reading” is present in infants, but teaching is necessary to develop the full-blown capacity seen in adults. The authors draw parallels between learning to read and learning to read minds. Science , this issue p. 10.1126/science.1243091

1 January 2012 in Journal of Comparative Psychology
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CHCecilia Heyes
Cecilia Heyes
Research on social learning in animals has revealed a rich variety of cases where animals--from caddis fly larvae to chimpanzees--acquire biologically important information by observing the actions of others. A great deal is known about the adaptive functions of social learning, but very little about the cognitive mechanisms that make it possible. Even in the case of imitation, a type of social learning studied in both comparative psychology and cognitive science, there has been minimal contact between the two disciplines. Social learning has been isolated from cognitive science by two longstanding assumptions: that it depends on a set of special-purpose modules--cognitive adaptations for social living; and that these learning mechanisms are largely distinct from the processes mediating human social cognition. Recent research challenges these assumptions by showing that social learning covaries with asocial learning; occurs in solitary animals; and exhibits the same features in diverse species, including humans. Drawing on this evidence, I argue that social and asocial learning depend on the same basic learning mechanisms; these are adapted for the detection of predictive relationships in all natural domains; and they are associative mechanisms--processes that encode information for long-term storage by forging excitatory and inhibitory links between event representations. Thus, human and nonhuman social learning are continuous, and social learning is adaptively specialized--it becomes distinctively "social"--only when input mechanisms (perceptual, attentional, and motivational processes) are phylogenetically or ontogenetically tuned to other agents.

4 March 2014 in Perspectives on Psychological Science
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CHCecilia Heyes
Cecilia Heyes
The nativist view of mentalizing—the view that humans have an inherent capacity to think about the mental states of others—has been recently reinvigorated by reports that adults and infants automatically represent mental states—that they engage in implicit mentalizing. In this article, I take a close look at the strongest evidence of implicit mentalizing in adults, which suggests that people automatically represent what others see, intend, and believe. I argue that although these experiments have been ingeniously designed and carefully implemented, they do not provide evidence of implicit mentalizing because their results could be due instead to submentalizing—domain-general cognitive mechanisms that simulate the effects of mentalizing in social contexts. These include the processes that mediate involuntary attentional orienting, spatial coding of response locations, object-centered spatial coding of stimulus locations, retroactive interference, and distraction. If my analysis is correct, it suggests that the same domain-general processes can provide a fast and efficient alternative to mentalizing in everyday life, allowing people to navigate a wide range of social situations without thinking about mental states. Thus, submentalizing could be both a substrate and a substitute for mentalizing.