Luciano Fanti

Luciano Fanti

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Luciano Fanti

Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

22Years (2005-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 April 2017 in International Review of Economics
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LFLuciano Fanti
Luciano Fanti
DBDomenico Buccella
Domenico Buccella
This paper analyses the equilibrium outcomes in a duopoly market where firms follow corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviours under managerial delegation. It is shown that in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, both firms emerge as CSR-type, and the firms’ profitability (resp. the welfare of consumers and society) are beneficiated (resp. harmed) by the CSR behaviour. This result is in sharp contrast with the conventional result (established under non-managerial firms) that the higher the CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus, the lower (resp. higher) the firms’ profitability (resp. the consumer surplus and social welfare).

2 December 2016 in Journal of Industrial and Business Economics
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LFLuciano Fanti
Luciano Fanti
DBDomenico Buccella
Domenico Buccella
Using a simple Cournot duopoly model with differentiated products, this work studies the firms’ strategic choice of whether to adopt Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rules. The proposed game-theoretic approach shows that, depending on the degree of product differentiation and firms’ social concern, different equilibria arise: (1) all firms in the industry follow CSR rules, (2) all firms are profit-maximising (PM), (3) asymmetric equilibria are present (one CSR firm, one PM firm), and (4) multiple symmetric equilibria are present. Under Bertrand competition, universal PM is the unique equilibrium in which the social welfare is the least desirable: this implies that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, Bertrand may appear as welfare dominated by Cournot. This work can help to explain the widely observed phenomenon, in the real world, of different industries in which firms’ CSR behaviours are more or less commonly widespread.

23 May 2021 in Journal of Economics
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LFLuciano Fanti
Luciano Fanti
DBDomenico Buccella
Domenico Buccella
By analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms’ cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Pareto-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).

8 June 2013 in Journal of Population Economics
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LFLuciano Fanti
Luciano Fanti
Luca GoriLuca Gori
Luca Gori

9 May 2018 in International Review of Economics
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LFLuciano Fanti
Luciano Fanti
DBDomenico Buccella
Domenico Buccella
The present paper shows that, when firms compete in a non-cooperative way on the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in network industries, the conventional result of the prisoner’s dilemma structure of the game in standard industries—i.e. to have social concerns is the Nash equilibrium, but it is harmful for firms’ profits—vanishes and, for sufficiently intense network externalities, the equilibrium in which both firms have social concerns is more profitable than simple profit-seeking. Moreover, we show that—when firms cooperate in choosing the profit-maximising level of social concerns—a profit-maximising CSR level does exist, provided that network effects are sufficiently strong. Therefore, in network industries, firms may obtain higher profits engaging in—cooperatively as well as non-cooperatively—CSR activities, showing that firms’ social concerns may be motivated by the owners’ selfish behaviour. Finally, a counter-intuitive result as regards consumer’s surplus and social welfare is obtained: those are always higher under competitive than cooperative choice of CSR because the level of CSR activities is higher in the former case. However, given that firms gain their largest profits with the cooperative choice of CSR, a Pareto-superior outcome is not reached.

6 January 2013 in Journal of Population Economics
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LFLuciano Fanti
Luciano Fanti
Luca GoriLuca Gori
Luca Gori