Mathias Pessiglione

Mathias Pessiglione

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Mathias Pessiglione

Motivation, Brain & Behavior team, Paris Brain Institute, Sorbonne Université, Inserm, CNRS, Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, Paris, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 February 2012 in PLOS Biology
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Journal Article
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LSLiane Schmidt
Liane Schmidt
MLMaël Lebreton
Maël Lebreton
MCMarie-Laure Cléry-Melin
Marie-Laure Cléry-Melin
JDJean Daunizeau
Jean Daunizeau
MPMathias Pessiglione
Mathias Pessiglione
Mental and physical efforts, such as paying attention and lifting weights, have been shown to involve different brain systems. These cognitive and motor systems, respectively, include cortical networks (prefronto-parietal and precentral regions) as well as subregions of the dorsal basal ganglia (caudate and putamen). Both systems appeared sensitive to incentive motivation: their activity increases when we work for higher rewards. Another brain system, including the ventral prefrontal cortex and the ventral basal ganglia, has been implicated in encoding expected rewards. How this motivational system drives the cognitive and motor systems remains poorly understood. More specifically, it is unclear whether cognitive and motor systems can be driven by a common motivational center or if they are driven by distinct, dedicated motivational modules. To address this issue, we used functional MRI to scan healthy participants while performing a task in which incentive motivation, cognitive, and motor demands were varied independently. We reasoned that a common motivational node should (1) represent the reward expected from effort exertion, (2) correlate with the performance attained, and (3) switch effective connectivity between cognitive and motor regions depending on task demand. The ventral striatum fulfilled all three criteria and therefore qualified as a common motivational node capable of driving both cognitive and motor regions of the dorsal striatum. Thus, we suggest that the interaction between a common motivational system and the different task-specific systems underpinning behavioral performance might occur within the basal ganglia. Incentive motivation refers to the process in the brain by which we translate the expectation of a potential reward into the effort required to do an action, as for instance when the expected paycheck brings the employee to work. Different types of effort can be implemented in everyday life, some being more cognitive, like paying attention, and others more motor-involved, like lifting weights. Reward, cognitive, and motor representations are known to rely on distinct regions of the frontal cortex and basal ganglia. However, how expected rewards motivate these different types of efforts remains poorly understood. Here, we addressed this question by developing a functional neuroimaging approach where we independently varied a monetary reward as well as the cognitive and motor demand of the task. Our results suggest that the expectation of a reward is encoded in the ventral striatum, which can then drive either the motor or cognitive part of the dorsal striatum, depending on the task, in order to boost behavioral performance. We conclude that intra-striatal effective connectivity may explain how both motor and cognitive efforts can be driven by a single motivational module.

29 November 2017 in Brain
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Journal Article
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MPMathias Pessiglione
Mathias Pessiglione
FVFabien Vinckier
Fabien Vinckier
SBSébastien Bouret
Sébastien Bouret
JDJean Daunizeau
Jean Daunizeau
RBRaphaël Le Bouc
Raphaël Le Bouc
Motivation deficits, such as apathy, are pervasive in both neurological and psychiatric diseases. Even when they are not the core symptom, they reduce quality of life, compromise functional outcome and increase the burden for caregivers. They are currently assessed with clinical scales that do not give any mechanistic insight susceptible to guide therapeutic intervention. Here, we present another approach that consists of phenotyping the behaviour of patients in motivation tests, using computational models. These formal models impose a precise and operational definition of motivation that is embedded in decision theory. Motivation can be defined as the function that orients and activates the behaviour according to two attributes: a content (the goal) and a quantity (the goal value). Decision theory offers a way to quantify motivation, as the cost that patients would accept to endure in order to get the benefit of achieving their goal. We then review basic and clinical studies that have investigated the trade-off between the expected cost entailed by potential actions and the expected benefit associated with potential rewards. These studies have shown that the trade-off between effort and reward involves specific cortical, subcortical and neuromodulatory systems, such that it may be shifted in particular clinical conditions, and reinstated by appropriate treatments. Finally, we emphasize the promises of computational phenotyping for clinical purposes. Ideally, there would be a one-to-one mapping between specific neural components and distinct computational variables and processes of the decision model. Thus, fitting computational models to patients’ behaviour would allow inferring of the dysfunctional mechanism in both cognitive terms (e.g. hyposensitivity to reward) and neural terms (e.g. lack of dopamine). This computational approach may therefore not only give insight into the motivation deficit but also help personalize treatment.

1 August 2008 in Neuron
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Journal Article
Open access
MPMathias Pessiglione
Mathias Pessiglione
PPPredrag Petrovic
Predrag Petrovic
JDJean Daunizeau
Jean Daunizeau
SPStefano Palminteri
Stefano Palminteri
RDRaymond J. Dolan
Raymond J. Dolan
CFChris D. Frith
Chris D. Frith
How the brain uses success and failure to optimize future decisions is a long-standing question in neuroscience. One computational solution involves updating the values of context-action associations in proportion to a reward prediction error. Previous evidence suggests that such computations are expressed in the striatum and, as they are cognitively impenetrable, represent an unconscious learning mechanism. Here, we formally test this by studying instrumental conditioning in a situation where we masked contextual cues, such that they were not consciously perceived. Behavioral data showed that subjects nonetheless developed a significant propensity to choose cues associated with monetary rewards relative to punishments. Functional neuroimaging revealed that during conditioning cue values and prediction errors, generated from a computational model, both correlated with activity in ventral striatum. We conclude that, even without conscious processing of contextual cues, our brain can learn their reward value and use them to provide a bias on decision making.

19 November 2014 in The Journal of Neuroscience
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VSVasilisa Skvortsova
Vasilisa Skvortsova
SPStefano Palminteri
Stefano Palminteri
MPMathias Pessiglione
Mathias Pessiglione
The mechanisms of reward maximization have been extensively studied at both the computational and neural levels. By contrast, little is known about how the brain learns to choose the options that minimize action cost. In principle, the brain could have evolved a general mechanism that applies the same learning rule to the different dimensions of choice options. To test this hypothesis, we scanned healthy human volunteers while they performed a probabilistic instrumental learning task that varied in both the physical effort and the monetary outcome associated with choice options. Behavioral data showed that the same computational rule, using prediction errors to update expectations, could account for both reward maximization and effort minimization. However, these learning-related variables were encoded in partially dissociable brain areas. In line with previous findings, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was found to positively represent expected and actual rewards, regardless of effort. A separate network, encompassing the anterior insula, the dorsal anterior cingulate, and the posterior parietal cortex, correlated positively with expected and actual efforts. These findings suggest that the same computational rule is applied by distinct brain systems, depending on the choice dimension—cost or benefit—that has to be learned.

10 November 2009 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
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SPStefano Palminteri
Stefano Palminteri
MLMaël Lebreton
Maël Lebreton
YWYulia Worbe
Yulia Worbe
DGDavid Grabli
David Grabli
AHAndreas Hartmann
Andreas Hartmann
MPMathias Pessiglione
Mathias Pessiglione
Theories of instrumental learning aim to elucidate the mechanisms that integrate success and failure to improve future decisions. One computational solution consists of updating the value of choices in proportion to reward prediction errors, which are potentially encoded in dopamine signals. Accordingly, drugs that modulate dopamine transmission were shown to impact instrumental learning performance. However, whether these drugs act on conscious or subconscious learning processes remains unclear. To address this issue, we examined the effects of dopamine-related medications in a subliminal instrumental learning paradigm. To assess generality of dopamine implication, we tested both dopamine enhancers in Parkinson's disease (PD) and dopamine blockers in Tourette's syndrome (TS). During the task, patients had to learn from monetary outcomes the expected value of a risky choice. The different outcomes (rewards and punishments) were announced by visual cues, which were masked such that patients could not consciously perceive them. Boosting dopamine transmission in PD patients improved reward learning but worsened punishment avoidance. Conversely, blocking dopamine transmission in TS patients favored punishment avoidance but impaired reward seeking. These results thus extend previous findings in PD to subliminal situations and to another pathological condition, TS. More generally, they suggest that pharmacological manipulation of dopamine transmission can subconsciously drive us to either get more rewards or avoid more punishments.

10 August 2011 in PLOS ONE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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MCMarie-Laure Cléry-Melin
Marie-Laure Cléry-Melin
LSLiane Schmidt
Liane Schmidt
GLGilles Lafargue
Gilles Lafargue
NBNicolas Baup
Nicolas Baup
PFPhilippe Fossati
Philippe Fossati
MPMathias Pessiglione
Mathias Pessiglione
Depression is mainly characterized as an emotional disorder, associated with reduced approach behavior. It remains unclear whether the difficulty in energising behavior relates to abnormal emotional states or to a flattened response to potential rewards, as suggested by several neuroimaging studies. Here, we aimed to demonstrate a specific incentive motivation deficit in major depression, independent of patients' emotional state. We employed a behavioral paradigm designed to measure physical effort in response to both emotional modulation and incentive motivation. Patients did exert more effort following emotionally arousing pictures (whether positive or negative) but not for higher monetary incentives, contrary to healthy controls. These results show that emotional and motivational sources of effort production are dissociable in pathological conditions. In addition, patients' ratings of perceived effort increased for high incentives, whereas controls' ratings were decreased. Thus, depressed patients objectively behave as if they do not want to gain larger rewards, but subjectively feel that they try harder. We suggest that incentive motivation impairment is a core deficit of major depression, which may render everyday tasks abnormally effortful for patients.