World Health Organization (WHO), Regional Office for Africa, Liaison Office to the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
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Ambrose Talisuna
World Health Organization (WHO), Regional Office for Africa, Liaison Office to the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Introduction Estimating COVID-19 cumulative incidence in Africa remains problematic due to challenges in contact tracing, routine surveillance systems and laboratory testing capacities and strategies. We undertook a meta-analysis of population-based seroprevalence studies to estimate SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence in Africa to inform evidence-based decision making on public health and social measures (PHSM) and vaccine strategy. Methods We searched for seroprevalence studies conducted in Africa published 1 January 2020–30 December 2021 in Medline, Embase, Web of Science and Europe PMC (preprints), grey literature, media releases and early results from WHO Unity studies. All studies were screened, extracted, assessed for risk of bias and evaluated for alignment with the WHO Unity seroprevalence protocol. We conducted descriptive analyses of seroprevalence and meta-analysed seroprevalence differences by demographic groups, place and time. We estimated the extent of undetected infections by comparing seroprevalence and cumulative incidence of confirmed cases reported to WHO.PROSPERO: CRD42020183634. Results We identified 56 full texts or early results, reporting 153 distinct seroprevalence studies in Africa. Of these, 97 (63%) were low/moderate risk of bias studies. SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence rose from 3.0% (95% CI 1.0% to 9.2%) in April–June 2020 to 65.1% (95% CI 56.3% to 73.0%) in July–September 2021. The ratios of seroprevalence from infection to cumulative incidence of confirmed cases was large (overall: 100:1, ranging from 18:1 to 954:1) and steady over time. Seroprevalence was highly heterogeneous both within countries—urban versus rural (lower seroprevalence for rural geographic areas), children versus adults (children aged 0–9 years had the lowest seroprevalence)—and between countries and African subregions. Conclusion We report high seroprevalence in Africa suggesting greater population exposure to SARS-CoV-2 and potential protection against COVID-19 severe disease than indicated by surveillance data. As seroprevalence was heterogeneous, targeted PHSM and vaccination strategies need to be tailored to local epidemiological situations.
In 1998, the WHO African region adopted a strategy called Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR). Here, we present the current status of IDSR implementation; and provide some future perspectives for enhancing the IDSR strategy in Africa. In 2017, we used two data sources to compile information on the status of IDSR implementation: a pretested rapid assessment questionnaire sent out biannually to all countries and quarterly compilation of data for two IDSR key performance indicators (KPI). The first KPI measures country IDSR performance and the second KPI tracks the number of countries that the WHO secretariat supports to scale up IDSR. The KPI data for 2017 were compared with a retrospective baseline for 2014. By December 2017, 44 of 47 African countries (94%) were implementing IDSR. Of the 44 countries implementing IDSR, 40 (85%) had initiated IDSR training at subnational level; 32 (68%) had commenced community-based surveillance; 35 (74%) had event-based surveillance; 33 (70%) had electronic IDSR; and 32 (68%) had a weekly/monthly bulletin for sharing IDSR data. Thirty-two countries (68%) had achieved the timeliness and completeness threshold of at least 80% of the reporting units. However, only 12 countries (26%) had the desired target of at least 90% IDSR implementation coverage at the peripheral level. After 20 years of implementing IDSR, there are major achievements in the indicator-based surveillance systems. However, major gaps were identified in event-based surveillance. All African countries should enhance IDSR everywhere.
Background: Emerging and re-emerging diseases with pandemic potential continue to challenge fragile health systems in Africa, creating enormous human and economic toll. To provide evidence for the investment case for public health emergency preparedness, we analysed the spatial and temporal distribution of epidemics, disasters and other potential public health emergencies in the WHO African region between 2016 and 2018. Methods: We abstracted data from several sources, including: the WHO African Region’s weekly bulletins on epidemics and emergencies, the WHO-Disease Outbreak News (DON) and the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). Other sources were: the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED) and the Global Infectious Disease and Epidemiology Network (GIDEON). We included information on the time and location of the event, the number of cases and deaths and counter-checked the different data sources. Data analysis: We used bubble plots for temporal analysis and generated graphs and maps showing the frequency and distribution of each event. Based on the frequency of events, we categorised countries into three: Tier 1, 10 or more events, Tier 2, 5–9 events, and Tier 3, less than 5 or no event. Finally, we compared the event frequencies to a summary International Health Regulations (IHR) index generated from the IHR technical area scores of the 2018 annual reports. Results: Over 260 events were identified between 2016 and 2018. Forty-one countries (87%) had at least one epidemic between 2016 and 2018, and 21 of them (45%) had at least one epidemic annually. Twenty-two countries (47%) had disasters/humanitarian crises. Seven countries (the epicentres) experienced over 10 events and all of them had limited or developing IHR capacities. The top five causes of epidemics were: Cholera, Measles, Viral Haemorrhagic Diseases, Malaria and Meningitis. Conclusions: The frequent and widespread occurrence of epidemics and disasters in Africa is a clarion call for investing in preparedness. While strengthening preparedness should be guided by global frameworks, it is the responsibility of each government to finance country specific needs. We call upon all African countries to establish governance and predictable financing mechanisms for IHR implementation and to build resilient health systems everywhere.
The spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) has been unprecedented in its speed and effects. Interruption of its transmission to prevent widespread community transmission is critical because its effects go beyond the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths and affect the health system capacity to provide other essential services. Highlighting the implications of such a situation, the predictions presented here are derived using a Markov chain model, with the transition states and country specific probabilities derived based on currently available knowledge. A risk of exposure, and vulnerability index are used to make the probabilities country specific. The results predict a high risk of exposure in states of small size, together with Algeria, South Africa and Cameroon. Nigeria will have the largest number of infections, followed by Algeria and South Africa. Mauritania would have the fewest cases, followed by Seychelles and Eritrea. Per capita, Mauritius, Seychelles and Equatorial Guinea would have the highest proportion of their population affected, while Niger, Mauritania and Chad would have the lowest. Of the World Health Organization's 1 billion population in Africa, 22% (16%–26%) will be infected in the first year, with 37 (29 – 44) million symptomatic cases and 150 078 (82 735–189 579) deaths. There will be an estimated 4.6 (3.6–5.5) million COVID-19 hospitalisations, of which 139 521 (81 876–167 044) would be severe cases requiring oxygen, and 89 043 (52 253–106 599) critical cases requiring breathing support. The needed mitigation measures would significantly strain health system capacities, particularly for secondary and tertiary services, while many cases may pass undetected in primary care facilities due to weak diagnostic capacity and non-specific symptoms. The effect of avoiding widespread and sustained community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is significant, and most likely outweighs any costs of preventing such a scenario. Effective containment measures should be promoted in all countries to best manage the COVID-19 pandemic.
In December 2019, a new coronavirus, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) and associated disease, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), was identified in China. This virus spread quickly and in March, 2020, it was declared a pandemic. Scientists predicted the worst scenario to occur in Africa since it was the least developed of the continents in terms of human development index, lagged behind others in achievement of the United Nations sustainable development goals (SDGs), has inadequate resources for provision of social services, and has many fragile states. In addition, there were relatively few research reporting findings on COVID-19 in Africa. On the contrary, the more developed countries reported higher disease incidences and mortality rates. However, for Africa, the earlier predictions and modelling into COVID-19 incidence and mortality did not fit into the reality. Therefore, the main objective of this forum is to bring together infectious diseases and public health experts to give an overview of COVID-19 in Africa and share their thoughts and opinions on why Africa behaved the way it did. Furthermore, the experts highlight what needs to be done to support Africa to consolidate the status quo and overcome the negative effects of COVID-19 so as to accelerate attainment of the SDGs.
On 5 March 2020, South Africa recorded its first case of imported COVID-19. Since then, cases in South Africa have increased exponentially with significant community transmission. A multisectoral approach to containing and mitigating the spread of SARS-CoV-2 was instituted, led by the South African National Department of Health. A National COVID-19 Command Council was established to take government-wide decisions. An adapted World Health Organiszion (WHO) COVID-19 strategy for containing and mitigating the spread of the virus was implemented by the National Department of Health. The strategy included the creation of national and provincial incident management teams (IMTs), which comprised of a variety of work streams, namely, governance and leadership; medical supplies; port and environmental health; epidemiology and response; facility readiness and case management; emergency medical services; information systems; risk communication and community engagement; occupational health and safety and human resources. The following were the most salient lessons learnt between March and September 2020: strengthened command and control were achieved through both centralised and decentralised IMTs; swift evidenced-based decision-making from the highest political levels for instituting lockdowns to buy time to prepare the health system; the stringent lockdown enabled the health sector to increase its healthcare capacity. Despite these successes, the stringent lockdown measures resulted in economic hardship particularly for the most vulnerable sections of the population.