This monograph provides a critical overview and assessment of dakwahtainment or Islamic televangelism in post-reform Indonesia. Dakwah is an Indonesian word based on Arabic that means propagation of Islam - a religious duty for all Muslims. This monograph looks at what happens to Islamic propagation when, against the background of an increasingly materialist, consumerist, nihilistic and voyeuristic culture of celebrity that is engulfing Indonesia, it is turned into media entertainment. The monograph stems from an action research project on religion and gender in Indonesia, which was supported initially by the Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid and extended with support from the Faculty of Dakwah of the State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga and Globethics.net. It is written in a semiacademic style to make the research more accessible and comprehensible for readers.

29 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXIX, No.2, WINTER 2016 Minoritization & Criminalization of Shia Islam in Indonesia1 Dicky Sofjan2 Background Historically, Shia Islam has been around in the Nusantara3 —an archaic name for most of the territory under the colonial control of the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia)—for many centuries. Evidence suggests that vestiges of Shia influence extend to Muslim pockets throughout Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Southern Philippines. Unfortunately, historiography of the Shia Muslims in the country has been buried by grand, if not hegemonic, narratives about the arrival of Islam and its vast spread across the archipelago by the Wali Songo (Nine Saints) of Java, some of whom were more accepting and tolerant than others in their practice of infusing local Hindu-influenced customs, traditions and culture into Islamic dakwah (propagation). An example of such fusion is the familiar utilization of wayang (traditional Javanese shadow puppet) performances to spread the core messages of Islam. 1 The article is a product of a previous draft paper that was presented in the 32th American Council on the Study of Islamic Societies Conference at Villanova University, which was held on April 17-18, 2015. The initial thoughts and ideas for this work were presented in a workshop at the State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, on “Religious Diversity and Cultural Identity”. The workshop, held on November 22, 2013, was in collaboration with Georg-August-Universität Göttingen based in Germany. 2 The author is a Core Doctoral Faculty of the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS), located in the Graduate School of Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) based in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. In ICRS, Dr. Sofjan regularly teaches Religion and the Politics of Multiculturalism at the Ph.D. level. He can be contacted at: dickysofjan@ugm.ac.id or dickysofjan@yahoo.com. 3 The reference to “Shia Islam” (from Shi’atu Ali) may seem redundant to some and unfitting for others. The same argument could be made to the phrase “Sunni Islam” (from Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah). Both Shia and Sunni Islam are two official main schools of thought in Islam, according to the “Amman Message” drafted in November 2004, which attempted to unify Muslims from different creeds and madzhabs (schools of thought). For more, see its official website at: http://www.ammanmessage.com. Throughout this article, I will treat the words “Shia” and “Sunni” as both adjectives and pronouns. 30 It is therefore almost a truism to state that Shia Islam only came to the Indonesian shores in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran, which brought to center stage a medieval-looking, yet charismatic and idiosyncratic, long-bearded religious figure cloaked in black garb and turban. The clerical figure was the Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini or otherwise known by the Iranian masses as “Imam Khomeini”, who was known to have valiantly confronted Western powers for their penchant to gain hegemonic control over oil-rich Iran and the Middle East. Immediately after successfully dethroning the autocratic monarch, Shahanshah Muhammad Reza Pahlevi, Khomeini ardently called for the exportation of the Revolution to all corners of the world, while inciting the mustadh’afin (oppressed people) to rise up against the mustakbirin (oppressors).4 Unsurprisingly, Khomeini became an instant idol at the last quarter of the 20th century, who represented Muslim audacity against the ‘morally bankrupted West’. In his quarrel with the United States of America, Khomeini persistently labeled the most powerful state as Syaiton-e Bozorg (Great Satan). The revolutionary fervor was invariably followed by a rising expectation among the disheartened Muslim intellectuals and political activists, who perceived the victory of the Islamic Revolution not only as a cause celêbre, but also as a possible turning point for the stagnant and dormant ummah (Islamic world community) and the beginning of the end for Western secular civilization. In Indonesia, the Islamic Revolution of Iran immediately spawned discussions and debates in many circles, which brought Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and students in contact with Iranian Shia religious scholars and writers such as Murtadha Motahhari, Ali Syariati, Muhammad Hussein Thabathaba’i and obviously Khomeini himself. Many of their books...

The term “literacy” has been mostly applied in the context of language, mathematical and cultural abilities as a basic competency in life and social interaction. Thus, competence in reading, writing and math subjects as well as cultural training are perceived to be the definition of literacy found in many societies around the world. This article examines the concept and application of Indonesia’s “religious literacy” program as a multifaith site for mutual learning among religious communities. This program is expected to offer a mechanism to moderate the religious fervour that is currently engulfing the nation and become a buffer against radicalism. Based on collaboration between university-based academics and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the program strives to promote social justice, religious harmony and multiculturalism. The religious literacy program mainly targets the Ministry’s religious extension officers, religion teachers and representatives of various so-called “strategic groups” in six provinces in Indonesia. Findings suggest that the religious literacy program has helped the frontliners to get to know each other, share their tacit knowledge, insights and experiences, making the program into a multifaith site for mutual learning.

This paper examines religious pluralism discourse in post-Reformasi Indonesia. Though there is general consensus about the importance of maintaining inter-religious harmony, there are still various perspectives and arguments on the idealization of dealing with religious diversity in society. The differences are found not only between the advocates and opponents of religious pluralism but also among proponent groups of religious pluralism. This paper looks at how religious organizations for inter-religious harmony struggle for legitimating their religious pluralism ideals in society. In this context, this paper, by using Habermas’ theory of communicative action, focuses on the characteristics of their efforts to communicate with others in the public sphere. It examines inter-faith dialogue done by NGOs’ activities and arguments, focusing on their validity claims for justifying religious pluralism. This paper argues that some conceptions and presuppositions of this theory need to be critically assessed and modified in analyzing these NGOs’ discourse so that it can be appropriately applied to the Indonesian context in which religion has substantial power to influence people’s thoughts and behaviors. Particularly it will point out 1) the problem of universalized rationality, 2) power relation and strategic action, and 3) the role of religious reason in public discourse. [Artikel ini mengkaji diskursus pluralisme agama di era pasca-Reformasi Indonesia. Meski ada kesepakatan akan pentingnya membangun harmoni lintas agama, tapi pada tataran praktiknya masih ada pelbagai perspektif dan argumentasi dalam menyikapi keanekaragaman agama dalam masyarakat. Perbedaan ini tidak hanya ditemukan di kalangan mereka yang kontra, tapi juga di kalangan mereka yang pro pluralisme agama. Artikel ini bermaksud meneliti bagaimana organisasi agama yang memperjuangkan harmoni lintas agama berjuang memancang ide-ide ideal mereka terkait pluralisme agama di masyarakat. Dalam konteks ini, penelitian ini mengacu pada teori communicative action-nya Habermas dan fokus memantau karakteristik organisasi-organisasi tersebut dalam berinteraksi satu sama lain di ruang publik. Artikel ini bermaksud menguji sejauh mana dialog antar-agama dilakukan oleh organisasi-organisasi ini, terutama validitas klaim mereka dalam menjustifikasi pluralisme agama. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa konsepsi dan asumsi dari teori-teori tersebut perlu ditinjau ulang secara kritis untuk bisa diterapkan dalam konteks Indonesia, di mana agama masih memiliki kekuatan potensial untuk mempengaruhi pemikiran dan perilaku masyarakat. Secara khusus artikel ini akan membahas 1) problem rasionalitas universal, 2) relasi kuasa dan aksi strategis, serta 3) peran logika agama di ruang (diskursus) publik.

FPI is one among several Islamist Groups in Indonesia. Seeing through its fierce actions, people tend to judge FPI as radicals. Some political elites even classify it as terrorist. Despite the fact that it violates many rules, FPI claims to be a religious and pious one. The government disbanded FPI at the end of 2020 because of its numerous violent actions. However, it continues to get support from many Islamic communities. For some conservative Muslims, FPI actions are a sample of how Islamic teaching should be applied in daily life. Using qualitative research and narrative analysis, this paper explored the narrative of Sacred Text, especially the Quran and Hadith presented by FPI, on how it is managed, interpreted, and spread to the public. This paper also explored the possible errors FPI made in narrating sacred text. The results show FPI’s determination to interpret and narrate sacred text as a way to achieve a goal, without considering the views of other religious scholars and books that can better guide narrating and interpreting the Sacred Text.