NING DU

Dr. NING DU

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 June 2007 in International Journal of Forecasting
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NING DUNING DU
NING DU
DBDavid V. Budescu
David V. Budescu

6 April 2015 in Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
NING DUNING DU
NING DU
JRJoshua Ronen
Joshua Ronen
JYJianfang Ye
Jianfang Ye
This study investigates the role of Chinese auditors in preventing aggressive management financial reporting. We conduct two experiments to investigate auditors’ behaviors. The first experiment examines auditors’ awareness of earnings management (EM) attempts induced by the delisting rule. One hundred seventy-four Chinese auditors participated in the study. The evidence shows that auditors believe the use of the classification of investment transactions to avoid losses is appropriate. The second experiment investigates whether the bond (Guanxi) between managers and auditors may have contributed to auditors’ reluctance to mitigate delisting-motivated EM and whether increased regulatory enforcement may moderate this behavior. We find that Guanxi undermines auditors’ ability to correct EM. Specifically, when auditors have close bond (Guanxi) with managers, they are less likely to recommend adjustments; however, we find that increased penalty has a positive effect on auditors’ performance, as harsh penalties/sanctions enhance their willingness to challenge managers’ decisions.

15 December 2017 in Journal of Behavioral Finance
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Journal Article
Closed access
NING DUNING DU
NING DU
DBDavid V. Budescu
David V. Budescu
Extensive research has been devoted to the quality of analysts' earnings forecasts. The common finding is that analysts' forecasts are not very accurate. Prior studies have tended to focus on the mean of forecasts and measure accuracy using various summaries of forecast errors. The present study sheds new light on the accuracy of analysts' forecasts, by measuring how well calibrated these forecasts are. The authors follow the tradition of calibration studies in psychological literature and measure the degree of calibration by the hit rate. They analyze a year's worth of data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System database, which includes over 200,000 annual earnings forecasts made by over 6,000 analysts for over 5,000 companies. By using different ways to convert analysts' point estimates of earnings into a range of values, the authors establish the bounds that are necessary to determine the hit rates, and examine to what extent the actual earnings announced by the companies are bracketed by these intervals. These hit rates provide a more complete picture of the accuracy of the forecasts.

2 January 2014 in Journal of Behavioral Finance
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Journal Article
Closed access
NING DUNING DU
NING DU
MSMarjorie K. Shelley
Marjorie K. Shelley
Prior evidence suggests that managers and investors play an earnings game in which managers bias their earnings forecasts downward as the earnings announcement date approaches. Knowing managers’ incentives to provide biased guidance, investors still revise their expectations downward helping to create “positive earnings surprises.” Using a 2 (ambiguity) × 2 (familiarity) between subject randomized experimental design where MBA students playing the roles of manager and investor answer a series of questions related to earnings guidance, we investigate whether earnings environment ambiguity and manager-investor familiarity influence behavior during the “earnings game.” In general, results from this study suggest that ambiguity contributes to managers’ propensity to mislead and investors’ propensity to follow, and a false sense of familiarity may amplify investors’ reliance on managers’ guidance.

12 October 2012 in International Journal of Financial Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
NING DUNING DU
NING DU
SSSandra Shelton
Sandra Shelton
RWRay Whittington
Ray Whittington
Does Supplementing Outcome Feedback with Performance Feedback Improve Probability Judgments?

1 July 2019 in Behavioral Research in Accounting
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Journal Article
Closed access
NING DUNING DU
NING DU
MMMary P. Mindak
Mary P. Mindak
RWRay Whittington
Ray Whittington
JMJohn E. McEnroe
John E. McEnroe
The objective of this study is to provide additional evidence regarding the effect of ambiguity on auditors' and investors' judgments when they evaluate managers' disclosures about loss contingencies. Inspired by Nelson and Kinney (1997), we conducted an experiment where auditors and investors evaluate management's loss disclosures. We manipulate the probability of loss at three levels and the uncertainty about the ambiguity at two levels. Our results show that both auditors and investors appear to be aggressive toward financial reporting choices, and are less willing to recommend a loss contingency disclosure when there is ambiguity. Our results extend prior accounting literature and highlight the importance of understanding imprecise estimates in financial reporting. We found that auditors and investors reacted very similarly toward ambiguity in loss disclosures. This result may reflect a narrowing of the expectations gap around reporting accounting estimates and highlight the potential improvements in users' confidence in accountants.