Shuolei Xu

Dr. Shuolei Xu

Department of Business, Xi'an University of Finance and Economics, Xi'an, China
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 December 2019 in Journal of Economic Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
Fangjun WangFangjun Wang
Fangjun Wang
Shuolei XuShuolei Xu
Shuolei Xu
JSJunqin Sun
Junqin Sun
CCCharles P. Cullinan
Charles P. Cullinan

8 May 2022 in Australian Accounting Review
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Journal Article
Open access
Shuolei XuShuolei Xu
Shuolei Xu
Fangjun WangFangjun Wang
Fangjun Wang
CCCharles P. Cullinan
Charles P. Cullinan
NDnanyan dong
nanyan dong
Paying taxes to support the societies in which they operate is both a legal and ethical responsibility of business. Nevertheless, some companies work to avoid taxes, which could cause society to question the legitimacy of the organisation. Many companies provide reports on their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities; more transparent CSR reports may help to restore the legitimacy loss associated with tax avoidance. We investigate the relationship between tax avoidance and CSR report readability among Chinese companies. We find a positive relationship between corporate tax avoidance and the readability of CSR reports. This relation is weaker among state‐owned enterprises, which may have stronger pre‐existing legitimacy owing to their relationship with the state. The relationship is also weaker among companies in less developed regions of China, which have less developed institutions to monitor organisational legitimacy. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that CSR reporting represents an attempt to overcome legitimacy concerns arising from tax avoidance. Our findings indicate that tax avoidance and CSR reporting are alternative means of establishing legitimacy, rather than complementary reflections of an organisational culture that values (or devalues) CSR.

1 January 2021 in The Journal of Developing Areas
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
FWFangjun Wang
Fangjun Wang
Shuolei XuShuolei Xu
Shuolei Xu
CCCharles P. Cullinan
Charles P. Cullinan
JSJunqin Sun
Junqin Sun
We examine whether large shareholders (other than the largest shareholder) could constrain the influence of the largest shareholder by electing more independent directors to the board. Moreover, we assess whether this constraining ability is related to the size of other large shareholders' ownership position relative to the largest shareholder. Using a sample of 13,951 firm-year observations from the unique Chinese capital market between 2004 and 2014, our empirical results indicate that other large shareholders can elect a larger number of independent directors to the board when their share ownership increases. However, these other large shareholders have increased voting power on the board (through a larger percentage of independent directors) only if the largest shareholder owns less than 30% of the company's shares. When the largest shareholder owns less than 30% of the shares, we find that other shareholder constraints are associated with a larger number of independent directors, a larger percentage of independent directors on the board and a larger board size. In addition, board size partially mediates the relationship between other shareholder constraints and the percentage of independent directors. For companies in which the largest shareholder owns at least 30% of the shares, our results indicate that other shareholder constraints are associated with a higher number of independent directors and larger boards, but are not associated with the percentage of independent directors. Moreover, the increased board size fully mediates the relationship between other shareholder constrains and the percentage of independent directors. A larger number of independent directors, without an increase in the percentage of independent directors, suggests that the relationship between other shareholder constraints and the percentage of independent directors is mainly driven by the other shareholder constraints/board size relationship, rather than by an increased percentage of independent directors. Our results indicate that minority shareholders may have a voice on the board, but greater board voting power is more difficult for the minority shareholder to obtain.