In complex environments, many potential cues can guide a decision or be assigned responsibility for the outcome of the decision. We know little, however, about how humans and animals select relevant information sources that should guide behavior. We show that subjects solve this relevance selection and credit assignment problem by selecting one cue and its association with a particular outcome as the main focus of a hypothesis. To do this, we examined learning while using a task design that allowed us to estimate the focus of each subject's hypotheses on a trial-by-trial basis. When a prediction is confirmed by the outcome, then credit for the outcome is assigned to that cue rather than an alternative. Activity in medial frontal cortex is associated with the assignment of credit to the cue that is the main focus of the hypothesis. However, when the outcome disconfirms a prediction, the focus shifts between cues, and the credit for the outcome is assigned to an alternative cue. This process of reselection for credit assignment to an alternative cue is associated with lateral orbitofrontal cortex.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTLearners should infer which features of environments are predictive of significant events, such as rewards. This “credit assignment” problem is particularly challenging when any of several cues might be predictive. We show that human subjects solve the credit assignment problem by implicitly “hypothesizing” which cue is relevant for predicting subsequent outcomes, and then credit is assigned according to this hypothesis. This process is associated with a distinctive pattern of activity in a part of medial frontal cortex. By contrast, when unexpected outcomes occur, hypotheses are redirected toward alternative cues, and this process is associated with activity in lateral orbitofrontal cortex.
A core assumption often heard in public health discourse is that increasing trust in national political leaders is essential for securing public health compliance during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic (2019–ongoing). However, studies of national government trust are typically too coarse-grained to differentiate between trust in institutions versus more interpersonal trust in political leaders. Here, we present multiscale trust measurements for twelve countries and territories across the West, Oceania and East Asia. These trust results were used to identify which specific domains of government and social trust were most crucial for securing public health compliance (frequency of mask wearing and social distancing) and understanding the reasons for following health measures (belief in effectiveness of public health measures). Through the use of linear regression and structural equation modeling, our cross-cultural survey-based analysis (N = 3369 subjects) revealed that higher trust in national and local public health institutions was a universally consistent predictor of public health compliance, while trust in national political leaders was not predictive of compliance across cultures and geographical regions. Institutional trust was mediated by multiple types of transparency, including providing rationale, securing public feedback, and honestly expressing uncertainty. These results highlight the importance of distinguishing between components of government trust, to better understand which entities the public gives the most attention to during crises.
Humans tend to avoid mental effort. Previous studies have demonstrated this tendency using various demand-selection tasks; participants generally avoid options associated with higher cognitive demand. However, it remains unclear whether humans avoid mental effort adaptively in uncertain and nonstationary environments. If so, it also remains unclear what neural mechanisms underlie such learned avoidance and whether they remain the same regardless of cognitive-demand types. We addressed these issues by developing novel demand-selection tasks where associations between choice options and cognitive-demand levels change over time, with two variations using mental arithmetic and spatial reasoning problems (males/females: 29:4 and 18:2). Most participants showed avoidance, and their choices depended on the demand experienced on multiple preceding trials. We assumed that participants updated the expected cost of mental effort through experience, and fitted their choices by reinforcement learning models, comparing several possibilities. Model-based fMRI analyses revealed that activity in the dorsomedial and lateral frontal cortices was positively correlated with the trial-by-trial expected cost for the chosen option commonly across the different types of cognitive demand. Analyses also revealed a trend of negative correlation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. We further identified correlates of cost-prediction error at time of problem presentation or answering the problem, the latter of which partially overlapped with or were proximal to the correlates of expected cost at time of choice cue in the dorsomedial frontal cortex. These results suggest that humans adaptively learn to avoid mental effort, having neural mechanisms to represent expected cost and cost-prediction error, and the same mechanisms operate for various types of cognitive demand.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTIn daily life, humans encounter various cognitive demands and tend to avoid high-demand options. However, it remains unclear whether humans avoid mental effort adaptively under dynamically changing environments. If so, it also remains unclear what the underlying neural mechanisms are and whether they operate regardless of cognitive-demand types. To address these issues, we developed novel tasks where participants could learn to avoid high-demand options under uncertain and nonstationary environments. Through model-based fMRI analyses, we found regions whose activity was correlated with the expected mental effort cost, or cost-prediction error, regardless of demand type. These regions overlap, or are adjacent with each other, in the dorsomedial frontal cortex. This finding helps clarify the mechanisms for cognitive-demand avoidance, and provides empirical building blocks for the emerging computational theory of mental effort.
The dorsal and ventral parts of the lateral prefrontal cortex have been thought to play distinct roles in decision making. Although its dorsal part such as the frontal eye field (FEF) is shown to play roles in accumulation of sensory information during perceptual decision making, the role of the ventral prefrontal cortex (PFv) is not well-documented. Previous studies have suggested that the PFv is involved in selective attention to the task-relevant information and is associated with accuracy of the behavioral performance. It is unknown, however, whether the accumulation and selection processes are anatomically dissociated between the FEF and PFv. Here we show that, by using concurrent TMS and EEG recording, the short-latency (20 – 40 ms) TMS-evoked potentials after stimulation of the FEF change as a function of the time to behavioral response, whereas those after stimulation of the PFv change depending on whether the response is correct or not. The potentials after stimulation of either region did not show significant interaction between time to response and performance accuracy, suggesting dissociation between the processes subserved by the FEF and PFv networks. The results are consistent with the idea that the network involving the FEF plays a role in information accumulation, whereas the network involving the PFv plays a role in selecting task relevant information. In addition, stimulation of the FEF and PFv induced activation in common regions in the dorsolateral and medial frontal cortices, suggesting convergence of information processed in the two regions. Taken together, the results suggest dissociation between the FEF and PFv networks for their computational roles in perceptual decision making. The study also highlights the advantage of TMS-EEG technique in investigating the computational processes subserved by the neural network in the human brain with a high temporal resolution.
Biological and artificial intelligence (AI) are often defined by their capacity to achieve a hierarchy of short-term and long-term goals that require incorporating information over time and space at both local and global scales. More advanced forms of this capacity involve the adaptive modulation of integration across scales, which resolve computational inefficiency and explore-exploit dilemmas at the same time. Research in neuroscience and AI have both made progress towards understanding architectures that achieve this. Insight into biological computations come from phenomena such as decision inertia, habit formation, information search, risky choices and foraging. Across these domains, the brain is equipped with mechanisms (such as the dorsal anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) that can represent and modulate across scales, both with top-down control processes and by local to global consolidation as information progresses from sensory to prefrontal areas. Paralleling these biological architectures, progress in AI is marked by innovations in dynamic multiscale modulation, moving from recurrent and convolutional neural networks—with fixed scalings—to attention, transformers, dynamic convolutions, and consciousness priors—which modulate scale to input and increase scale breadth. The use and development of these multiscale innovations in robotic agents, game AI, and natural language processing (NLP) are pushing the boundaries of AI achievements. By juxtaposing biological and artificial intelligence, the present work underscores the critical importance of multiscale processing to general intelligence, as well as highlighting innovations and differences between the future of biological and artificial intelligence.