Stephan Hartmann

Prof. Stephan Hartmann

Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich, 80539 München, Germany
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Academic Career Length

32Years (1995-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 October 2010 in Erkenntnis
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Journal Article
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FDFoad Dizadji-Bahmani
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani
RFRoman Frigg
Roman Frigg
Stephan HartmannStephan Hartmann
Stephan Hartmann
We reconsider the Nagelian theory of reduction and argue that, contrary to a widely held view, it is the right analysis of intertheoretic reduction. The alleged difficulties of the theory either vanish upon closer inspection or turn out to be substantive philosophical questions rather than knock-down arguments.

21 October 1999
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Book Chapter
Closed access
Stephan HartmannStephan Hartmann
Stephan Hartmann
Models as Mediators - October 1999

1 June 2001 in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
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Journal Article
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Stephan HartmannStephan Hartmann
Stephan Hartmann

1 December 2018 in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
ARAlexander Reutlinger
Alexander Reutlinger
DHDominik Hangleiter
Dominik Hangleiter
Stephan HartmannStephan Hartmann
Stephan Hartmann
Toy models are highly idealized and extremely simple models. Although they are omnipresent across scientific disciplines, toy models are a surprisingly under-appreciated subject in the phil...

8 January 2004
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Book
Closed access
LBLuc Bovens
Luc Bovens
Stephan HartmannStephan Hartmann
Stephan Hartmann
Probabilistic models have much to offer to epistemology and philosophy of science. Arguably, the coherence theory of justification claims that the more coherent a set of propositions is, the more confident one ought to be in its content, ceteris paribus. An impossibility result shows that there cannot exist a coherence ordering. A coherence quasi-ordering can be constructed that respects this claim and is relevant to scientific-theory choice. Bayesian-Network models of the reliability of information sources are made applicable to Condorcet-style jury voting, Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda puzzle, the variety-of-evidence thesis, the Duhem–Quine thesis, and the informational value of testimony.

1 March 2015 in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
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RDRichard Dawid
Richard Dawid
Stephan HartmannStephan Hartmann
Stephan Hartmann
JSJan Sprenger
Jan Sprenger
Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning (which we call the ‘no alternatives argument’) is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis.