Four World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centres for Reference and Research on Influenza and one WHO Collaborating Centre for the Surveillance, Epidemiology and Control of Influenza (WHO CCs) tested 10,641 viruses collected by WHO-recognized National Influenza Centres between May 2013 and May 2014 to determine 50% inhibitory concentration (IC50) data for neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) oseltamivir, zanamivir, peramivir and laninamivir. In addition, neuraminidase (NA) sequence data, available from the WHO CCs and from sequence databases (n=3206), were screened for amino acid substitutions associated with reduced NAI susceptibility. Ninety-five per cent of the viruses tested by the WHO CCs were from three WHO regions: Western Pacific, the Americas and Europe. Approximately 2% (n=172) showed highly reduced inhibition (HRI) against at least one of the four NAIs, commonly oseltamivir, while 0.3% (n=32) showed reduced inhibition (RI). Those showing HRI were A(H1N1)pdm09 with NA H275Y (n=169), A(H3N2) with NA E119V (n=1), B/Victoria-lineage with NA E117G (n=1) and B/Yamagata-lineage with NA H273Y (n=1); amino acid position numbering is A subtype and B type specific. Although approximately 98% of circulating viruses tested during the 2013-2014 period were sensitive to all four NAIs, a large community cluster of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses with the NA H275Y substitution from patients with no previous exposure to antivirals was detected in Hokkaido, Japan. Significant numbers of A(H1N1)pdm09 NA H275Y viruses were also detected in China and the United States: phylogenetic analyses showed that the Chinese viruses were similar to those from Japan, while the United States viruses clustered separately from those of the Hokkaido outbreak, indicative of multiple resistance-emergence events. Consequently, global surveillance of influenza antiviral susceptibility should be continued from a public health perspective.

The novel low-pathogenic avian influenza A H7N9 viruses (LPAI H7N9 viruses) have been a threat to public health since their emergence in 2013 because of the high rates of mortality and morbidity that they cause. Recently, highly pathogenic variants of these avian influenza A H7N9 viruses (HPAI H7N9 viruses) have emerged and caused human infections and outbreaks among poultry in mainland China. However, it is still unclear how the HPAI H7N9 virus was generated and how it evolved and spread in China. Here, we show that the ancestor virus of the HPAI H7N9 viruses originated in the Yangtze River Delta region and spread southward to the Pearl River Delta region, possibly through live poultry trade. After introduction into the Pearl River Delta region, the origin LPAI H7N9 virus acquired four amino acid insertions in the hemagglutinin (HA) protein cleavage site and mutated into the HPAI H7N9 virus in late May 2016. Afterward, the HPAI H7N9 viruses further reassorted with LPAI H7N9 or H9N2 viruses locally and generated multiple different genotypes. As of 14 July 2017, the HPAI H7N9 viruses had spread from Guangdong Province to at least 12 other provinces. The rapid geographical expansion and genetic evolution of the HPAI H7N9 viruses pose a great challenge not only to public health but also to poultry production. Effective control measures, including enhanced surveillance, are therefore urgently needed. IMPORTANCE The LPAI H7N9 virus has caused five outbreak waves in humans and was recently reported to have mutated into highly pathogenic variants. It is unknown how the HPAI H7N9 virus originated, evolved, and disseminated in China. In this study, we comprehensively analyzed the sequences of HPAI H7N9 viruses from 28 human and 21 environmental samples covering eight provinces in China that were taken from November 2016 to June 2017. The results show that the ancestor virus of the HPAI H7N9 viruses originated in the Yangtze River Delta region. However, the insertion of four amino acids into the HA protein cleavage site of an LPAI H7N9 virus occurred in late May 2016 in the Pearl River Delta region. The mutated HPAI H7N9 virus further reassorted with LPAI H7N9 or H9N2 viruses that were cocirculating in poultry. Considering the rapid geographical expansion of the HPAI H7N9 viruses, effective control measures are urgently needed.

Poultry passport to pandemic: What conditions are required to nurture the seeds of a pandemic? The avian influenza virus H7N9 rarely spills over into humans, but when it does, mortality exceeds 30%, far in excess of that of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Chen et al . used whole-genome sequencing to investigate the contribution of rare mutations among poultry workers who can be exposed to high levels of H7N9. Multiple defective single-nucleotide variants in the myxovirus resistance Mx1 locus were prevalent in H7N9 patients. In vitro infection experiments and influenza polymerase activity assays showed that 14 of the 17 MxA protein variants had no antiviral activity. Thus, individuals with such genetic vulnerabilities, when exposed to high virus loads, may act as crucibles for transmission of virulent new influenza subtypes. —CA

Emergence of influenza viruses with reduced susceptibility to neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) is sporadic, often follows exposure to NAIs, but occasionally occurs in the absence of NAI pressure. The emergence and global spread in 2007/2008 of A(H1N1) influenza viruses showing clinical resistance to oseltamivir due to neuraminidase (NA) H275Y substitution, in the absence of drug pressure, warrants continued vigilance and monitoring for similar viruses. Four World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centres for Reference and Research on Influenza and one WHO Collaborating Centre for the Surveillance, Epidemiology and Control of Influenza (WHO CCs) tested 11,387 viruses collected by WHO-recognized National Influenza Centres (NIC) between May 2012 and May 2013 to determine 50% inhibitory concentration (IC50) data for oseltamivir, zanamivir, peramivir and laninamivir. The data were evaluated using normalized IC50 fold-changes rather than raw IC50 data. Nearly 90% of the 11,387 viruses were from three WHO regions: Western Pacific, the Americas and Europe. Only 0.2% (n=27) showed highly reduced inhibition (HRI) against at least one of the four NAIs, usually oseltamivir, while 0.3% (n=39) showed reduced inhibition (RI). NA sequence data, available from the WHO CCs and from sequence databases (n=3661), were screened for amino acid substitutions associated with reduced NAI susceptibility. Those showing HRI were A(H1N1)pdm09 with NA H275Y (n=18), A(H3N2) with NA E119V (n=3) or NA R292K (n=1) and B/Victoria-lineage with NA H273Y (n=2); amino acid position numbering is A subtype and B type specific. Overall, approximately 99% of circulating viruses tested during the 2012-2013 period were sensitive to all four NAIs. Consequently, these drugs remain an appropriate choice for the treatment and prophylaxis of influenza virus infections.

Human Infections with Influenza A(H5N6), China

Clade 2.3.4.4 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (H5Nx) have spread from Asia to other parts of the world. Since 2014, human infections with clade 2.3.4.4 highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 viruses have been continuously reported in China. To investigate the genesis of the virus, we analyzed 123 H5 or N6 environmental viruses sampled from live-poultry markets or farms from 2012 to 2015 in Mainland China. Our results indicated that clade 2.3.4.4 H5N2/N6/N8 viruses shared the same hemagglutinin gene as originated in early 2009. From 2012 to 2015, the genesis of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 viruses occurred via two independent pathways. Three major reassortant H5N6 viruses (reassortants A, B, and C) were generated. Internal genes of reassortant A and B viruses and reassortant C viruses derived from clade 2.3.2.1c H5N1 and H9N2 viruses, respectively. Many mammalian adaption mutations and antigenic variations were detected among the three reassortant viruses. Considering their wide circulation and dynamic reassortment in poultry, we highly recommend close monitoring of the viruses in poultry and humans. IMPORTANCE Since 2014, clade 2.3.4.4 highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5Nx) viruses have caused many outbreaks in both wild and domestic birds globally. Severe human cases with novel H5N6 viruses in this group were also reported in China in 2014 and 2015. To investigate the genesis of the genetic diversity of these H5N6 viruses, we sequenced 123 H5 or N6 environmental viruses sampled from 2012 to 2015 in China. Sequence analysis indicated that three major reassortants of these H5N6 viruses had been generated by two independent evolutionary pathways. The H5N6 reassortant viruses had been detected in most provinces of southern China and neighboring countries. Considering the mammalian adaption mutations and antigenic variation detected, the spread of these viruses should be monitored carefully due to their pandemic potential.