The relationship between climate, environment, and human mobility is complex as (im)mobility outcomes are influenced by multiple socioeconomic, political, and environmental factors. The current debate is focused on migration as an adaptation strategy in the face of climate change but largely ignores the immobility aspect, particularly in the Eastern Hindu Kush where mountain livelihoods are strongly dependent on local environmental conditions. In this study, we examine the interrelations between climate change and the environment as drivers of human mobility and immobility in the mountain communities of Lotkuh valley, Chitral, in north Pakistan. We employed a mixed methods approach grounded in migration theory to describe the relationship between climate change, environment, and (im)mobility outcomes. The study reveals that climate (im)mobilities are the outcome of a complex interplay between climate change, extreme events, and local livelihoods. The primary drivers of (im)mobility are socioeconomic factors. Forced displacement is driven by a multitude of extreme events in the area. Three critical aspects of livelihoods—land resources, crop productivity, and livestock farming—are identified as significant factors influencing mobility and immobility outcomes. Recurring extreme events such as floods and landslides exacerbate soil erosion and the loss of fertile farmlands, leading to food insecurity and compelling households to resort to labor migration as an adaptation strategy. Conversely, for households facing severe income stress and depleted economic assets, immobility becomes the only viable option due to insufficient resources for migration. Moreover, the study reveals that some households adopt a mixed strategy by sending select members to other areas while others remain in their places of origin to sustain their livelihoods. The study has implications for policymakers, government, and development organizations in the region suggesting sustainable livelihoods and adaptation measures to address the specific challenges faced by mountain communities in the Lotkuh valley and the wider region.
Externalized “migration management” in West Africa involves different infrastructures of monitoring, control, and blockage of mobility. By taking the Kantchari/Makalondi borderland between Burkina Faso and Niger as a case, we study infrastructures that condition (im)mobility. We analyze infrastructures that both support migrant mobility and serve the European idea of keeping Africans in their place, but also analyze how these infrastructures are subverted, challenged, and used by the ones who are supposed to be immobilized by them in order to remain mobile. Hence, we develop a relational view of the infrastructure of (im)mobilities as a dynamic network of social organization, economic order, and technological integration.
The article examines how communities in the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin manage security and cooperation after the weakening of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the rise of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Using interviews, observations, and social network analysis, the study reveals that, in the absence of strong state or regional authority, local actors—such as chiefs, market women, religious leaders, and youth groups—develop their hybrid systems for resolving disputes, ensuring security, and managing cross-border trade. While these informal and locally rooted arrangements often fill gaps left by formal institutions and can be effective and innovative, they also have serious limitations. They may exclude outsiders, reinforce old hierarchies, and sometimes escalate tensions or insecurity. Digital tools like WhatsApp are increasingly important, but access is unequal. The article argues that real regional integration and security depend on recognizing and supporting these local practices, while also addressing their shortcomings and not just relying on top-down solutions from organizations like ECOWAS. The experience of these borderlands challenges traditional ideas about borders and governance, showing that both resilience and vulnerability coexist in complex ways.
1 January 2025 in Review of African Political Economy
Countries in the global South are engaging and building strong relationships with powerful global organisations and big tech corporations, based on a profitable digital cooperation. This article explains this emerging trend using the concept of biometric coloniality of power, to show how techno-capitalist biometric identification interventions in the new biometric states in the global South replicate colonial relations of dominance. It draws on Nigeria’s experience to illustrate the utilisation of social hierarchies and biometric categories in the state-sponsored exclusion and disempowerment of the most vulnerable groups. The article argues that the rise of biometric states is associated with the political instrumentalisation of personal data, resulting in social conflict. Digital subjects confront and negotiate a deeply imbricated biometric power structure through which biometric policing, fraud, exclusion, surveillance, the breach of personal data privacy and other concrete materialisations of biometric authoritarianism are institutionalised. The article concludes that biometric states are complicit in multinational corporations’ monopolistic siege of Africa’s digital market, which allows for the unrestricted capture of digital data through ongoing digital commodification and dispossession.