How do changes in Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) scores influence banks’ systemic risk contribution? Using a dynamic panel model, we document a beneficial impact of the ESG Combined Score and Governance pillar on banks’ contribution to system-wide distress analysing a panel of 367 publicly listed banks from 47 countries over the period 2007–2020. Stakeholder theory and theory relating social performance to expected returns in which enhanced investments in corporate social responsibility mitigate bank-specific risks explain our findings. However, only better corporate governance represents a tool in reducing bank interconnectedness and maintaining financial stability. The results are robust to alternative measures of systemic risk, both contribution and exposure, as well as when estimating a static model. Our findings stress the importance of integrating banks’ ESG disclosure into regulatory authorities’ supervisory mechanisms as qualitative information.

In this paper, we assess the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in controlling short- and long-term credit growth. Using a sample of 414 banks located in 61 countries, we document that macroprudential policies manifest a stabilizing effect in the short run, reducing credit growth, with borrower-targeted macroprudential policies being the most effective in taming credit developments. However, in the long-term tight macroprudential policies enhance credit growth. In this case, country-level analysis shows that financial institution-targeted macroprudential policy is more effective than the instruments that target borrowers, whereas at the bank-level the opposite is true. In addition, using a difference-in-difference approach, we emphasize that there is heterogeneity in the relationship among macroprudential policy and credit growth across different types of countries, banking systems, policy regimes and banks. Our findings stress the importance of macroprudential instruments in limiting excessive lending, most notably borrower-based tools.

This paper examines cyclical behaviour of banks’ systemic risk contribution and exposure. Using a panel of 787 banks from country members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the European Union covering the period 2000–2017, we document that both systemic risk contribution and exposure are positively related to business cycle. Systemic risk starts to accumulate in the financial sector during periods of boom when the output gap is positive. Furthermore, during periods of robust economic growth, the level of credit tends to increase dramatically, going hand in hand with asset and property prices developments. We also find that contribution and exposure to system-wide distress move procyclically during credit and house cycles, meaning that during upturns in credit and house cycles bank interconnectedness increases, but tend to fall during the downturns. However, individual risk of the banks evolves countercyclically during business and financial cycles.

In this article, we examine the non‐linear relationship between the number of fiscal rules in place and compliance with the European Union's (EU) numerical fiscal targets included in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Using a sample composed of 27 EU Member States for a period spanning 2000 to 2021, we document that countries' compliance with fiscal rules is positively associated with the number of numerical fiscal targets. However, this association only holds up to a specific threshold. Once this threshold is achieved, the relationship becomes negative, implying that the multiplication of numerical fiscal rules may undermine compliance, thereby reducing their effectiveness. In addition, we find that general elections and frequent changes in government reduce compliance, whereas economic adjustment programmes contribute positively to countries' compliance with fiscal targets. The findings bear critical policy implications against the backdrop of the current review of the European fiscal framework.