We consider a contract-farming supply chain with multiple farmers and an agro-dealer, where farmers are risk-averse and they invest in green technologies. To hedge the risk of yield uncertainty, farmers can purchase agricultural yield insurance. We build a Stackelberg game model to investigate the optimal decisions of farmers and the agro-dealer. The results show that agricultural competition, yield uncertainty, and farmers’ risk aversion have negative impacts on the farm size and the agrochemical reduction technology input, while the yield insurance has positive impacts. We also show that, for farmers with low initial agrochemical input, yield insurance can reduce the agrochemical inputs per acre, and the total agrochemical inputs despite that the farm size increases. Therefore, yield insurance can reduce agricultural pollution emissions. Despite the result of higher social welfare, more agricultural competition generates higher agricultural pollution emissions because farmers would have no incentive to invest more in green technologies. Furthermore, yield insurance enhances the social welfare if the environmental damage of agrochemicals is low. However, when the environmental damage of agrochemicals is high, the social welfare decreases under the yield insurance.

The game models were used to study the mechanism of coal-electricity price conflict under conditions of double price regulations of coal and electricity. Based on this, the peak shaving reserve mechanism was designed to probe into the countermeasures against the coal-electricity price conflicts. The study revealed that in the boom seasons of coal demand, the initiatives of the coal enterprises to supply thermal coal and the electricity enterprises to order thermal coal are reduced under conditions of double price regulations. However, under the circumstances of coal price marketization, in the boom seasons of coal demand the thermal coal price may go up obviously, the initiatives of the coal enterprises to supply thermal coal are increased, and meanwhile the initiatives of the power enterprises to order thermal coal are decreased dramatically. The transportation capacity constraint of coal supply leads to the evident decrease of the initiatives of coal enterprises for the thermal coal supply. The mechanism of peak shaving reserve of thermal coal may not only reduce the price of coal market but also increase the enthusiasm of the power enterprises to order more thermal coal and the initiatives of the coal enterprises to supply more thermal coal.

We consider a capital-constrained contract-farming supply chain with a risk-averse farmer and a risk-neutral agro-dealer, where the farmer faces some yield uncertainty that can be covered by insurance. Using the Stackelberg model, we derive the optimal strategies on the insured level, production and wholesale price. The result shows that farmers with low risk aversion tend not to be insured, while those with high risk aversion tend to insure. Further analysis indicates that, as the degree of the farmer’s risk aversion increases, the farm size decreases, but the yield per unit area and the wholesale price of the agricultural product increases. In addition, yield insurance and premium subsidies can lead to a decrease of the yield per unit area. However, the expansion of the farm size can compensate for the inhibitory effect of the decrease of yield per unit area on the total yield, and thus the total yield increases. We also find that when the premium subsidy rate is low, the yield insurance’s value to farmers is negative. Moreover, the yield insurance’s value to farmers increases with respect to the bank’s interest rate.