Explanations of Russia's foreign energy policy typically focus on major events, such as the gas conflicts with Ukraine, and argue that these events represent simplistic patterns of behavior, reflecting the policy-makers’ emphasis on politics, commercial gain, corruption, or ad hoc opportunism. This analysis goes beyond these explanations to argue that the Russian leadership pursues a rational set of political and economic goals in its foreign energy policy, but that it is constrained in its efforts by the set of tools available to it. To understand the resulting patterns of behavior, it is necessary to devote more analytical attention to Russia's foreign policy tools and their limits. The article draws on a new dataset of Russia's policy tools in 31 energy conflicts with 20 countries from 2000 to 2010. These conflicts are defining moments in Russia's foreign policy because they put to the test the toolkit that Russia has assembled to impose its will on a counterpart. The study finds increased use of transit pipelines, generally decreased use of subsidies and persistent use of efforts to purchase assets in foreign countries, cutoff pipeline supplies, and attempts to use energy to achieve specific political goals. By emphasizing the tools that Russian policy-makers use to conduct policies, the article provides a more nuanced analysis of the capacity and limits of Russian foreign energy policy than is currently available.

Russian big business is converting its economic resources into political power at the regional level.

Despite the rise of the Internet, state-dominated media—especially television—remain a crucial tool for regime control in authoritarian societies. Governments in China and Russia are the forefront of the state media model, but such systems dominate in countries as diverse as Azerbaijan, Iran, Rwanda, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. To achieve dominance state media seek to influence four audiences: regime coalition elites; the populace at large; Internet users; and the opposition and civil society. The authoritarian media strategy is not designed to block everything, but instead is aimed at obstructing news about politics or other sensitive issues from consistently reaching key audiences. The Internet may offer a freer alternative to state-dominated media, but the Internet's fragmented character makes it a poor match for the disciplined messaging of authoritarian regimes that have a single-minded focus on self-preservation.

Corruption is one of the key problems facing the Russian state as it seeks to evolve out of its socialist past. Naturally, regional patterns of corruption exist across a country as large and diverse as the Russian Federation. To explain these variations, the authors analyze 2002 data from Transparency International and the Information for Democracy Foundation that provide the first effort to measure differences in the incidence of corruption across forty Russian regions. They find that corruption in Russia is fueled by the size of government and by the level of development. Within each region, the amount of corruption increases as the number of bureaucrats grows and gross regional product per capita decreases. Russian policymakers can therefore work to reduce corruption by effectively reforming or scaling back bureaucracies and by encouraging economic development outside of the key centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's “News of the Week” show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict – World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the “fascist” and anti-American frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a “television party” and an “Internet party” in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other.

Many countries now operate state-funded international broadcasters, communicating directly with foreign publics to promote a variety of foreign policy goals. RT (formerly known as Russia Today) is currently one of the most prominent broadcasters in a crowded field. What is RT’s strategy, the size of its audience, and the effectiveness of its broadcasts in implementing its strategy? To answer these questions, we explore a case study of RT’s YouTube programming utilizing a new dataset of 70,220 video titles spanning the 2 years from February 2015 through January 2017. RT’s three-prong strategy focuses attention on strategic groups outside the West, including Arabic, Russian, and Spanish speakers, circumvents local media in target countries to promote Kremlin aims, and spreads a positive image of Russian accomplishments, particularly in Syria, which it considers a foreign policy success. The data presented here show that RT’s strategy is only partially successful since it underperforms among Arabic speakers, its main target, while doing relatively better among Russian, global English, and Spanish audiences.