Although there is ample evidence that stock markets react negatively to unethical corporate behavior, our understanding of the mechanisms that shape variation in these reactions across different incidents of misconduct remains underdeveloped. We propose and test a framework for explaining this variation by focusing on the role of the media in disseminating initial information about misconduct. We argue that the signaling effects of this information are important for investors because corporations have strong incentives to limit the information they disclose about misconduct. More specifically, we hypothesize that investors are more likely to react negatively when the media presents clear and credible information that misconduct occurred, that the firm was responsible for it, and that the misconduct was the result of deeper organizational problems. We also predict that information which signals that a firm has restorative capacity tempers investor reactions when the media places blame for misconduct on the corporation rather than specific individuals. We test our hypotheses in a unique sample of 345 acts of corporate misconduct in five European countries. Our findings provide broad support for our hypotheses, and we discuss implications for research on corporate misconduct and the role of non-state actors in regulating unethical corporate behavior.
Aggressive tax planning has become a sustainability problem, as governments have to cope with less tax revenue, which is crucial for investments in sustainable development goals. The OECD and the EU authorities have taken several initiatives against aggressive tax planning, such as the Action Plan against BEPS. However, these initiatives lack effectiveness, and aggressive tax planning is still omnipresent. We analyze the fight against aggressive corporate tax planning from a Real Option Theory perspective, in order to find an explanation for the difficult shift of companies’ aggressive tax planning strategies to more sustainable tax behavior. The Real Option Theory shows that, as long as the option to ‘delay’ the investment in sustainable tax behavior has too much value because the benefits of such investment are uncertain, companies will wait. Based on this new understanding, we suggest additional public policy interventions against aggressive tax planning. These interventions aim directly at reducing this real option value (of waiting).